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ABSTRACT 
Friendship played an outsized role in ancient political thought in comparison to medieval and 
modern political philosophies.  Most modern scholarship has paid relatively little attention to the 
role of friendship in ancient political philosophy. Recently, however, scholars are increasingly 
beginning to investigate classical conceptions of friendship.  My dissertation joins this growing 
interest by examining the importance of friendship in the political thought of Socrates and 
Aristotle.  Specifically, I analyze the divergent approaches that Socrates and Aristotle take to 
politics and trace these distinct approaches to their differing conceptions of friendship.  Through 
an examination of two Platonic dialogues—the Lysis and the Gorgias—I make the case that 
Socrates has a largely negative conception of friendship, according to which all friendships are 
based upon a metaphysical lack or need.  This negative understanding of friendship causes him 
to adopt a negative, abstentious approach to politics.  In contrast, in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle presents a conception of friendship that is based not upon deficiency and need, but 
instead upon the mutual recognition of each other’s complementary virtues.  Aristotle’s positive 
account of friendship ensures that he does not take a negative, abstentious approach to politics, 
but instead seeks to use his philosophic insight to impact politics and orient it toward the good.
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INTRODUCTION.   POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND FRIENDSHIP 
Friendship and Politics 
The topic of friendship has recently seen a resurgence of scholarly interest.  No less than eight 
monographs in the past few years have been devoted to this topic, and a fair number of such 
recent publications make recourse to the writings on friendship that date from classical antiquity 
to help further their own inquiries into the concept of friendship.1  Interestingly, while political 
philosophers of antiquity, such as Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero all discuss the concept of 
friendship in detail, it fell out of favor as a source of inquiry with the coming of the Christian era.  
Lorraine Smith Pangle argues that Christianity’s call to “devote one’s heart as completely as 
possible to God, and to regard all men as brothers” may be the cause of this eclipse.2  According 
to Pangle, this new conception of the way social relations ought to be ordered “made the 
existence of private, exclusive, and passionate attachments to individual human beings seem 
inherently questionable,” unless ordered toward marriage and family life.3  Through much of the 
Middle Ages, friendship seems to have been less important as a topic of inquiry than it had been 
                                                 
1 See, P.E. Digeser, Friendship Reconsidered: What it Means and How it Matters to Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2016); Alexander Nehamas, On Friendship (New York: Basic Books, 2016) Ann Ward, 
Contemplating Friendship in Aristotle’s Ethics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016); Filippa 
Modesto, Dante’s Idea of Friendship: The Transformation of a Classical Concept (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2015); Gregg Lambert, Philosophy After Friendship: Deleuze’s’ Conceptual Personae (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2017); Seow Hon Tan, Justice as Friendship: A Theory of Law, (New York: 
Routledge, 2015); John von Heyking, The Form of Politics: Aristotle and Plato on Friendship (Montreal: McGill-
Queens University Press, 2016);  Alicia J. Batten, Friendship and Benefaction in James (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2017). 
2 Lorraine Smith Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 2. 
 
3 Ibid.; Cf., David Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) esp. 
156–167; But see, Constant J. Mews and Neville Chiavaroli, “The Latin West” in Friendship: A History, ed. 
Barbara Caine (New York: Routledge, 2014) 73, who argue that while there was a profound shift in the 
understanding of friendship from the Classical period to the  Medieval period, “classical traditions of friendship 
never completely disappeared.” 
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during the classical period.  Though it enjoyed a mild resurgence in the Renaissance era in the 
writings of Michel de Montaigne and Francis Bacon, after the Enlightenment, it again fell into 
desuetude.4  
 This history may go some way to explaining the resurgence of interest in friendship.  If 
Christianity is responsible for channeling the love of friendship into marriage, it may be that the 
recent breakdown of the family goes some way to explaining the renewed interest in friendship: 
as the social unit in which individuals found completion begins to break down, people may begin 
looking to friendship elsewhere to fulfill that lacuna.  Alternatively, it may be that people are 
responding to the inability of social contract theories to explain deep commitments. Perhaps as 
abstract rights and duties begin to be perceived as no longer capable of providing a solid 
foundation for politics, people are turning to friendship to afford this foundation.5  Whatever the 
reason, friendship has long been perceived as holding out the possibility of providing completion 
to man.6  To what extent can friendship provide an antidote to what seems to be a prevailing 
sense of anomie and isolation in our society?  Should friendship figure more prominently in our 
political life?  Was the eclipse of friendship as a basis of political order a salutary development 
or a problematic one? 
                                                 
4 Montaigne, “Of Friendship,” in The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Donald Frame (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1976); Francis Bacon, “Of Friendship,” in Francis Bacon: Essays and New Atlantis (New York: 
Walter J. Black, 1942).  Pangle writes that “the devaluation of friendship is the result of a decisive new tun in 
philosophy that occurred in the years immediately after the publications of Montaigne’s and Bacon’s essays…. For 
it was early in the next century that Thomas Hobbes began to develop his powerful reinterpretation of human nature 
as directed neither to friendship nor to virtue” Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship, 3. 
 
5 Ruth Abbey, “Review Essay: On Friendship.” Review of Politics 79 no. 4 (2017): 695–707. 
 
6 See for example, Aristophanes’ speech in the Symposium (Sym. 189a2–193d6). 
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 The purpose of this dissertation is to enter into the discussion surrounding the above 
questions through an analysis of Plato’s Lysis and Gorgias, as well as books VIII and IX of 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  Both Socrates and Aristotle inquire into the character of 
friendship, its relation to politics, and what our stance toward it ought to be, and for the most 
part, both wrestle with the same questions and themes.  Indeed, Aristotle’s indebtedness to 
Socrates in Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics is evident, as he develops many of the 
themes articulated in the Lysis.  Despite the different conclusions that Socrates and Aristotle 
reach, both provide invaluable insights into the extent to which friendship should inform our 
political life.   
 
The City and the Philosopher 
Socrates’ death at the hands of his political community, famously recounted in Plato’s Apology, 
illustrates the inherent tension that seems to exist between the philosopher’s devotion to a life of 
contemplation and the political community.  Socrates’ famous assertion that “the unexamined 
life is not worth living” generates criticism both among the Athenian political elite, and among 
the poets, who point out that his life of constant inquiry calls into question the conventional 
practices of Athens (Apol. 38a6–7).  The tension between philosophy and the polis pervades 
much of subsequent philosophy, with the result that many political philosophers since Socrates—
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particularly in the modern era—have recognized this tension and sought to reduce it in various 
ways.7  
 This theme of the tension between philosophy and politics pervades Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics as well—albeit in a nuanced form—and has recently been the focus of a 
renewed interest in Aristotle’s Ethics.8  However, in contrast to Socrates, Aristotle makes his 
peace with politics.  Not only does Aristotle devote an entire treatise—the Politics—to the 
different possible regimes and the manner in which such regimes might be improved, but he also 
famously collected constitutions alleging that these collections of laws and regime types would 
be of good use to those who are capable of determining which laws would be beneficial for the 
various types of regimes (1181b8–10).  As a result, some have persuasively argued that the 
Politics is intended to be the counterpart to the Ethics, and that the one is meant to lead 
seamlessly into the other.9   
 Furthermore, Aristotle’s interest in politics was not limited to strictly theoretical concerns 
but extended to practical engagement with politics.  Aristotle’s relation to the Macedonian rulers 
                                                 
7 For example, Georg W. F. Hegel contrasts Socrates’ discovery and devotion to the principle of subjectivity with 
the objective Greek customary morality. The Philosophy of History (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1956 [1837]), 269.  Hegel 
goes on to reconcile the principle of subjectivity with objective morality through what he terms the “absolute and 
universal law.” Ibid., 255.  Similarly, Jean-Jacques Rousseau despite being estranged from his native city-state of 
Geneva and describing himself as the “solitary walker,” seeks to legitimate the civil order through the notion of 
adherence to the “general will.” See, The Social Contract trans. and ed. by Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, [1762] 1997), Bk 1.  This theme is reiterated throughout the history of Western 
philosophy.  The philosopher is presented as largely alienated from the political regime and, through some sort of 
devotion to an abstract rule, is able to reconcile his subjective will with that of the political community. 
 
8 See, Richard Bodéüs, The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s ‘Ethics’ trans. by Jan Edward Garrett. (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1993); Aristide Tessitore, Reading Aristotle’s Ethics: Virtue, Rhetoric, and Political 
Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); Ronna Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates: 
On the Nicomachean Ethics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
 
9 A. W. H. Adkins, “The Connection Between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” Political Theory, 12 (1984): 29–41. 
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has long been acknowledged—in particular his relationship with Alexander the Great, whom he 
was hired to tutor in 343 BC.  While the exact extent to which Aristotle acted as a political 
advisor to Alexander is debated, most scholars agree that Aristotle had an influence on 
Alexander’s political and ethical undertakings.10  Whatever the extent to which his advice had a 
practical impact on Alexander’s policies, scholars generally agree that Aristotle was politically 
active.  Thus, in contrast to Socrates, who eschewed the practice of politics as an enterprise that 
entailed the exercise of injustice (Cf. Apol. 31d–32e.) and inquired into political matters only to 
show the inherent limits of politics, Aristotle inquired into and engaged in the practice of politics 
in a concrete manner.   
 How is it that Aristotle alleviated the tension between politics and philosophy in a way 
that Socrates chose not to?  Can it be that Aristotle was simply more of a realist than Socrates 
when it comes to political life?  Did Aristotle understand the harsh necessities of politics and 
condone them in a way that Socrates did not?  Many political interpretations of Aristotle’s Ethics 
have adopted precisely this argument.11  Leo Strauss and others have put forward an 
interpretation according to which Aristotle recognized the tension between philosophy and 
                                                 
10 Carnes Lord relates that while “it seems highly likely that [Aristotle] was more active politically on behalf of 
Macedon … it appears that the traditional picture of Aristotle as a close associate and admirer of Alexander and his 
works is, at best, very overdrawn.” “Introduction” in Aristotle’s Politics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013), 
viii.  Paul Cartledge relates that Aristotle gave Alexander a copy of the Iliad, and that Alexander carried his 
“Aristotle-annotated text” with him on his expedition to Asia.  Alexander was said to be “so attached to it that at 
night he allegedly slept with it—and a dagger—under his pillow.” Alexander the Great: The Hunt for a New Past 
(New York: Overlook Press, 2004), 227.  For a full overview of the relations between Aristotle and Alexander, see 
Victor Ehrenberg, Alexander and the Greeks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938), 62–102.  
 
11 N. D. Arora and S. S. Awasthy, Political Theory and Political Thought (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 
2007), 77: “The two major streams along which the whole Western political thought keeps marching on are: (i) 
political idealism or as one may see [sic] political philosophy, and (ii) political realism, or as one may call it political 
science.  Plato represents political idealism, and Aristotle represents political realism.” 
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politics, but sought to alleviate it in various ways, all the while maintaining the superiority of the 
philosophical life.12  According to this interpretation, Aristotle’s concern with the political 
community was primarily practical—he recognized that the philosopher’s good is in some way 
dependent on the political community and, as a result, he attempted to foster a favorable 
disposition towards philosophy among the educated political class.13  In essence, the “Straussian 
interpretation” of the Ethics holds that at best Aristotle’s presentation of the moral virtues was 
intended to point out that they are merely a pale imitation of the philosophical life of 
contemplation, while at worst, his presentation may simply be an elaborate ruse, the goal of 
which was to ensure that the city is made safe for philosophy.   
 The standard “Straussian reading” of the Ethics has much to offer.  According to this 
reading, Aristotle sought to present the life of moral virtue so as to emphasize its nobility, while 
also exposing its limitations.  In this way, the well-bred Greek gentleman (καλοσκάγαθος), if he 
is a sufficiently attentive reader, will recognize that the true benefit of moral virtue is that it 
points beyond itself toward philosophical virtue, which is self-sufficient and capable of being 
                                                 
12 See, Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964); Harry V. Jaffa Aristotelianism and 
Thomism: A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1979); Aristide Tessitore, Reading Aristotle’s Ethics; Ronna Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates. 
 
13 Allan Bloom argues that the fundamental problem of politics lies in determining how the wisdom of the 
philosophers may come to influence the gentlemen who have power.  In his commentary on the Republic, Bloom 
notes that the first very scene of the Republic (327a–328b), in which Polemarchus orders his slave to catch up with 
Socrates as he is leaving the Piraeus exemplifies the fundamental political problem: “Power is in the hands of the 
gentlemen, who are not philosophers.  They can command the services of the many, and their strength is such that 
they always hold the philosophers in their grasp.  Therefore, it is part of the philosophers’ self-interest to come to 
terms with them.  The question becomes: to what extent can the philosophers influence the gentlemen?” 
“Interpretive Essay” in The Republic of Plato, (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 312. 
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practiced alone.14  This interpretation accords nicely with the general consensus that perceives 
Socrates as the idealist who doggedly pursues the good and holds Aristotle to be the realist who 
moderates his pursuit of the good in order to concern himself with political matters.15 
 While there is certainly an element of truth to the idealist/realist dichotomy that scholars 
have imposed on Socrates and Aristotle, I will argue that their differing evaluations of political 
life stem instead from their different conceptions of friendship.  While the interpretation of 
Aristotle’s Ethics described above provides much purchase, its greatest difficulty is that it 
struggles to incorporate much of books VIII and IX into the overall inquiry of the book.  These 
books, both of which deal with friendship, are largely treated by the standard Straussian 
approach as an exhortation preparing the reader for Aristotle’s somewhat startling claim that the 
philosophical life is the happiest life.16   In contrast, I will argue that these two books, which 
together comprise a fifth of the entirety of the Ethics, entail a direct response to Socrates’ inquiry 
into friendship in the Lysis, and are meant to make clear the deficiencies of Socrates’ 
understanding of friendship, as well as of his approach to politics as described in the Gorgias.  
                                                 
14 Aristide Tessitore writes, “Aristotle attempts to offer guidance for those who are disposed to an active life of 
political involvement … [while] at the same time … point[ing] his most gifted students to … contemplate something 
of the radical and more fully satisfying character of the philosophic life.” Reading Aristotle’s Ethics, 20. 
 
15 Leo Strauss seems to suggest as much, when he writes “The only reason why not Socrates but Aristotle became 
the founder of political science is that Socrates who spent his life in the unending ascent to the idea of the good and 
in awakening others to that ascent, lacked for this reason the leisure not only for political activity but even for 
founding political science.” The City and Man, 29.  Robert C. Bartlett argues that the “‘best regime’” of Books VII 
and VIII of Aristotle’s Politics, the classic of premodern political science, shows Aristotle to be in no sense naïve or 
that he knows full well the ways of the world.” “The ‘Realism’ of Classical Political Science” American Journal of 
Political Science 38 no. 2 (1994), 382.    
 
16 This position is encapsulated nicely by the following statement from Aristide Tessitore: “Aristotle’s treatment of 
friendship in Books VIII and IX … prepares readers for his concluding endorsement of the rare but simply best way 
of life available to human beings.  His subsequent demotion of the life of moral virtue in light of the superior 
happiness afforded by the contemplative pleasures of philosophy is perhaps less strange and less jarring because it is 
prefaced with a consideration of friendship.” Reading Aristotle’s Ethics, 95. 
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As I will make clear, Socrates had a largely negative understanding of friendship, according to 
which friendship acts as an impediment to one’s advancement toward what is good. It is this 
understanding that causes Socrates to treat philosophy and the pursuit of the good as occurring 
outside of the political realm.  In contrast, Aristotle had a positive conception of friendship.  This 
positive view, I will argue, caused Aristotle to present politics in a favorable light and enabled 
him to use philosophy as a measure that can order the political realm toward the good. 
 
Friendship, Necessity, and the Polis 
It may perhaps, seem odd to explain the differing stances that Socrates and Aristotle take toward 
the polis as the result of their differing concepts of friendship.  Friendship seems, at first glance, 
to be decidedly non-political.  Neither Plato nor Aristotle discuss friendship at length in their 
most obviously political works.17  Furthermore, contemporary conventional understanding of 
friendship seems to suggest that it is more fundamental than politics.  Not only are friendships 
able to transcend political boundaries (and, in fact, often do), but our understanding of political 
relations ordinarily entails concepts of rights and duties that seem to be foreign to our conception 
of friendship.  Perhaps as a result, friendship seems to be pre-political.  This raises the question: 
if friendship is pre-political, does it impact politics?  The answer, I hope to make clear, is: yes, 
the pre-political has a fundamental bearing on politics.   
                                                 
17 Friendship is not treated at length in either Plato’s Republic or the Laws, nor is it treated in Aristotle’s Politics. 
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 Both Socrates and Aristotle point out, that it is precisely pre-political relationships—
specifically, relationships developed to fulfill a felt need, or lack—that give rise to the polis.18  In 
Book II of the Republic, Socrates relates to Adeimantus that a city “comes into being because 
each of us isn’t self-sufficient but is in need of much” (Rep. 369b6–7).  What follows is an 
analysis of the way in which different parts of the city come together to provide one another with 
various necessary goods.  Aristotle’s account of the development of the polis appears to be 
similar to that of Socrates.  The polis seems to emerge from a variety of parts that come together 
to counter necessity.  The most basic unit of the polis, states Aristotle, is the individual, who 
joins with other individuals to form the household.  This is done to provide “for the needs of 
daily life,” as these individuals “cannot exist without one another.” In turn, several households 
come together to form a village, so as to provide for the sake of “non-daily needs.”  Finally, the 
“complete community, arising from several villages, is the city” (1252a26–30).  Thus, Socrates 
and Aristotle both suggest that the polis has its origin in the pre-political relationships that are 
ordered toward countering necessity. 
 There is, however, a subtle difference between Socrates’ account of the city’s formation, 
and that of Aristotle.  While Socrates is quite clear that the city arises from the pre-political 
relationships that are ordered toward countering necessity, Aristotle’s account goes beyond this.  
Indeed, as Aristotle presents it, both the daily and non-daily necessities are countered at the level 
of the household and the village respectively, and the city—the complete community—comes 
into being “for the sake of living well” (1252a30).  However, Aristotle remains silent about what 
                                                 
18 Cf. Plato, Republic 369b6–7; Aristotle, Politics 1252a25–b13. 
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it is that causes the city to be ordered towards this end.  As a result, it seems that for Aristotle 
there is some force other than a desire to relieve man’s estate that orders the city towards living 
well. 
  I hope to show that the differences between Socrates and Aristotle have their roots in 
their disparate understandings of friendship.  If the pre-political relationship of friendship has its 
basis in a felt need or lack, then Socrates is correct: the entirety of the political community is 
founded on pre-political relationships of desire and need.  Political communities are, at bottom, 
little more than economic associations meant to provide for man’s necessities.  Friendship and 
political community are, in the end, little more than arrangements of convenience designed to 
facilitate mutual, utilitarian advantage; only the desire to overcome the harsh necessities of 
nature causes human beings to form communities.  However, if individuals are liable to enter 
into friendships with one another wholly independent of need, then Aristotle’s account may be 
correct.  Political communities have their basis in pre-political relationships that are based not on 
lack but on an appreciation of another’s virtues or goodness.  Political communities are ordered 
toward an end that is more noble than mere utilitarian advantage. 
 It is precisely this difference in understanding of friendship that causes Socrates and 
Aristotle to take differing approaches to the political realm.  Socrates’ belief that friendship, and 
by extension the political realm, has its basis in necessity, causes him to take a negative, 
abstentious approach to politics.  Placing philosophy in the service of politics would be a 
degrading and humiliating exercise that is beneath the dignity of the philosopher.  In contrast, 
Aristotle’s understanding of friendship and politics as based on self-sufficiency and a recognition 
of another’s virtues, allows philosophy to play the crucial function of ennobling politics; 
11 
 
 
 
philosophy can have a positive guiding impact on politics.  For Aristotle, friendship grants 
dignity to politics, a dignity that relationships based on necessity alone do not provide.  Viewed 
in this perspective, the concept of friendship developed in the Ethics not only affects politics but 
may be precisely that which prompts Aristotle to offer the practical, political advice contained in 
the Politics.  
 The following four chapters proceed in a comparative manner.  In Chapter 1, I detail 
Socrates’ understanding of friendship as presented in the Lysis.  I make the case that the Lysis 
ought to be read as Plato’s subtle critique of Socrates’ conception of friendship.  Plato presents 
Socrates as using eristic arguments and sophisms, while engaging his youngest interlocutors in 
the entirety of the Platonic corpus—Menexenus and Lysis—in a discussion concerning the 
definition of friendship.  At one point, Plato presents Socrates as adopting a sophistic argument 
that is strikingly similar to an argument used by the two sophists, Euthydemus and 
Dionysodorus, in the Euthydemus.  Plato’s ultimate critique, I argue, is that Socrates collapses 
the distinction between friendship and eros, such that friendship and eros are both characterized 
by a felt need or desire.  According to Socrates, there is no such thing as a friendship based on 
self-sufficiency and an appreciation that two people may have of one another’s good qualities.  I 
show that Plato adopts this presentation of Socrates’ understanding of friendship not only to 
intimate that Socrates is incorrect in suggesting that all friendship has its basis in need, but also 
to point to the dangers that attend his conception of friendship.   
 Chapter 2 presents the political implications of Socrates’ conception of friendship by 
examining the Apology and the Gorgias.  The Apology shows Socrates’ relation to the practice of 
politics to be one of negation and abstention.  As he attests in his defense speech, Socrates never 
12 
 
 
 
puts forward a positive teaching, but instead always goes around to the citizens of Athens 
questioning their settled convictions and exposing their ignorance.  The result, I argue, is an 
approach to politics that is entirely negative or dissolvent of people’s opinions.  Not only is 
Socrates’ approach entirely negative, but it is abstentious as well.  In his defense speech, 
Socrates claims that he entirely avoids the practice of politics due to its incompatibility with 
justice.  While Socrates does not explain in his defense speech precisely why he believes the 
practice of politics to be incompatible with justice, this connection is made clear in the Gorgias 
and, as I make clear, hinges directly on Socrates’ understanding of friendship.  At a critical 
juncture of the dialogue, Socrates directs his interlocutor, Callicles, away from the practice of 
politics precisely on the basis of a definition of friendship that had been proposed—but found 
wanting—in the Lysis.  I show that for Socrates the conventional practice of politics depends on 
a false conception of justice and friendship. 
 The third chapter analyzes Aristotle’s discussion of friendship in Book VIII of the Ethics 
in light of his understanding of the virtue of magnanimity.  I argue that Aristotle’s friendship of 
the good is ultimately intended to describe the friendship between two magnanimous individuals.  
Turning first to Aristotle’s presentation of magnanimity in the Posterior Analytics, in which 
Aristotle suggests that there may be two types of magnanimity—one that is political and another 
that is philosophical—I show that Aristotle views the virtue of magnanimity to be problematic.  
The two types of individuals who are held up as being potentially magnanimous are presented as 
being self-sufficient and aware of the honor and respect they deserve.  Nevertheless, when they 
fail to attain the honors they rightly deserve, they tend to act in a socially destructive manner.  I 
go on to argue that Aristotle’s presentation of magnanimity in the Ethics is intended to suggest 
13 
 
 
 
that the cure for the socially destructive tendencies of such magnanimous individuals is 
friendship.  If the magnanimous philosopher were to befriend the magnanimous politician, they 
would not only temper one another’s socially destructive tendencies, but their alliance—the 
alliance of power and wisdom—would be capable of bestowing great benefits on the political 
realm.   
 While Chapter 3 shows that Aristotle’s friendship of the good is intended to describe 
friendship between two magnanimous individuals, Chapter 4 explains why it is that such 
individuals will choose to befriend one another.  Aristotle recognizes that philosophers are not 
likely to become friends with individuals who hold positions of power, as those in power may 
well have had to engage in nefarious tactics to attain their position and therefore cannot be 
described as virtuous or good.  Nevertheless, in Book IX Aristotle uses a protreptic address to 
convince the philosopher to engage with the statesman.  As I make clear, Aristotle induces the 
philosopher to interact with and to activate the statesman’s potential for virtue. In this way, 
Aristotle ensures that philosophy will have an indirect, guiding effect on the practice of politics.   
 In the conclusion, I examine the extent to which the distinct understandings of friendship 
developed by Socrates and Aristotle can be of use in our own practice of politics.  I hope to show 
that Aristotle’s conception of friendship can provide a solid foundation for politics that endows it 
with a certain level of dignity.  Nevertheless, I emphasize that neither Socrates nor Aristotle 
believe that friendship can provide people with the completion that they may desire.  While 
Aristotle differs from Socrates in recognizing friendship as a positive good that is not based on a 
metaphysical lack or need, he emphasizes that the pleasures associated with friendship can 
distract us from the practice of our most complete, or most divine, activity—the activity of 
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contemplation.   Last, I examine some of the practical consequences of Aristotle’s understanding 
of friendship and magnanimity.  What role ought the virtue of magnanimity play in the practice 
of modern politics?  Are magnanimity and the friendship associated with it antithetical to modern 
liberal democracy’s commitment to egalitarianism and the rule of law?   I argue that Aristotle’s 
analysis of magnanimity and friendship remains not only relevant, but crucial, to the practice of 
politics today.
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CHAPTER ONE.   SOCRATIC FRIENDSHIP AND MAN’S  
DESIRE FOR THE GOOD: LYSIS 
 
In his Second Letter, Plato informs us that his writings present a Socrates “become young and 
beautiful” (Letters 2.314c).  If this is the case, Plato’s writings present at least some difficulty in 
distinguishing the true “historical” Socrates from the Socrates made young and beautiful.  This 
difficulty is only heightened by Socrates’ well-known self-deprecation and irony.  Thus, not only 
do we receive a portrait of Socrates that is potentially highly idealized, but we are further 
hampered in our efforts to attain a portrait of the “real” Socrates due to his dissembling 
dialectics.  However, Plato chooses to write four dialogues in narrative form (The Republic, 
Lysis, The Lovers, and Charmides), in which Socrates himself conveys not only the 
conversations in which he engages, but his activities and reflections as well. As a result, although 
these dialogues may not obviate the problem of distinguishing the “historical” Socrates from the 
Socrates made young and beautiful, they may enable us to distinguish more clearly Socrates’ 
dialectical arguments from his true intentions.1 Thus, these dialogues provide us with a window 
                                                 
1 The distinction between Socrates’ outward statements (dialectical or otherwise) and his intentions is made most 
clear toward the end of the Lysis.  After recounting the various arguments raised throughout the dialogue, Socrates 
comments, “If nothing among these is a friend, I no longer know what to say” (222e9).   However, immediately after 
this, he suggests to the reader, “But as I said these things, I already had in mind to set in motion someone else 
among the older fellows” (223a1).  While Socrates expresses dismay, it seems that he is not as much at a loss, as he 
lets on to his interlocutors.  On the importance of the narrated dialogues see, Catherine Zuckert, Plato’s 
Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 19; Leo Strauss, 
On Plato’s “Symposium,” ed. and with a foreword by Seth Benardete (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2001), 
186. 
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into Socrates’ character in a way that most other dialogues do not, granting us a particularly clear 
picture of who Plato believed Socrates to be.   
 Despite the fact that the Lysis has been called the Platonic dialogue on friendship, what it 
teaches about friendship has been highly contested.  Some scholars have argued that it is simply 
aporetic and contains no positive teaching.  Pointing to Socrates’ last line of the dialogue, in 
which he concludes, “What he who is a friend is we have not yet been able to discover” (Lys. 
223b9–10),2 these scholars maintain that the Lysis is one of Plato’s earlier dialogues and presents 
a failed attempt at defining friendship.3  Others maintain that amidst the false starts and 
inconclusive arguments, the Lysis does present a coherent account of friendship or, at the very 
least, points toward what a friend is.4  Still others, such as David Bolotin, have pointed toward 
the inconclusive ending of the dialogue in order to show that it contains a teaching pertaining to 
man’s  metaphysical neediness.  According to this argument, Plato holds that all friendship and 
desire have their roots in man’s need for completion.5 
                                                 
2 All citations to the Lysis are taken from David Bolotin’s interpretation unless otherwise noted. Plato’s Dialogue on 
Friendship: An Interpretation of the Lysis with a New Translation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979). 
 
3 W. R. M. Lamb in the introduction to his translation of the Lysis notes that “Socrates is content to lead his young 
friend into a maze of analogical reasoning, from which neither of them can find any certain egress.”  Plato III, Loeb 
Classics (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1975), 3. Similarly, George Grote, notes: “To multiply defective 
explanations, and to indicate why each is defective, is the whole business of the dialogue.” Plato, and the Other 
Companions of Sokrates, vol. II (London: John Murray, 1867), 186. 
 
4 Lorraine Smith Pangle comments: “Plato may provide the reader with the outlines of compelling arguments that, 
though facilely rejected, are not refuted” Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship, 21.  James M. Rhodes points to 
the subtitle of the dialogue, “On Philia: Obstetric,” and concludes that “Socrates is practicing the midwife’s art.  
Socrates will not give us a propositional ‘theory of philia.’  Rather, the ‘pregnant’ characters in the play and we 
ourselves need to be delivered of the virtue of friendly love” (“Platonic Philia and Political Order” in Friendship 
and Politics, ed. by John von Heyking and Richard Avramenko [University of Notre Dame Press, 2008], 25–26). 
 
5 Bolotin, Plato’s Dialogue on Friendship.  In my analysis of the dialogue, I am deeply indebted to Bolotin’s superb 
interpretation of the dialogue.  However, I seek to further Bolotin’s analysis by pointing to some of the deficiencies 
in Socrates’ arguments, which suggest that Plato may have been subtly critiquing Socrates. 
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 What is it about this dialogue that lends itself to such different, even contradictory, 
interpretations?  Part of the reason is that at least some of the arguments raised and eventually 
refuted by Socrates, are neither fully fleshed out nor conclusively refuted.  In fact, one of the 
possible definitions of friendship that Socrates raises is hardly even explored.  As a result of the 
dialogue’s elementary and, at times, even specious arguments, some scholars in the nineteenth 
century went so far as to label it spurious, contending that Plato could not have written 
something containing so many eristic arguments.6  Today, the authenticity of the Lysis is no 
longer disputed but is by and large agreed to be a genuine work.7  However, the difficulty posed 
by the sophistic arguments remains: Why would Plato present Socrates as failing to properly 
refute arguments and engaging in sophistic arguments, all while speaking to what are likely the 
youngest interlocutors in the entire Platonic corpus?   
 Diogenes Laertius relates that “on hearing Plato read the Lysis, Socrates exclaimed, ‘By 
Heracles, what a number of lies this young man is telling about me!’”8  To assume that 
Diogenes’ recounting of Socrates’ reaction to the dialogue is accurate would not prove Plato’s 
depiction of Socrates to be erroneous.  However, assuming its truth would point to a difference of 
opinion between Plato and Socrates on the topic of friendship.  It is my contention that Plato 
intends for the dialogue to elucidate the disagreement between himself and Socrates on the topic 
of friendship.  To this end, Plato writes the dialogue in such a way that it both points toward a 
                                                 
6 Cf. Friedrich Ast, Platon’s Leben und Schriften (Leipzig: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1816) 428–34; Joseph 
Socher, Uber Platons Schriften (Munich: Ignaz Joseph Lentner, 1820), 137–44. 
 
7 Cf. Robert G. Hoerber, “Plato’s Lysis,” Phronesis 4 no. 1 (1959): 15. 
 
8 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, ed. by James Miller and trans. by Pamela Mensch (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2018) Bk. III, 35. 
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more complete understanding of friendship, while also revealing a deficiency in Socrates’ 
understanding of friendship.  Specifically, Plato shows that in his haste to direct the young 
toward a life of contemplation, Socrates fails to give the concept of friendship the proper regard 
it deserves; a failure that has extremely negative political consequences.  As a result, I contend 
that Plato presents Socrates as raising serious arguments, but as rejecting them in a facile, 
sophistic manner.   
 In what follows, I will first turn to the prologue of the Lysis to show the way in which it 
provides the key to uncovering Plato’s intentions.  Next, I will catalogue Socrates’ use of eristic 
and sophistic arguments throughout the dialogue, suggesting that Plato intends to point to 
deficiencies in Socrates’ understanding of friendship. Specifically, I will argue that Plato 
suggests Socrates is too quick to conclude that all friendship has its basis in need in the same 
way as erotic love.  In addition, I will show that through this process, Plato leaves enough of a 
trail from which one can develop a fully coherent understanding of friendship.9  I will close with 
some remarks concerning the implications that this dialogue has for Socrates’ approach to 
politics in general. 
 
The Introduction: Panops, Hermes, and a Sleight of Hand 
The Lysis begins by introducing the reader to characters and details that seem superfluous to 
what appears to be the dialogue’s main inquiry: what is friendship?  Socrates relates, “I was on 
my way from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, along the road outside the wall” (203a1–2). 
                                                 
9 It is precisely this trail that Aristotle picks up on in Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
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Both the Academy and the Lyceum are located outside of the walls of the city; the Academy to 
the north, and the Lyceum to the south-east.  Socrates is therefore taking the circuitous route 
outside and around the city rather than choosing to go directly through the city itself.  While we 
are not told why Socrates makes this choice, we are told that the road he was walking along was 
“outside the wall and close under the wall itself,” and it is here that he chances upon 
Hippothales, Ctesippus, and some other youths outside the palaestra near the spring of Panops 
(203a 2–7).10  Panops, whose full name is Argus Panoptes, was the name of a local deity, whose 
name means all-seeing.  According to Greek mythology, Panops was famous for his watchful 
gaze.  Thus, the dialogue takes place near the edge of the city under watchful eyes. 
 Hippothales tries to induce Socrates to come inside the palaestra and talk with them.  
Plato seems purposefully to direct our attention to the location in which the conversation about 
friendship will take place, describing it as “a kind of enclosure set against the wall” and 
informing us that it was “built recently” (203b7–204a3).  A palaestra is a place of instruction in 
both wrestling and other matters.  Thus, the setting of the dialogue on friendship is a place of 
instruction—together the disputants will wrestle with one another, in an attempt to come to a 
conclusion as to who or what a friend is.11  The fact that Socrates needs to enter the palaestra to 
engage in the discussion concerning friendship may suggest that he himself is in need of 
instruction.  This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that Hippothales informs Socrates that the 
                                                 
10 The entirety of this dialogue, in which Socrates fails to find a definition of friendship, occurs at the very edge of 
the city.  This fact may be suggestive of Socrates’ relation to the city and to politics in general.  In contrast, the 
Phaedrus—a dialogue concerning eros—occurs well-outside the city. 
 
11 On the connection between wrestling and philosophy, see Clinton DeBevoise Corcoran, “Wrestling and the Fair 
Fight in Plato,” in Topography and Deep Structure in Plato: The Construction of Place in the Dialogues (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2016), 119–151. 
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teacher at the palaestra is Socrates’ “companion” “and praiser—Miccus” (204a7).  Socrates 
responds with an oath and relates that “the man is not an inferior one, but a capable sophist” 
(204a8–9).  That the dialogue on friendship occurs in a place of instruction under the guidance of 
an instructor suggests that Socrates is not in an unambiguous position of superiority in this 
dialogue.  Of course, Miccus does not instruct the participants of the conversation, but the fact 
that he is mentioned in the prologue and is recognized by Socrates as “a capable sophist” may 
suggest that Socrates’ understanding is in some way deficient.12 
 Hippothales suggests that Socrates pass time with the group.  He proposes that the group 
might share their speeches with him and that, together, they could observe the “good-looking” 
boys.  Hippothales thus sets up the invitation as one in which all will share in the good things 
equally. Hippothales’ invitation tells us that he has a relatively sanguine view of friendship.  
Indeed, the idea that they might share their speeches with Socrates brings to mind the adage that 
will come to impact the conversation later: “Friends have all things in common” (cf. 207c9–11).  
In contrast, Socrates’ response indicates the opposite.  While interested, he replies that he would 
prefer first to hear “what terms [he is] to enter on and who the good-looking one is” (204b1–2).  
Socrates’ wariness of friendship is on display already at the beginning of the dialogue.  He will 
not accept Hippothales’ friendly invitation without knowing “the terms” he is to enter on; 
Socrates suspects that friendships involve a quid pro quo and are not something simply 
gratuitous or given solely for the sake of the other.   
                                                 
12 Terry Penner and Christopher Rowe, commenting on the passage in question, note that while the term ‘sophist’ is 
ordinarily used in a derogatory sense, here “the term seems to be used in a purely descriptive way; and that … is the 
point: Miccus professes, and teaches, wisdom, and wisdom or knowledge will be one of the chief themes of the main 
part of the dialogue” (Plato’s Lysis [Cambridge University Press, 2005], 4n2). 
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 While Socrates’ skepticism may be disconcerting, Plato points out that it is not—at least 
in this case—completely unwarranted, as it soon becomes clear that Hippothales likely does have 
an ulterior motive in inviting Socrates to join the group.  Hippothales is quickly revealed to be 
“in love” (ἔρωτος) with one of the good-looking ones.  Indeed, when Socrates pushes him to 
reveal who he believes the good-looking one to be, Hippothales blushes, apparently out of 
modesty or bashfulness.  Socrates then tells Hippothales that he can see that Hippothales is not 
only in love, but that he is “far along the way in love already” (204b8–9).  Thus, the dialogue on 
friendship begins with a young man who is in love.  In fact, the term “love” (ἔρως) enters into the 
discussion prior to the term “friend” (φίλος).  Thus, the structure of the dialogue seems implicitly 
to attest that for Socrates love takes primacy over friendship.  Socrates continues, making note of 
his knowledge of erotic matters: “I am inferior and useless in other things, but this has somehow 
been given to me from a god—to be able quickly to recognize both a lover and a beloved” 
(204b9–c2).  Socrates refers to his divine gift and suggests that his knowledge of erotic matters is 
his only area of expertise.  Later on, Socrates will tell us that he has no knowledge of what a 
friend is.  Given Socrates’ distinction between friendship and erotic love, we may wonder 
whether Socrates is useless when it comes to friendship, or whether perhaps his sole fixation on 
erotic love causes him to run roughshod over the concept of friendship. 
 Socrates points out that his capacity to recognize lover and beloved is a useful one.  In 
response, Hippothales blushes “still much more” (204c3).  This time however, it is not clear that 
he blushes from bashfulness alone; perhaps Hippothales blushes from the shame of having his 
friendly invitation to Socrates uncovered as having an ulterior motive; enlisting his help in 
discerning whether his beloved is endeared toward him.   
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 In any case, Ctessipus breaks in, noting that all this false modesty is a little much coming 
from a man who is so in love with the young boy, Lysis, that he constantly sings his praises, 
much to the annoyance of his friends.  Ctessipus goes on to detail how Hippothales sings songs 
of praise about Lysis that include songs regarding Lysis’ family’s past exploits, and his family’s 
mythical connection to the gods.  When Socrates hears this, he rebukes Hippothales strongly 
declaring his actions to be “ridiculous.”  He notes, “Whoever is wise in love-matters … does not 
praise his beloved before he catches him” (206a2–3), for in doing so, the lover simply fills the 
beloved with “proud thoughts and bragging,” making the beloved “harder to capture” (206a4–5).  
After this, Hippothales finally fesses up to his ulterior motives in conversing with Socrates, 
noting, “It’s because of these things, Socrates, that I’m consulting with you.  And if you have 
anything else, give your advice as to what to say in conversation or what to do so that someone 
might become endeared to his favorite” (206c1–4).  Socrates agrees to make a “display” of what 
it is Hippothales needs to say to Lysis to ensure his love is requited, and the group begins to 
design a scheme whereby they may induce Lysis into conversation. 
 It is at this point that we are informed that the dialogue on friendship is taking place 
during the Hermaea, a festival in honor of the god Hermes. Hermes was not only the patron of 
the palaestra, but he was also known as the god of tricks who would commit thefts and other 
shameful acts, the god who transgressed boundaries, and the god who would outwit other gods in 
order to help human beings.13  In fact, it is precisely this penchant for crossing boundaries that 
allows Socrates and the other older youths to associate with Lysis.  As part of their scheming, 
                                                 
13 Walter Burkert, Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical, trans. John Raffan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1985), 156–58. 
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Hippothales notes that “since they’re observing the Hermaea, the youths and the boys are 
mingled in the same place” (207d1–3).  The rules, or boundaries, surrounding appropriate 
relations are relaxed during the Hermaea, allowing the older youth to associate with the younger 
boys.14  Thus, the setting for the dialogue has been carefully constructed: the very dialogue in 
which Plato is scrutinizing Socrates’ understanding of friendship occurs during a festival in 
honor of a deity who deceives other deities in order to help humans transgress their limits.   
 That the dialogue occurs during the Hermaea is significant not only because of Hermes’ 
status as the god who helps human beings transgress their limits, but also due to Hermes’ relation 
with Panops.  As will be recalled, at the very beginning of the dialogue, Socrates relates that he 
was stopped near the “spring of Panops.”  The references to Panops and Hermes—the only 
references to deities (aside from oaths) in the entire dialogue—is not accidental.  As it turns out, 
the two deities both figure prominently in the Greek myth of Io.  To appreciate the full 
significance of these mythical allusions to the dialogue, it will be useful briefly to recap the myth 
of Io.  According to Greek mythology, Zeus had attempted to seduce Io, the beautiful daughter of 
the river god.  When she resisted his charms, Zeus covered the earth with a dark cloud, grabbed 
Io, and raped her.  Seeing the cloud and suspecting that her husband was being unfaithful, Hera 
hurried to earth to investigate.  Upon her approach, Zeus transformed Io into a white heifer to 
cover up his infidelity.  However, Hera sensed that Zeus was being unfaithful and asked to be 
given the cow as a gift.  Hera then gave Argus Panoptes (Panops)—a deity whose one hundred 
eyes never all slept at the same time—the task of guarding Io, to ensure that she did not 
                                                 
14 Catherine Zuckert notes that Socrates’ entry into the palaestra is itself a transgression of boundaries, as only the 
older youth were allowed to mingle with the boys, not adults such as Socrates. Plato’s Philosophers, 513. 
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transform from a cow back into a deity. After some time, Zeus took pity on Io and sent Hermes 
to rescue her.  To do so, Hermes tricked Argus Panoptes by telling him incredibly long tales until 
he fell asleep, at which point he cut off Panoptes’ head, setting Io free.15   
 Why would Plato allude to this story—a story recounting the primordial crime of the first 
murder among the gods—in the dialogue concerning friendship?  As the remainder of the 
dialogue indicates, Socrates effects a similar transformation.  Through the use of sophistic 
arguments, Socrates manages to transform friendship into love under the watchful eyes of Plato.   
 
A False Start 
When the group enters the palaestra, Socrates relates that the boys are all dressed up, playing 
knucklebones, a game of chance.  The fact that these boys are all dressed up and seem to take 
their game of chance quite seriously may indicate that friendship in general, or at least non-
intentional friendship, is taken much too seriously.  The scene also reinforces the fact that the 
boys in the palaestra are quite young.  The boys’ young age makes Socrates’ subsequent 
conversation with them all the more scandalous.  Indeed, in what follows, he engages in a 
conversation with the boys that can be broken up into three parts: First, he speaks with both 
Lysis and his friend Menexenus as to the nature and purpose of their friendship.  Next, he speaks 
                                                 
15 According to the myth, once Io has been set free she is not yet free to transform back into a deity, but is pursued 
by the shade of Argus, as well as by a gadfly that stings her incessantly.  It is only once Io the cow reaches Egypt 
that she is finally free to transform back to a deity.  If Plato intends for this myth to act as an allegory of Socrates’ 
treatment of friendship, the fact that Io is pursued by a gadfly brings to mind Plato’s depiction of Socrates as a 
gadfly in the Apology.  Socrates is said continually to alight on the city as a means of waking it from its slumber.  It 
would seem that the change from friendship to eros is a cause of consternation for the city. 
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with Lysis alone, questioning the love Lysis’ parents have for him.  Last, he again speaks with 
both Lysis and Menexenus as to who or what a friend is.  In the course of the latter two portions 
of the conversation, however, Socrates makes use of a variety of questionable claims and eristic 
arguments.  These claims and arguments are being used to question not only the young boys’ 
relationship with one another, but also their other relationships, such as those they have with 
their parents and with the city itself.  Socrates seems to be using sophisms and eristic arguments 
to undermine the children’s existing attachments.  Based on the depiction of Socrates in this 
dialogue, one gets the sense that the charge of corruption of the youth in the Apology may not 
have been unwarranted.   
 The conversation begins with a false start. Once Lysis and Menexenus have come over to 
join the conversation—a mini-drama itself, which requires the more forthright Menexenus to join 
the group first before his more bashful friend Lysis summons the courage to join them—Socrates 
begins by asking them which one of them is older.  Thus, rather than beginning the inquiry into 
friendship with a “what is” question, as Socrates is prone to do in other dialogues, he begins by 
exposing a quality of friendship.16  Indeed, the question posed is seemingly designed to uncover 
a source of conflict between the two young boys, who are of roughly the same age.  Menexenus 
confirms this, stating, “We dispute about that” (207b13).  Socrates’ question suggests that he 
seems already to have some idea of what friendship is.  Socrates continues to ask questions that 
                                                 
16 David B. Robinson notes that the Lysis “is one of five short Platonic dialogues which address themselves entirely 
to a question of definition.  Besides the Lysis these dialogues are the Charmides, Laches, Hippias Major, and 
Euthyphro; all of these ask a question of the type ‘What is x?’ and make this question their sole concern” (“Plato’s 
Lysis: The Structural Problem,” Illinois Classical Studies 11 no. 1/2 [1986]: 63).  While I agree with Robinson that 
the dialogue does seek a definition of friendship, I am of the opinion that the dramatic activity surrounding the 
question suggests that the purpose of the dialogue is not simply to define what friendship is. 
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bring out the competitive nature of their friendship, including who is more noble (γενναιότερος) 
and who more beautiful (καλλίων).  Last, he asks them about their wealth.  Citing the well-
known adage, he states, “Well the things of friends are said to be in common, so you [two] won’t 
differ in … respect [to wealth], if indeed you [two] are speaking the truth about your friendship” 
(207c9–11).  Both Lysis and Menexenus agree.  Doubt has already been raised implicitly earlier 
on in the dialogue as to whether friends have all things in common, and it seems that Socrates is 
pursuing this line of inquiry.  As friends who are similar to one another in age and nobility, Lysis 
and Menexenus naturally compete with one another, and while it is certainly possible for them 
also to compete about who is more wealthy, the boys seem to be sufficiently well-born to 
recognize that competition in such matters is unseemly.  Thus, Socrates’ probing questions have 
uncovered that at the heart of their friendship lies a desire in each of them to strive after what is 
good for themselves.  Socrates is about to pursue further the inquiry into whether all things are 
held in common by asking them “which one was juster and wiser,” but is interrupted when 
Menexenus is called away (207d1–4).  
 The question of which of the two boys is juster and wiser, which Socrates was about to 
ask, is a potentially fruitful avenue of inquiry for who or what a friend is.  Indeed, are justice and 
wisdom, like age and nobility, things about which friends compete?  Socrates sought to frame the 
question in a compound manner—“I was attempting to question them as to which one was juster 
and wiser” (207d1–4)—thereby giving the boys the option to agree that while the one is more 
just, the other is wiser.  In this way, justice and wisdom would not be like the other things about 
which friends compete.  Indeed, the two would not simply strive against one another in a bid to 
outdo each other, as they do when they argue about who is older, or more noble, but would 
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instead recognize each other’s strengths.  Perhaps, their differing strengths could even be 
recognized as complementary.17  The complementarity of Lysis and Menexenus is intimated at 
various points of the dialogue.  Recall, for example, that the bashful Lysis would not join the 
group until the more forthright Menexenus had joined (207a3–b5).  Similarly, later in the 
conversation, after Lysis volunteers to take over for Menexenus after Socrates perplexes him, 
Socrates notes, “Since I wished to give Menexenus a rest and was also pleased by [Lysis’] love 
of wisdom [φιλοσοφία], I turned to Lysis and began to make my arguments to him” (213d8–e1).  
Plato draws our attention to the fact that the brash Menexenus and the bashful but wise Lysis 
have complementary strengths.  However, Socrates is frustrated in his attempt to ask which one 
is “juster and wiser,” as Menexenus is called away “to supervise the sacred rites” as part of the 
Hermaea (207d–4).  Hermes, the god of tricks and transgression of boundaries, requires a 
sacrificial victim before the inquiry into what friendship is can continue. 
 
Socratic Sophisms and a Sacrificial Victim 
At this point, the conversation takes a sharp turn.  From the conversation that follows, it seems 
that the sacrificial victim that Hermes requires if he is to help man transgress his boundaries and 
have a share of the divine lot, is Lysis’ friendships.  Indeed, rather than an inquiry designed to 
discover the complementarity of Lysis and Menexenus, Socrates’ line of questioning makes 
Lysis begin to question all of his existing friendships.  In stark contrast to Hippothales’ love 
                                                 
17 This is precisely the definition of friendship that is alluded to but not fully explored in the final sections of the 
dialogue.  See 222b4: “If what is akin differs in some respect from the like, we might be saying something, in my 
opinion, concerning what a friend is.” 
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songs, which speak of the exploits of Lysis’ family, Socrates immediately sets Lysis against his 
family.  First, by means of a faulty argument, Socrates intimates that Lysis’ parents do not love 
him.  He begins by asking Lysis whether his parents love him, and whether they want him to be 
happy.  Lysis predictably answers that of course his parents love him and want him to be happy.  
Next, Socrates asks him, whether it would be possible to be happy if one were a slave, “and if it 
were not possible for him to do anything he desired” (207e1–3).  When Lysis answers no, 
Socrates, asks whether his parents, therefore, allow him to do whatever he desires, since he avers 
that they want him to be happy.  Of course, Lysis relates that they do prevent him from doing a 
great number of things.  Socrates drives the point home by purposefully asking Lysis about 
various activities that he knows his parents will not allow him to do, such as riding his father’s 
chariots in a competition, driving the mules, or even ruling over himself.  Socrates further elicits 
from Lysis that his parents trust hirelings or slaves with these tasks, while they prevent Lysis 
himself from undertaking them.  It seems that Socrates’ point in pursuing this line of questions is 
to suggest to Lysis that his parents do not love him and seek to prevent him from doing what he 
desires.  Socrates seems purposefully to be driving Lysis to resent his parents on the grounds that 
they don’t love him. 
 However, this line of questioning, as well as the implied conclusion are obviously false.  
It is not true that if Lysis’ parents desire him to be happy, they would allow him to do whatever 
he wants.  Following one’s desires, whatever they happen to be, does not lead to happiness.  This 
is made eminently clear in the Republic, where Socrates depicts the tyrannical soul as a 
destructively desirous soul that acts against its own wishes by following its every desire (Rep. 
579a–c).  Lysis likely does not recognize what is at stake philosophically in Socrates’ line of 
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argumentation, and instead asserts in conformity with what is conventionally appropriate, that his 
parents prevent him from engaging in various activities because he is not yet old enough for 
these tasks.  Socrates, however, skillfully directs Lysis away from the topic of age and leads him 
to recognize that it is because of his lack of understanding that his parents prevent him from 
racing chariots and driving the mule team.  Whereas they grant him autonomy in such things as 
reading, writing, playing the lyre, and other activities of which he has an understanding, they 
deny him autonomy in other activities, in which he lacks understanding.    
 Socrates continues, using Lysis’ recognition that his parents prevent him from engaging 
in various activities to suggest that as soon as his father recognizes that Lysis is not only capable, 
but superior to his father in the things he is currently prevented from doing, then his father will 
trust Lysis to manage both his father and his father’s estate.  At this point, Socrates begins to 
straightforwardly appeal to Lysis’ ambition and desires.  Not only will his father entrust his 
estate to him, but his neighbor will do so as well, once he believes Lysis’ household management 
skills to be better than his own.  In fact, once Lysis has the requisite skill and knowledge, the 
Athenians will hand over the keys of the city to him—the only thing preventing Lysis from 
ruling in the city is that he does not yet have the knowledge.  Socrates concludes: 
With regard to the things in which we become prudent, everyone—
Greeks as well as barbarians, and both men and women—will entrust 
them to us…. But with regard to those things in which we don’t acquire 
good sense, no one will entrust [them to us] … but everyone will obstruct 
us as much as is in his power—not merely aliens, but even our father and 
mother and whatever may be more closely or akin to us than they are. 
(210a9- c3).   
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Good sense, Socrates argues, is all that is required for one to rule over all.  Of course, Socrates’ 
argumentation fails to acknowledge the possibility that others may not recognize Lysis’ good 
sense.  Good sense alone is not enough to obtain power.  However, what is most striking is 
Socrates’ statement that to the extent we do not have good sense, “everyone will obstruct us as 
much as is in his power.”  One could charitably interpret Socrates’ overall intention in this part 
of the dialogue to be an attempt to make Lysis recognize his own deficiency and thereby spur 
him toward self-improvement and the acquisition of “good sense.”  However, this particular line 
of the argument seems to cast doubt on this interpretation, as it introduces an antagonistic 
element to all of Lysis’ relationships that would seem to be unnecessary if Socrates’ sole 
intention was to cause Lysis to recognize his deficiency.  The implication is that no one loves 
another for his own sake, but only in so far as he has good sense and will be beneficial.  
 Thus far, Socrates has appealed to Lysis’ competitive and ambitious nature to cause him 
radically to question his existing relationships and to view them all in terms of utility and need.   
However, after having fed Lysis’ vanity and ambition, Socrates cuts him down to size. He 
relates, “Now, therefore, not even your father loves you, nor does anyone else love anyone else 
insofar as he is useless” (210c8–9).  Friendship, Socrates argues, depends upon wisdom.  If Lysis 
becomes wise, he will be useful and good, but if he fails to do so “no one else will be your 
friend, and neither will your father, nor your mother, nor your own kinsmen” (210d2–4).  It is 
important to note that according to Socrates, not only will his father and his mother not love him, 
but his entire political community will disown him.  While the main point is to humble Lysis, we 
can see here that Socrates’ understanding of friendship is somewhat problematic, as political 
friendships are equated with the love parents have for their children, with no distinction.  
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 At this point in the conversation, Lysis has been shown to have knowledge in some areas 
(reading, writing, and playing the lyre), and lacking knowledge in others (chariot racing and 
mule driving).  However, Socrates drives home Lysis’ lack of wisdom by means of another 
fallacious argument, which ends with the conclusion that Lysis does not have any knowledge.  
He asks Lysis, “Is it possible … for someone to think big, in regard to those matters in which 
he’s not yet thinking?” (210d4 – 5).  Lysis responds that it would be impossible.  Socrates 
follows up by stating (not asking), “And if you require a teacher, you’re not yet thoughtful” 
(210d6–7). When Lysis concurs, Socrates concludes that “your thoughts are not [too] big, if 
indeed you’re still thoughtless” (210d7–8).   
 In making this argument, Socrates is engaging in a deliberate sophism, in the same way 
and regarding the same topic as the sophists did in the Euthydemus.  It will be helpful to relate 
the scene from the Euthydemus to emphasize the similarity between the way Socrates proceeds 
and the way the sophists do.  In the Euthydemus, two sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, 
heckle a young boy named Cleinias with eristic arguments, designed to tangle him up in knots, 
by equivocating on the term “to learn.”  Euthydemus asks Cleinias whether those who learn are 
the wise or the ignorant.  No matter which way Cleinias answers, the two sophists are able to 
refute him. When Cleinias first answers that the wise learn, the sophists point to the fact that 
those students who learn from their teachers are “unlearned” at the time of their learning.  
However, when Cleinias agrees that the ignorant are the ones who learn, the sophists 
immediately point out that when the teacher dictates things, it is the wise boys, rather than the 
unlearned boys, who learn the dictation.  Thus, no matter what Cleinias answers, the sophists are 
able to refute him.  After this display of sophistry, Socrates consoles Cleinias:  
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Our two visitors are pointing out this very thing, that you did not realize 
that people use the word “learn” not only in the situation in which a 
person who has no knowledge of a thing in the beginning acquires it 
later, but also when he who has this knowledge already uses it to inspect 
the same thing….  Now this, as they are pointing out, had escaped your 
notice—that the same word is applied to opposite sorts of men, to both 
the man who knows and the man who does not….  These things are the 
frivolous part of study … and I call these things “frivolity” because even 
if a man were to learn many or even all such things, he would be none the 
wiser as to how matters stand (277e4–278b5).   
 
By equivocating on the term “to learn,” the sophists have refuted Cleinias.  It is precisely this 
same tactic that Socrates uses against Lysis.  The statement, “if you require a teacher, you’re not 
yet thoughtful,” can be both true and false depending on what the term “thoughtful” (φρονεῖν) 
means. The ambiguity of the term renders Socrates’ question sophistic, as it can mean both “to 
understand” and “to think.”  Indeed, if thoughtful means “to understand,” then it would be 
correct to state that the fact that Lysis needs a teacher means he does not yet “understand.”  
However, if thoughtful simply means “to think,” then the syllogism would be incorrect.  It is not 
true that simply because Lysis needs a teacher, he does not yet “think.”  Αs Benjamin Rider 
points out, “A student spends a lot of time thinking about his subject; he just thinks deficiently 
and needs a teacher to help him understand it.”18  Socrates equivocates on the term φρονεῖν in a 
manner that is strikingly similar to the way the sophists equivocate on the term “to learn.” 
 After this sophism, the demonstration is finished.  Socrates has made Lysis recognize that 
he is not wise.  In addition, he has caused him to question his existing relationships—primarily, 
but not exclusively, his relationship with his parents.  At this point, Socrates looks over at 
                                                 
18 Benjamin Rider, “A Socratic Seduction: Philosophical Protreptic in Plato’s Lysis,” Apeiron 44 no. 1 (2011): 56. 
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Hippothales and nearly blurts out, “This, Hippothales, is how one needs to converse with his 
favorite, by humbling him and drawing in his sails instead of puffing him up and spoiling him, as 
you do” (210e3–6).  Hippothales’ gratification of Lysis through constant songs of praise only has 
the effect of spoiling him and leads to vanity.  To “catch” one’s beloved, Socrates shows, it is 
necessary to shake him from his complacency and show him that he is not, in fact, self-sufficient.  
 Why does Plato present Socrates as using sophistic arguments to make his point? 
According to James Rhodes, Socrates is not being serious either when he questions whether the 
boy’s parents love him or when he suggests that all friendships stem from the utility they obtain.  
Rhodes argues that, instead, these arguments are simply a dialectic ploy meant to “bamboozle” 
Lysis and are part of a larger attempt to correct a moral failing on the part of Lysis.  He writes, 
“when we mean to take the wind out of a person’s sails, we need not resolve that every word we 
utter be true.  It suffices to contrive that our speech, true or false, will deflate our victim.”19   
Thus, according to Rhodes, Socrates uses sophistic arguments simply to cut Lysis down to size 
and cause him to recognize that utility cannot be the basis of friendship.20  While this is possible, 
it seems to me to be only a partial answer, as it fails to account for why sophistic arguments are 
necessary for this purpose.  Presumably, Socrates would be capable of constructing non-sophistic 
arguments that have the effect of belittling Lysis.  Furthermore, it fails to account for the striking 
similarity between Socrates’ approach and the approach adopted by the sophists in the 
Euthydemus; Plato goes out of his way to a draw a parallel between these two dialogues.  
                                                 
19 James Rhodes “Platonic Philia and Political Order,” 27. 
 
20 According to Rhodes, far from seeking to develop a utilitarian conception of friendship, Socrates goal is to curb 
Lysis’ utilitarian impulses. Ibid., 31. 
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 To avoid this problem, Benjamin Rider argues that Socrates makes use of sophistic 
arguments in an effort to draw Lysis into the philosophic life.  Focusing on Lysis’ competitive 
character, Rider argues that Socrates uses Lysis’ penchant for eristic games by raising 
“interesting and worthy problems,” so as to encourage him to apply his “skills in competitive 
argument to doing real philosophy.”21  While this may seem to be a plausible interpretation, one 
of the difficulties with it—one with which Rider does not contend—is that it is not clear that 
Lysis is ever led to pursue “real philosophy” or the life of contemplation.22  If Lysis has not been 
led to pursue the life of contemplation, but has instead simply been led to question his existing 
relationships, Socrates may be acting in a reckless fashion; a recklessness that the end of the 
dialogue intimates.23  
  The recklessness of Socrates’ activity is revealed more immediately when Menexenus 
rejoins the conversation.  Upon his return, Lysis turns to Socrates and whispers to him, asking 
him to repeat the conversation to Menexenus.  Presumably Lysis desires Menexenus to go 
through the same humiliating experience he has just undergone.  Socrates counsels Lysis to tell 
Menexenus himself, instructing him to remember everything clearly: “Try, then … to remember 
it as well as possible, so you can tell him everything clearly.  And if you forget any of it, ask me 
again, when you first happen to come across me” (211a10–3).  Curiously, this type of 
                                                 
21 Rider, “A Socratic Seduction,” 65. 
 
22 See below at n. 46 and accompanying text. 
 
23 Right near the end of the dialogue (223a2–a7), Socrates narrates that the boys’ attendants came “like some 
daemons” and “bade them to leave for home.”  Socrates relates that he and the boys had an altercation with the 
attendants and “tried to drive them away.”  Socrates’ conversation has led the boys to chafe under the authority set 
over them by their parents.  
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regurgitative teaching is not in keeping with Socrates’ ordinary style, which is to consider the 
character and soul-type of his interlocutor.24  Might Plato be suggesting that Socrates is too quick 
to disabuse the young of their existing conceptions of friendship?  In any case, the fact that 
Socrates’ conversation with Lysis has had an effect on him becomes clear when Lysis reveals 
that his overriding concern is for Socrates to “chasten” Menexenus. As Bolotin notes, “In order 
to overcome his own humiliation, he arranges by stealth to have the returning Menexenus 
chastened, and not just ridiculed, in his presence.  This is no mere continuation of their friendly 
rivalry.  Lysis’ action, while playful and harmless enough, contains the seeds of betrayal.”25  It 
seems that Socrates’ earlier conversation has, in fact, caused Lysis to turn on his friend.26 
 
What Is Friendship? 
Socrates agrees to Lysis’ demand that he converse with Menexenus and initiates the conversation 
by delivering a long speech about his desire to have a friend.  He congratulates the boys on their 
friendship, noting, “I am so far from the possession that I don’t even know the manner in which 
one becomes a friend of another” (212a3–4).  Socrates’ disclamation of any knowledge regarding 
friendship sits in stark contrast with his claim to have a divine dispensation concerning erotic 
matters.  At this point, friendship and erotic love seem still to be clearly distinguished, although 
                                                 
24 Cf. Phaedrus 275d5–e5. 
25 Bolotin, 106. 
 
26 Bolotin defends Socrates from this charge, noting that Lysis’ desire to chasten Menexenus reveals that their 
“juvenile friendship was not innocent.  We may assume that the shortcomings of their friendship would have come 
to light eventually with or without the intervention of Socrates” (Bolotin, 106–7).  It’s not clear to me that this 
provides an adequate defense for Socrates’ behavior, as it underplays the extent to which Socrates’ earlier 
conversation with Lysis prompted Lysis’ desire to chasten Menexenus.  Furthermore, Socrates encourages, or 
stokes, Lysis’ desire for punishment by pointing to Menexenus’ “contentious” character (211c3–5). 
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Socrates’ disquisition concerning his desire to have a friend may perhaps foreshadow Socrates’ 
conflation of the two terms, given the association of erotic love with desire.   
 Calling on Menexenus’ “expertise” in friendship, Socrates asks him the following 
question: “When someone loves (φιλῇ) someone, which one becomes a friend (φίλος) of the 
other, the loving (φιλῶν) of the loved (φιλουμένου), or the loved (φιλούμενος) of the loving 
(φιλοῦτος)?  Or is there no difference?” (212a10 – b2).  What seems to be straightforward 
question is in fact a minefield of ambiguity.  As A. W. Price points out, Socrates’ initial 
interaction with Menexenus contains three senses, or usages, of the term φίλος: 
(i) Reciprocal and equivalent to our ‘friend’; usually conveyed by a pair 
of correlative pronouns (212a6, c8), once by a conjunction of the active 
and passive moods of the verb philein (213a6 – 7), and once simply by 
the plural ‘the philoi’ (213a7). (ii) Neuter and passive, meaning ‘dear’; 
often followed by a personal dative (most explicitly at 212e6, and 
introduced by a list of philo-compounds (for instance, ‘horse-lover’, 
‘dog-lover’, 212d5 – 7). (iii) Masculine and active, meaning ‘fond’; often 
followed by a genitive (most explicitly at 213b5–6).27  
 
This dizzying array of different usages of the term φίλος allows Socrates to switch between the 
various meanings of the term throughout his first colloquy with Menexenus, leading to their 
failure to adequately define what a friend is. 
 Menexenus answers that in his opinion it makes no difference which of the two loves the 
other, so long as one of the two individuals loves the other, the two will both become friends. 
Socrates notes that this cannot be.  Using the verb φιλεῖν, Socrates notes that it is possible for 
one to love and not be loved in return.  To explicate this, he provides the example of a lover 
                                                 
27 A. W. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 3–4. 
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(ἐραστής) who, even though he loves (φιλοῦντες) as much as possible, supposes that he is not 
loved in return (οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι).  While Socrates’ example seems to be simply a particularly 
acute case of non-reciprocal friendship, Socrates’ use of the term ἐραστής is significant, as it 
connotes a more passionate love bound up with desire than the term φίλος ordinarily implies.  As 
will be made clear, Socrates’ use of this term is not simply to provide an acute example of non-
reciprocal love, but it again foreshadows the way in which the ordinary sense of the term 
friendship or φιλία will ultimately be transformed into ἔρως by the end of the dialogue.   In any 
case, because it would be ridiculous to say that there is friendship between the ἐραστής and his 
indifferent beloved, Socrates and Menexenus temporarily conclude that love must be reciprocal. 
 Shortly afterwards, Socrates notes that it would then be improper to call those who love 
inanimate objects lovers.  Using the masculine noun φίλοι, Socrates asks whether the poet Solon 
was lying when he said, “Prosperous is he who has children as friends (φίλοι), together with 
single-hoofed horses, Dogs for the hunt, and a guest-friend in a foreign land?” (212e3–4).  Using 
the masculine noun, Socrates is able to show that in everyday discourse, people speak—in a 
colloquial way—of being friends with inanimate objects: lovers of dogs, lovers of wine, or lovers 
of wisdom.  Assuming that Solon did not speak incorrectly, they tentatively conclude, now using 
the neuter noun, that “that which is loved … is a friend (φίλον) to the lover … whether it loves or 
even if it hates” (212e6–8).  According to this account, “it’s not the one who loves who is a 
friend but the loved one” (213a5–6).  However, this definition proves to be obviously 
problematic as well, as it leads to the conclusion that “many … are loved by their enemies and 
hated by their friends” (213a8–b2).  Socrates and Menexenus agree that this conclusion is 
absurd, but given the way Socrates has framed the question, no path forward is evident. 
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 Socrates suggests that they turn away from the semantic difficulties associated with the 
concept of friendship and seek help from the poets instead.  Doing so clears the way to get at the 
ground of friendship.  Indeed, the poets assert that “always a god leads [the one who is] like to 
[the one who is] like” (214a8).  Thus, for the poets, the gods are the cause of friendship, and they 
lead those who are alike to become friends.  Ostensibly, Socrates turns to the poets because they 
are, “as it were, our fathers in wisdom and our guides” (214a1–2).  However, a short while later, 
Socrates will invoke a second poet, Hesiod, in support of a completely contradictory principle: 
those who are most alike to one another, are “most filled with envy, love of victory, and hatred 
toward each other,” while those most unlike one another are filled with friendship (215d1–4).  
According to Socrates’ interpretation of Hesiod’s poetry, those who are opposite will be friends.  
If fathers are, indeed, like the poets as Socrates suggests, they would also say contradictory 
things (cf. NE 1180a19–29).  Socrates’ point in invoking the poets as “our fathers in wisdom” 
seems to be a further attempt to undermine Lysis’ trust in his parents; neither a parent’s love nor 
the veracity of his claims ought to be taken as a matter of trust.  Instead, recourse to philosophy 
is necessary.   
 Perhaps, as a result of the unreliability of the poets, Socrates invokes the authority of 
certain philosophers “who converse and write about nature and the whole” in support of the 
contention that “like is always necessarily a friend to its like” (214b2–6).28  However, in bringing 
up these philosophers, Socrates engages in a somewhat curious dance regarding how they should 
react to the statement that like is a friend to like.  He notes, first, that perhaps the philosophers 
                                                 
28 The two philosophers who inquire into the whole and are of the view that like is necessarily always a friend to like 
are Empedocles and Democritus. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle invokes Empedocles in support of the 
principle “that like aims at like” (NE, 1155b5–7; emphasis added). 
39 
 
 
 
only speak well in half of what they say, because it would be impossible for those who are 
wicked to be friends with one another, as they would do injustice to one another.  Next, he 
alternatively suggests that perhaps the philosophers speak well in all of what they say, “only we 
don’t understand them” (214b8–10).  Why would Plato present Socrates as uncertain of the 
soundness of the philosophers’ statement?  Could it be that Plato is suggesting that Socrates does 
not understand these philosophers?  In the Phaedo, when he recounts Socrates’ famous turn from 
investigations concerning nature and the whole to what is distinctively human, Plato tells us that 
Socrates had “no natural aptitude” for natural philosophy (Phaedo 96c1–2).  Similarly, in the 
Metaphysics, Aristotle informs us that Socrates ignored the study of nature (Meta. 987b1–4).29  It 
may be that by presenting Socrates as unsure of the philosophers’ statement, Plato is pointing to 
a flaw in Socrates’ intellectual capacity, which influences his understanding of friendship.30 
 In any case, accepting that the wicked cannot be friends with one another—as they are at 
variance with even themselves—Socrates and the boys posit that the philosophers must mean 
that it is the good who are friends to one another.  However, Socrates complicates this possibility 
as well, asking, “Is he who is like, insofar as he is like, a friend to his like, and is such a one 
useful to such a one?” (214e 6–7).  This difficulty cuts to the heart of the dialogue.  By 
juxtaposing “the good” with “the useful,” Socrates is able to uncover the fundamental question 
concerning friendship.  Is it possible to have a friendship that is based solely on self-sufficiency, 
where both parties to the friendship admire and love one another for their own sake?  Or, are all 
                                                 
29 Specifically, Aristotle writes, “Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the 
world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on 
definitions” (Meta. 987b1–4). 
 
30 See below at n. 32. 
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friendships rooted in deficiency and need?  The difficulty is that in so far as a person is good, he 
would be self-sufficient and would not be in need of any other individual.  As Socrates notes, 
“Would anything whatsoever which is like anything whatsoever have the power to hold out any 
benefit to it, or to do it any harm, which that couldn’t also do itself to itself?” (214e8–10).  A 
completely self-sufficient individual, Socrates suggests, would have no need of anyone else and, 
hence, would have no reason to treasure another individual.  Because it would be absurd to claim 
that friendship exists among those who do not treasure one another, Socrates and Menexenus 
conclude that the basis of friendship cannot be the extent to which the parties are the same.  
 At this point, Socrates tries to take another tack and suggests that two individuals who are 
good might be friends with one another, insofar as they are good and not insofar as they are 
alike.  The idea seems to be that two people who are good, but nevertheless differ in some other 
respect, may be friends.  However, Socrates quickly points out that the difficulty with this 
proposition is, again, that as self-sufficient individuals who are “in want of nothing,” these good 
individuals would have no reason to treasure one another, and as such would not love one 
another (215a7–9).  As a result, because such individuals have no use for one another, they 
would not be friends.  In his earlier conversation with Lysis alone, Socrates had suggested that 
all of Lysis’ friends—including his parents and fellow citizens—are friends with him only to the 
extent to which he is useful.  Now, Socrates again asserts that it is need that causes one to 
befriend another.  Before he turns to the next possibility of who may be friends, Socrates asks 
Lysis, “Consider then, where we have gone astray.  Are we somehow being deceived in the 
whole?” (214c3–4).  Plato again seems to draw our attention to the fact that Socrates may not 
have a full grasp of “the whole,” or that his knowledge is only partial.  Perhaps there is 
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something in the saying of the “wisest ones” who study “nature and the whole” that Socrates 
does not fully understand.31 
 Socrates now brings up another possibility for the basis of friendship, noting that he once 
heard someone say, “that what is like was most hostile to its like, and that those who are good 
[were most hostile] to the good” (215c4–7).  According to this understanding of friendship, it is 
precisely those who are most unlike who will be friends with each other; the poor and the 
wealthy will be friends, as will the weak and the strong.  In fact, according to Socrates’ source, 
the principle that all opposites desire one another extends to all of nature, such that “what is dry 
desires [something] wet, [and] what is cold [something] hot” (215e3–5).  In contrast, those who 
are alike can derive no use or advantage from one another and are not friends.   
 Socrates asks Menexenus whether this “oppositional” account of friendship seems to be a 
correct understanding of friendship.  When Menexenus agrees, Socrates immediately points to 
the obvious difficulty with this conception of friendship: if opposites are friends, then it would be 
the case that an enemy—the opposite of a friend—would be “a friend to the friend” (216b3–4). It 
would, of course, be absurd to claim that an enemy is a friend.  However, the proposition that all 
opposites desire one another, would seem to entail this conclusion.  As a result of this absurd, but 
                                                 
31 In Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics, Empedocles is mentioned as the proponent of the view that “like aims at 
like.”  The only other time in the totality of the Ethics where Empedocles is mentioned is in Book VII, where 
Aristotle specifically critiques the Socratic thesis that “no one acts contrary to what is best while supposing that he is 
so acting” (1145b26–27).  In this discussion, Aristotle notes that a person may know the words of something but be 
ignorant of what they mean.  Such an individual, Aristotle comments “merely speaks, as a drunk man states the 
sayings of Empedocles” (1147b12–13).  It may be that Aristotle is suggesting that Socrates fails to understand the 
sayings of Empedocles.   
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logically necessary consequence, Socrates concludes that the “oppositional” account of 
friendship is incorrect: friendship does not exist between opposite entities.    
 However, in his depiction of this exchange, Plato seems to present Socrates as being 
much too quick to dismiss the “oppositional” conception of friendship.  Indeed, in bringing up 
the refutation of the “oppositional” conception of friendship, Socrates asks, won’t the “all-wise 
men, the ones skilled in contradicting, be pleased to leap upon us straightway and ask whether 
hatred isn’t most opposite to friendship?” (216a8–b1).  Plato seems to go out of his way to 
emphasize that only eristic debaters and the “all-wise” who are “skilled in contradicting” would 
try to exploit this linguistic difficulty rather than get to the root of what the “oppositional” 
conception of friendship entails.32  Plato suggests that by accepting the linguistic objection, 
Socrates is, in fact, acting like one of these eristic all-wise men who are skilled in contradicting. 
 Given the failure of the two previous definitions, Socrates now proposes his own 
definition, suggesting that “whatever is neither good nor bad may thus at some times become a 
friend of the good” (216c2–4).  He continues noting: 
I am really dizzy myself from the perplexity of the argument, and I’m 
afraid—as the old saying goes—that what is beautiful is a friend.  It 
seems, at any rate, like something soft, smooth, and sleek.  And that is 
why, perhaps, it easily slides past us and gives us the slip, inasmuch as it 
is such. (216c5–d2). 
 
A number of indicators suggest that this is not simply another definition, but is, in fact, a turning 
point in the dialogue.  First, Socrates’ definition drops the requirement that the friendship be 
                                                 
32 On what lies at the root of the oppositional conception of friendship, see below at pp. 164–170. 
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reciprocal. He only states that “whatever is neither good nor bad” becomes a friend of the good; 
he does not state that the good becomes a friend in return.  Furthermore, Socrates recognizes that 
friendship has been giving them the slip and admits that the perplexity of the argument has left 
him dizzy.  In fact, he’s so dizzy that he is afraid “that what is beautiful (τό καλόν) is a friend.”  
Why would Socrates be “afraid” of this possibility?  The answer, I believe, is that by suggesting 
that the beautiful is a friend, Socrates is admitting defeat as to the question of what “friendship” 
is.  At this point in the dialogue, Socrates is beginning to lay the groundwork for transforming 
friendship into erotic love.  Indeed, in the Symposium Socrates recounts how Diotima sought to 
initiate him into erotic matters by explaining to him how the beautiful acts as a spur to 
philosophical contemplation of the form of the good and the beautiful (Sym. 210a4–b6).  Diotima 
develops a “ladder of love,” whereby one’s initial encounter with the beautiful in the form of a 
particular person gives way to increasingly abstract encounters with the class of beautiful things, 
until at last one contemplates the form of the beautiful.  As we will see, Socrates’ suggested 
definition of friendship is very much akin to this “ladder of love.” 
 Socrates finally elaborates on his definition of friendship.  Noting that he is speaking “as 
a diviner”—we are not told whether his divination comes from a friendly source or not33—he 
states that “whatever is neither good nor bad is a friend of the beautiful and good” (216d3–8). By 
finding a middle category—a neutral state between good and bad—Socrates avoids the 
difficulties that beset the previous definitions of friendship.  Of course, it is precisely the 
                                                 
33 Ordinarily, when Socrates attributes his actions to a divine cause, we are told that the source is his “divine sign.”  
Furthermore, Socrates notes that the “divine sign” only ever tells “me to turn away from what I’m about to do, but 
never prescribes anything” (Theages 128d3–4).  This suggests that in this particular instance, Socrates is not 
speaking under the influence of his divine sign. 
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existence of this neutral, middle state that Diotima discloses to Socrates in the Symposium.  
Diotima tells Socrates that Eros (the δαίμων of desire) is something between the good and the 
bad, or between the beautiful and the ugly (Symposium 202b1–5).  This parallel seems further to 
indicate that the transformation from friendship to erotic love is underway. 
 At this point, none of the logical problems that hindered the previous definitions of 
friendship threaten to undermine Socrates’ proposed definition.  However, it is not yet clear why 
the neutral would seek out the good.  This difficulty is brought out when Socrates analogizes 
human desire for friendship or love to the human body’s desire for the medical art.  A healthy 
body has no need of the medical art due to its “sufficient” condition (217a6).  It is only insofar as 
the body is diseased that it seeks out the medical art.  Socrates emphasizes, however, that when 
the disease is in its initial stages the body itself remains neutral—it has not yet become bad.  As a 
result, the body (neutral) seeks the medical art (good) because of the presence of a disease (bad).  
Similarly, an individual only has need of the good when some evil is present, causing it to desire 
the good.  However, if the evil has been allowed to fester and caused the individual to become 
bad, it “deprives [him] of the desire, at the same time as the friendship, of the good,” because 
what is good cannot be a friend of what is bad (217b7–c1; emphasis added).  At this point, we 
can see Socrates effecting the transformation of friendship into erotic love, as he strings together 
desire (characteristic of ἔρως) and friendship, indicating that Socrates believes them to be in 
some way related.   
 Next, Socrates extends this formulation to an individual’s relation to wisdom.  Neither 
those who are already wise nor those who are so ignorant as to be bad would love wisdom.  
Instead, it is only those “who while having this evil, ignorance, are not yet senseless or stupid as 
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a result of it, but still regard themselves as not knowing whatever they don’t know.  And so 
therefore, the ones who are not yet either good nor bad love wisdom” (218a7–b2).  Why would 
Socrates extend his formula of “the neutral being a friend to the good” to cover the one who is 
partially ignorant as being a friend to wisdom?  The obvious answer is that he is holding up the 
philosophic life and the pursuit of wisdom as that which can most fulfill one’s desire for the 
good.  However, in making this argument, he is also walking back an argument he had earlier 
made to Lysis.  During the earlier part of his conversation with Lysis, Socrates made the 
sophistic argument that one either has knowledge, or one does not.  Socrates belittled Lysis in 
front of Hippothales by suggesting that Lysis did not have knowledge.  By walking back this 
argument, Socrates is showing how it was necessary for him to belittle Lysis, in order to make 
him aware of his ignorance.  It is only once Lysis becomes cognizant of his ignorance that he 
may be impelled to the pursuit of wisdom.  
 In any case, Socrates concludes that they have “discovered that which is the friend…. For 
we assert … that whatever is neither bad nor good is itself, because of the presence of an evil a 
friend of the good” (218b8–c3), and he rejoices as a result.  However, Socrates’ happiness at 
having discovered “that which is the friend” is short-lived, as “some most strange suspicion 
came over me—from where, I don’t know—that things we had agreed to were not true” (218c7–
9).  Socrates explains that the difficulty with this definition of friendship is that all friendships 
are entered into “for the sake of something” (218d8–9).  Just as the body (which is neutral) 
becomes friends with the medical art (which is good) for the sake of health (which is also good), 
so a friend becomes a friend for the sake of a further friend.  Socrates establishes a “ladder of 
friendship” that is strikingly similar to the “ladder of love” that Diotima develops in the 
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Symposium.  Of course, the implication is that no one becomes a friend to another for the sake of 
the other individual, but only insofar as that person can spur him on to higher friendships.  
Socrates notes that it is necessary “for us to renounce going on like this or else to arrive at some 
beginning principle,” so that they might “come to that which is a friend in the first place” 
(219c).34  Just as all the beautiful objects one encounters on the ascent up the “ladder of love” are 
pursued only for the sake of contemplating the “beautiful itself” (Sym. 211d1), so the ordinary 
friendships that one has are for the sake of the “first friend.”   
 In contrast to the Symposium, however, Socrates concludes not only that the lower 
objects on the “ladder” are for the sake of the “first friend,” but that they are, in fact, phantoms of 
the “first friend.”  Ordinary friends cannot even be considered friends as they are, in fact, 
“deceiving us,” as they are qualitatively different from the first friend (219d1–5).  Socrates’ 
denunciation of ordinary friendship seems especially harsh.  However, immediately after this, 
Socrates employs an analogy that pulls back on this harsh appraisal of friendship.  He notes that 
upon discovering that his son has drunk hemlock, a father who “values his son more highly than 
all his other possessions” would treasure not only wine, which acts as an antidote to hemlock, but 
also the jar that carries the wine (219d5–220a1).  These things are treasured, not for any intrinsic 
value they have, but only insofar as they are useful for the final good of healing the son.  A father 
who recognizes the instrumental value of the wine and the jar, values them correctly.  In the 
same way, an individual who recognizes the instrumental value of his ordinary friendships will 
value them correctly. 
                                                 
34 Socrates does not relate why it would be necessary to renounce going on like this.  Cf. Aristotle, NE 1094a17–23; 
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11 (47). 
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 Why would Socrates first suggest that ordinary friendships involve only deceptive 
phantom friends, and then indicate that these friendships have the potential to be useful?  
Through this juxtaposition, Socrates seems to be suggesting that while friendships have the 
potential to spur one on to higher friendships, and ultimately to the contemplative life, they are 
also potentially debilitating.  If a friendship leads to a sense of complacency, or a false sense of 
self-sufficiency, the friendship will act as an impediment to the philosophic life.  Thus, to the 
extent that any friendship is not directed toward the “first friend,” that is toward the good, it is a 
phantom image of friendship.  Socrates’ implicit lesson here seems to be that friendship ought to 
impel one toward the good, and that friendships are never for their own sake.  
 While Socrates’ introduction of the “first friend” theory calls into question many existing 
friendships, there is a logical difficulty with his introduction of the first friend theory as well.  
Indeed, this theory violates one of the principles established earlier; like cannot be a friend to its 
like.  By formulating the “ladder of friendship” in such a way that the body (neutral) becomes a 
friend with the medical art (good), and that the medical art accepts the friendship for the sake of 
health (good), Socrates intimates that the medical art (good) desires health (good).  Of course, 
because health and the medical art are both “good,” this would be a case of like becoming a 
friend to its like, which they had previously asserted to be impossible.  While Socrates 
recognizes this problem, he states “this I allow to go by” (219b7–9).35  Why would Socrates 
allow this to go by?  Whereas previously he invoked the violation of this principle as a reason to 
discard a definition of friendship (214e6–215a5), now this violation is allowed to go by.  It 
                                                 
35 In the Gorgias, Socrates professes that in his opinion friendship does consist of those who are alike (cf. Gor. 
510b4–6). 
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seems that Plato is, again, suggesting that Socrates is less interested in getting to the root of what 
friendship is than in driving forward a definition of friendship—a definition that encompasses 
friendship within the ambit of erotic love. 
 By establishing that the “first friend” is the only true friend, Socrates has made clear that 
all friendship aims at the good, and that it does so because of the presence of something bad; all 
friendship has its roots in some deficiency or need.  To explore whether this is, in fact, the only 
basis of friendship, Socrates engages in a thought experiment.  First, he asks whether “that which 
is good is a friend” (220b7–8).  When Menexenus agrees, Socrates follows up with the following 
hypothetical question: Supposing that what is bad did not afflict us, would the good still be 
useful to us?  If it is, in fact, the case that the “first friend” is a friend solely on account of the 
evils present in us, it would seem to be “of no use itself for its own sake” (220d7–8).  When 
Menexenus responds that based on what has been said, it doesn’t appear that the first friend 
would remain a friend to us in the absence of evil, Socrates responds with an oath.  He asks 
whether in such a situation all desires would cease as well.  Indeed, if that which is bad ceases to 
exist, would there still be hunger, thirst, or other desires? 
 The question, of course, cannot be answered, and Socrates—in recognition of this fact—
asks, “Is the question ludicrous—what will be or will not be then?  For who knows?” (221a1–6).  
What we do know, he suggests, is that even now it is possible for those with desires to desire in a 
manner that is beneficial for them (good desires), or in a manner that is detrimental to them (bad 
desires).  For example, someone might have a desire for healthy foods or for unhealthy foods.  
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As a result, if all bad things ceased to exist, only good desires would remain.36  Having come to 
the conclusion that there may still be desires in the absence of evil, Socrates asks whether “it is 
possible for one who desires and who loves passionately (ἐρῶντα) not to love (φιλεῖν) [as a 
friend] that which he desires and loves passionately?” When Menexenus answers that this would 
not be possible, Socrates concludes that “there will be, then, as it seems, some [things that are] 
friends, even if evils cease to be” (221b3–10).  At this point, it seems that Socrates has found a 
basis for friendship that is not dependent on some evil, although it does have its basis in desire, 
and is therefore not distinguishable from erotic love. 
 Socrates picks up this thread of the argument, asking, “Is desire … really a cause of 
friendship?” (221d3–6).  Securing Menexenus’ agreement, Socrates asks whether it is the case 
that “that which desires desires whatever it is in want of?” and, if so, whether “what is in want, 
[is,] therefore, a friend of that which it is in want of?” (221d8–e3).  Menexenus agrees to both 
questions.  At this point, Socrates has secured the boys’ agreement that all friendships have their 
basis in some perceived want or lack.  Recall that the background assumption of Socrates’ 
investigation at this point is that there is a basis for friendship independent of any evil. Thus, the 
want or lack that desire is responding to cannot be considered to be bad.  In any case, Socrates 
continues, addressing Menexenus and Lysis by name, and tells them that it appears “passionate 
love, friendship and desire happen to be for what is akin” (221e4–6).  Now, this is a curious 
statement.  Why would one have a desire for what is akin [οἰκείον]?  The difficulty resolves 
itself when we understand that the term “οἰκείον” can also be translated as “one’s own.”  Thus, 
                                                 
36 Specifically, Socrates states, “There will be, then, whatever desires are neither good nor bad, even if the things 
which are bad cease to be” (221b5–7). 
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one desires what is “one’s own.”  As David Bolotin notes, the desire discussed here is not “like 
any desire or need, to acquire what belongs naturally to a single human being; instead, the desire 
or longing of each being is to belong to a larger whole of which he is merely a part.”37   Socrates 
notes that if Menexenus and Lysis are friends, they are “by nature in some way akin to each 
other” (221e7–8).  If they are friends, Menexenus and Lysis belong to one another in some way; 
together they make up a composite whole.38  Both Menexenus and Lysis agree to this statement.  
It is perhaps not surprising that they do, as it seems to confirm that their friendship has its basis 
in nature.  
 Socrates concludes, “If someone desires another, boys, or loves him passionately, he 
would never desire, nor love passionately, nor love [as a friend] unless he happened to be akin in 
some way to his passionately beloved” (222a1–3).  This time only Menexenus agrees, whereas 
Lysis falls silent.  Socrates’ statement—which broadens those who are “akin” to include not only 
those who are friends but also those who love passionately—seems to have prompted Lysis to 
ponder Hippothales’ passionate love for him.  Whether or not Lysis takes Socrates statement this 
way, it seems that Hippothales certainly does, for when he hears Socrates state that because it is 
“necessary for us to love what is akin by nature” it is necessary “for the passionate lover, who is 
genuine, and not pretended, to be loved by his favorite(s),” he “radiate[s] all sorts of colors as a 
result of his pleasure” (222a6–b3).  At this point, it seems clear that Socrates has completed the 
transformation of friendship into passionate love.  He has made clear that just as it is necessary 
                                                 
37 Bolotin, 183. 
 
38 For the compatibility of Menexenus and Lysis see above at n. 18 and accompanying text. 
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for one to return the friendship (φιλία) of one who is akin by nature, it is equally necessary for 
one to return the love (ἔρως) of one who is akin by nature. 
 At this point, Socrates narrates to the reader that he “wish[ed] to examine the argument 
[for himself]” (222b4–5).  Two things are important about this narration.  First, Socrates 
expressly states that he now wishes to examine the argument for himself.  This suggests that 
previously, he was pursuing the argument, not for his own sake, but for the sake of his 
interlocutors.  Perhaps Socrates has been conducting the argument in a particular way to lead the 
boys to this understanding of friendship.  Second, Plato draws our attention to the fact that 
Socrates is in some way curious about the argument that friends might be “akin” to one another, 
or that he does not yet fully understand the argument, and therefore wishes to examine it further.  
Socrates turns to Lysis and Menexenus and states:  
If what is akin differs in some respect from the like, we might be saying 
something, in my opinion, concerning what a friend is.  But if it happens 
that like and akin are the same, it isn’t easy to reject the previous 
argument, which says that what is like is useless to its like insofar as 
there is likeness. (222b4–9). 
 
Conceding that they are “drunk” from the argument, Socrates suggests that they simply grant and 
declare that “what is akin is something other than the like” (222c1–4).  Thus, they do not even 
investigate whether this is, in fact, the case, but simply assume it.  Again, Plato seems to be 
hinting at sloppy reasoning by Socrates.  Socrates continues, “Shall we also, then, posit that what 
is good is akin to everyone, and that what is bad is alien? Or else [shall we posit] that what is bad 
is akin to the bad; that what is good is akin to the good; and that whatever is neither good nor bad 
is akin to whatever is neither good nor bad?” (222c4–8).  The boys opt for the latter, and 
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Socrates notes that this leads them back to the difficulties that plagued their earlier definitions of 
friendship; the bad and unjust will be friends with each other, no less than the good.   
 Socrates continues, suggesting that they avoid this difficulty by restricting what is akin to 
what is good—thereby excluding those who are bad.  However, he quickly notes that this avenue 
also would not work, as “on this point, too, we supposed that we had refuted ourselves” (222d8).  
However, as Bolotin points out, the refutation that the good cannot be friends to the good was 
refuted only on the supposition that the good were self-sufficient, and therefore would be of no 
use to each other.  As it is, the present argument rests on the presupposition that those who are 
akin are also good, and yet are not in every respect alike (222c1–3). Thus, it is not clear that the 
previous refutation holds as applied to the present argument.  Could it not be that two individuals 
who are akin (or who belong to each other), are both good—and yet are good each in his own 
way, or according to his own nature?   
 Socrates initially began the conversation with Menexenus and Lysis by asking which of 
them was “juster and wiser.”  It was earlier posited that this was a potentially fruitful line of 
inquiry, as it allowed the boys the option of suggesting that one of them was more just, while the 
other was wiser.  Furthermore, it was noted that throughout the dialogue Menexenus is presented 
as the more spirited or forthright of the two, while Lysis is presented as the more thoughtful.  If 
the virtues of justice and wisdom are both within the class of what is good, each boy would be 
self-sufficient in his respective field, and yet they would not be identical to one another.  As a 
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result, despite the fact that the two boys are both good and self-sufficient, they would 
nevertheless still be useful to one another.39  
 
Friendship and Desire  
Socrates’ assumption that the earlier refutation suffices to dispose of the proposed definition of 
friendship without re-examining it ensures that they do not discover a friendship between two 
self-sufficient individuals that is independent of need. Thus, the inquiry seems to conclude in a 
state of aporia. However, it is not the case that the dialogue is wholly without any development 
whatsoever.  Indeed, one fundamental change that occurs throughout the course of the dialogue 
is the character development of Lysis. Socrates’ interrogation on the nature of friendship has had 
an effect on Lysis, such that he begins not only to question his existing friendships, but also to 
recognize the benefit of erotic relationships.  While no proposed definition of friendship is ever 
successfully maintained, throughout the course of the dialogue Socrates has transformed 
friendship into erotic love.  Lysis has come to recognize that he suffers from some sort of 
metaphysical lack or need, which only the good, or the “first friend” can fulfill.  Socrates 
suggests that to the extent that Lysis’ ordinary friendships—his friendship with Menexenus, his 
friendship with his parents, or even the more extended friendship he has with the other members 
of his polis—leave him feeling sufficient and complacent, they are “phantom friends” that 
impede his access to the good.   By forcing Lysis to confront and recognize that at their root all 
                                                 
39 Bolotin notes that the notion that the spirited element of the soul is akin to the rational part of the soul is discussed 
in the Republic at 440e.  This is also picked up by Aristotle, who states that the non-rational part of the soul shares in 
reason to the extent it is capable of listening to the rational part of the soul. 
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his friendships are, in some way, based in desire, Socrates turns him toward “erotic love” and, 
therefore, toward the good.   
 That it seems to have been Socrates’ goal to turn Lysis toward “erotic love” and the good 
from start of their conversation is borne out by the end of the dialogue.  He concludes the inquiry 
into friendship by recounting the proposed definitions of friendship they have put forward—a 
method he rejects elsewhere.40  He lists nearly every definition of friendship that they have 
proposed, noting that “I, at least, don’t remember any more because of their multitude—if 
nothing among these is a friend, I no longer know what to say” (222e7–9).  Thus, Socrates seems 
to suggest that he is at a loss.  However, Plato has Socrates narrate to the reader the following: 
“But as I said these things, I already had in mind to set in motion someone else among the older 
fellows” (223a1–2).  Socrates is not nearly as much at a loss as he lets on, but is, in fact, very 
much in control of the argument.  What precisely is it that Socrates has in mind to set in motion 
among the older fellows?  While we are never explicitly informed as to what Socrates has in 
mind, the preceding action of the dialogue leaves little room for doubt.  Socrates has prepared 
Lysis for passionate love by causing him to question his existing friendships and inculcating in 
him a desire for the good.  Given that Socrates views ἕρως as an impetus to philosophic 
contemplation, it seems that what Socrates has in mind is to bring Lysis and one of the older 
fellows together.  In this way, the Lysis can be seen as a prelude to the Symposium, with its focus 
on ἔρώς.41 
                                                 
40 Phaedrus, 267d6–268a6. 
 
41 It is important to note that Socrates does not narrate that Hippothales is the older fellow whom he has in mind to 
set in motion.  This is important as it may absolve Socrates from the charge that he is acting, as Seth Benardete 
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 Throughout the dialogue, not only has Plato shown Socrates to be somewhat hasty and 
too quick to dismiss possible definitions of friendship, he has also shown him to have engaged in 
a rather reckless manner.  Socrates is seen to have used a variety of sophistic arguments to 
undermine the friendships of perhaps the youngest interlocutors in the entire Platonic corpus.42  
Indeed, first, Socrates indicated to Lysis that a person is only happy if he follows his desires, 
regardless of what those desires may be (207e1–3).  Next, he intimated that Lysis’ parents only 
love him to the extent he is useful (210d2–4).  Finally, in an effort to belittle Lysis, Socrates 
employed a specious argument that equivocated on the term “to understand,” showing him that 
he knows nothing (210d4–8).43  Socrates seems to have been depicted as a rather irresponsible 
individual.   
 One might want to absolve Socrates of his recklessness, given that his intention appears 
to have been to awaken in Lysis a desire for the good and to spur him to the contemplative life.  
However, Plato draws our attention to the fact that the dialogue does not have such a happy 
ending.  Before Socrates can “set in motion someone else among the older fellows” as he had 
intended, the attendants and brothers of Menexenus and Lysis come forward “like some 
daemons,” to bring the boys home (223a1–4).  Socrates relates that “we and those standing 
around tried to drive them away” (223a6–7).  The scene is striking, in that it is the only time in 
all the Platonic dialogues that Socrates is depicted as engaging in something more than a verbal 
                                                 
bluntly, states “a pimp.” “On Plato’s Lysis,” in The Argument of the Action: Essays on Greek Poetry and Philosophy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 198–202.  
  
42 Gary Allan Scott, Plato’s Socrates as Educator, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 52. 
 
43 Through the course of the dialogue, all three of these sophistic arguments are walked back (cf. 214c6–d4; 212e6–
213a4; 218a7–b1). 
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dispute.  As Bolotin notes, “Socrates directed or at least assisted Lysis and Menexenus in a 
rebellion against the guardians appointed by their fathers.”44  This little rebellion makes clear the 
effect that Socrates’ discussion has had on the boys.  While Socrates has sought to initiate the 
boys into the philosophic life, in the process of doing so, he has instilled in them a spirit of 
rebellion.  By finding that friendship has no basis apart from desire, Socrates has devalued 
existing attachments and friendships, including the friendships that exist between a parent and a 
child, and thereby the friendships that provide the foundation for traditional authority.  The 
rebellion with which the Lysis ends points toward the difficulty that Socrates’ approach poses to 
traditional authority and, by extension, to political cohesion.  Ultimately, the rebellion is 
unsuccessful; the attendants, we are told, were impervious to reason, as they “had been drinking 
quite a bit at the Hermaea” (223a8–b2).  Hermes, the god of tricks, appears once again to have 
frustrated Socrates’ intentions.   
 Given Socrates’ inability to match Lysis with one of the older fellows, we are left 
wondering about Lysis’ fate.  On the one hand, Lysis has been led to awareness of his own 
insufficiency, an awareness that leaves him desirous of completion—a completion that perhaps 
only philosophic contemplation and the pursuit of the truth can attain.  On the other hand, 
Socrates has also instilled within Lysis a rebellious streak that causes him to be dismissive of 
existing friendships.   These two outcomes suggest that Plato is aware of the dangers of Socrates’ 
approach.  The Socratic approach, he suggests, may lead an individual to pursue the 
contemplative life.  However, it may equally induce a hubris that is destructive of the friendships 
                                                 
44 Bolotin, 197. 
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that are at the basis of political life.45  The name of the dialogue itself suggests as much.  “Lysis” 
(Λυσις) can be translated both as “to loosen” and “to destroy.”46  Thus, while Socrates seeks to 
loosen Lysis from the strictures and standards of the city, he is at the same time destroying his 
pre-existing friendships in a way that may be harmful to the health of the polis.  
                                                 
45 Hannah Arendt explains how Socratic questioning of traditional virtues led some of his students to turn against 
Athenian customs: “In the circle around Socrates, there were men like Alcibiades and Critias—God knows, by no 
means the worst among his so-called pupils—who had turned out to be a real threat to the polis, and this … because 
they had been aroused by the gadfly.  What they had been aroused to was license and cynicism.  Not content with 
being taught how to think without being taught a doctrine, they changed the non-results of the Socratic thinking 
examination into negative results:  If we cannot define what piety is, let us be impious” Hannah Arendt, The Life of 
the Mind (New York: Harcourt, 1977,) 175. 
 
46 H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, Greek English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 1066–67. 
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CHAPTER TWO.   SOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 
 
In his Seventh Letter, Plato relates that he gave up on the reformation of politics because he 
found political reformation to be impossible without friends (Sev. Let. 325d).  For Plato, 
friendship seems to be a sine qua non for political action.  This is noteworthy, in that it suggests 
that Plato’s depiction of the Socratic approach to friendship has implications for politics.  What 
does Socrates’ treatment of friendship tell us about his relationship to politics?  We have seen 
that in the Lysis, Plato presents Socrates as running roughshod over the phenomenon of 
friendship: he transforms it into erotic desire.  Socrates takes his interlocutors’ friendships—
which were thought (perhaps erroneously) to be full and self-sufficient—and substitutes for them 
something that has its basis in desire, lack, or incompleteness.  In the Lysis, Socrates does not 
ever discover a definition of friendship that entails an appreciation between two people solely for 
the other’s good qualities.  Nevertheless, at the end of the dialogue, Socrates indicates that he 
considers himself to be the boys’ friend.  Through the process of refuting the boys, Socrates has, 
in some way, become their friend.  In addition, we have seen that Plato seems to be skeptical of 
Socrates’ approach to friendship.  Not only does he seem to point to an oversight or 
misunderstanding in Socrates’ understanding of friendship, but he also indicates that dangerous 
political effects attend the Socratic approach to friendship.  The rebellion that Socrates inspires at 
the end of the dialogue is indicative of this, and it hints at the deleterious effect that Socrates’ 
understanding of friendship can have on politics. 
 Having uncovered Socrates’ understanding of friendship by way of a close analysis of the 
Lysis, it is now necessary to explicate the way that this understanding impacts his approach to 
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politics.  In contrast to his presentation of Socrates’ conception of friendship, which covers only 
a single dialogue, Plato’s depiction of the Socratic approach to politics is covered in a variety of 
dialogues, each of which reveals only an aspect of this approach.1  The two dialogues that are 
most apposite for uncovering Socrates’ relationship to the political community are the Apology 
and the Gorgias.2  In the course of his trial, recounted in the Apology, Socrates documents his 
relationship with the polis.  As will be made clear, the Apology shows that Socrates’ interaction 
with the political community is essentially one of negation and abstention.   However, the trial 
takes place in a very public manner, in front of an audience consisting of five hundred jurors, 
who are largely hostile to Socrates’ way of life.  As a result, the reasons adduced by Socrates in 
defense of his peculiar stance toward the political community do not convey the totality of the 
reasons for his seemingly antagonistic relation to the political community.  Thus, while the 
Apology provides a succinct overview detailing the facts of Socrates’ relationship to the political 
realm, it does not adequately get to the heart of why the facts are the way they are.   
 In order to get to the heart of why Socrates’ stance toward political life is one of negation 
and abstention, it is necessary to turn to the Gorgias. Not only does the Gorgias allude to and 
                                                 
1 Leo Strauss comments, “The individual dialogue is not a chapter from an encyclopaedia of the philosophic sciences 
or from a system of philosophy, and still less a relic of a stage of Plato’s development.  Each dialogue deals with one 
part; it reveals the truth about that part.  But the truth about a part is a partial truth, a half truth.  Each dialogue, we 
venture to say, abstracts from something that is most important to the subject matter of the dialogue.” The City and 
Man, 62. 
 
2 The Platonic work that most obviously deals with Socrates’ relation to politics is, of course, the Republic.  In the 
Republic, Socrates and his interlocutors famously construct a “city in speech” in an effort to discover what justice is.  
Nevertheless, I have chosen to focus on the Gorgias because, like the Apology, it focuses on Socrates’ way of life.  
Both the Apology and the Gorgias concern Socrates’ way of life—that is the philosophic life—and examine its 
relation to the polis.  In contrast, the primary investigation of the Republic is not Socrates’ orientation toward 
political life, but the city taken as a whole and the way in which it ought to be ordered.  In this way, the Gorgias is 
primarily a practical dialogue rather than a theoretical dialogue.  The Gorgias concerns the practical question of how 
an individual ought to live, while the Republic is a theoretical investigation into the form of justice and the manner 
in which it might come into being in the city as a whole. 
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foreshadow Socrates’ trial and death numerous times, but it also deals with the same theme as 
the Apology.  Socrates’ way of life is explicitly put at issue and is contrasted with the active life 
of politics.3  However, in contrast to the highly public character of the Apology in which the 
political community makes Socrates’ way of life the focus of debate, the Gorgias is a private 
discussion among learned individuals, including one of the leading rhetoricians of the time, in 
which Socrates himself puts his way of life under discussion.  It is in this private setting amongst 
learned individuals that Socrates feels free to uncover what “he professes and teaches,” or “who 
he is” (Gor. 447–d).4  As Socrates makes clear, it is his opinion on the nature of friendship that 
causes his approach to the conventional practice of politics to be one of avoidance and 
negativity. 
 
The Apology:  A Life of Principled Abstention 
 In the Gorgias, Socrates tells Chaerephon to begin the conversation with the great sophist 
Gorgias by asking him “who he is” (447d).  By means of this question, Socrates aims to 
determine Gorgias’ relation to the polis.  Socrates points out that based on the craft in which an 
individual engages, one can easily determine what he ought to be called and what his function is 
in the polis.  By asking this question, Socrates indicates (as does the remainder of the dialogue) 
that the rhetoricians’ relation to the polis is questionable.  However, we may equally ask the 
                                                 
3 Further connection between the Apology and the Gorgias is made clear by Douglas D. Feaver and John E. Hare.  
They argue that every section of the Socrates’ main speech in the Apology is an “inverted parody” of Gorgias’ 
Defense of Palamedes. “The Apology as an Inverted Parody of Rhetoric,” Arethusa 14 no. 2 (1981), 205–16. 
 
4 All citations to the Gorgias are taken from the interpretation provided by James H. Nichols Jr. unless otherwise 
noted. Plato Gorgias (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).  
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same question of Socrates himself: “Who is he?” What is Socrates’ relation to the polis?  Does 
the philosopher have a defined role in the city, similar to that of any other craftsman?  An 
examination of the Apology does not definitively answer these questions.  However, it does 
reveal two essential characteristics about Socrates’ way of life that point toward an answer: 
Socrates’ way of life is both private and negative.  Socrates abstains from a public role in the 
city, and when a public role is forced upon him, his public activity is essentially negative in 
character.    
 In the course of his trial, Socrates explains his way of life as a kind of divine mission 
designed to reveal the paucity of human wisdom.  He recounts his perplexity at the fact that, in 
response to a question posed by Chaerephon, the oracle at Delphi stated there was none wiser 
than Socrates (21a).5  Why, Socrates wonders, would the oracle make this statement, given that 
he was, in fact, very conscious of his lack of wisdom?  Socrates states that as a result of his 
perplexity he set out to test the oracle’s statement by speaking to the politicians, poets, and 
craftsmen of the city, to test their wisdom.  Socrates relates that those most reputed to be wise 
among these three classes turned out to be ignorant of the “greatest things” (22d).6  In fact, after 
                                                 
5 All citations to the Apology will be taken from Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West’s translation in Four Texts 
on Socrates: Plato and Aristophanes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
 
6 Specifically, Socrates relates that the politician he questioned “seemed to be wise, both to man other human beings 
and most of all to himself, but that he was not” (21c).  In turn, of the poets, Socrates relates that “they do not make 
what they make by wisdom, but by some sort of nature and while inspired…. For they too say many noble things, 
but they know nothing of what they speak” (22b).  Last, of the manual artisans, or craftsman, Socrates states, “They 
did have knowledge of things which I did not have knowledge of, and in this way they were wiser than I.  But … the 
good craftsmen also seemed to go wrong in the same way as the poets: because he performed his art nobly, each one 
deemed himself wisest also in the other things, the greatest things—and this discordant note of theirs seemed to hide 
that wisdom” (22d). 
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speaking to one of the politicians, Socrates tells the jurors that he reasoned with himself as 
follows:  
I am wiser than this human being.  For probably neither of us knows 
anything noble and good, but he supposes he knows something when he 
does not know, while I, just as I do not know, do not even suppose that I 
do.  I am likely to be a little bit wiser than he in this very thing: that 
whatever I do not know, I do not even suppose I know. (21d). 
 
Socrates has no knowledge of the “greatest things” and is eminently aware of his ignorance.  As 
a result, he concludes that, paradoxically, he is the wisest. 
 In recounting his activities, Socrates reveals that the entire approach he adopts is 
negative.  This emphasis on negativity is consistent with what are held to be Plato’s early 
dialogues, in which Socrates employs dialectical argumentation to dissolve his interlocutors’ 
opinions about the various virtues.  In none of these early dialogues does Socrates ever arrive at a 
definition of the virtues.  As Dana Villa notes, Socrates does not claim to have any knowledge of 
the virtues.  Instead, all his energies “are devoted to dissolving the crust of convention and the 
hubristic claim to moral expertise.”7   Thus, the Socratic method seems to be entirely negative.8    
 In the Apology, after emphasizing that he possesses no knowledge of the “greatest 
things,” Socrates argues that his negativity and his practice of dissolving his fellow citizens’ 
                                                 
7 Dana Villa, Socratic Citizenship (Princeton University Press, 2001), 2. 
 
8 For an extended account of Socrates’ negativity see Søren Kierkegaard, On the Concept of Irony, with Continual 
Reference to Socrates: Together with Notes of Schelling’s Berlin Lectures, ed. and trans. Howard Vincent Hong and 
Edna Hatlestad Hong. (Princeton University Press, 1992).  For a contrary perspective, which emphasizes the positive 
nature of Socrates’ philosophic practice, see Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1991); Terence Irwin, “Socrates’ Method,” in Plato’s Ethics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 17–30. 
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opinions nevertheless benefits his fellow citizens.  He states that as a result of his divine mission, 
“I always do your business, going to each of you privately, as a father or an older brother might 
do, persuading you to care for virtue” (31b). By forcing them to examine their opinions 
concerning the “greatest things,” Socrates exposes his fellow citizens’ ignorance, purges them of 
their opinions, and opens them up to the possibility of true knowledge by perplexing them, or 
leading them to a state of confusion.9  What is revealing about Socrates’ statement is that it 
shows not only the negative character of his teaching, but also the private form it takes.  Socrates 
dissolves his fellow citizens’ opinions, and he does so by going around to each of them privately, 
and by “being a busybody in private” (31c).10   
 The negative, private approach that Socrates adopts ensures that he does not involve 
himself in the democratic institutions of Athens.  Instead, he purposefully seeks to avoid political 
activity (31c–d).  By Athenian standards, Socrates’ choice is, at best, peculiar.  Indeed, in 
choosing to eschew public life, Socrates is acting in a way that is not only contrary to what was 
customary for Athenians, but in a way that was decried as unpatriotic.  For example, in his 
famous Funeral Oration, Pericles describes the public life of the Athenian citizens as follows: 
“Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as 
well….  We do not say that man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own 
                                                 
9 This is, of course, a truncated description of the activity Socrates undertakes in the Lysis, as described in the 
previous chapter. Cf. Sophist 231e; Meno 84a–b. 
 
10 Cf. Rep. 443b–444a. 
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business; we say that he has no business here at all.”11  Socrates’ private, abstentious approach 
seems to be directly contrary to the Athenian ideals posited by Pericles. 
 Why would Socrates choose to proceed in a purely private manner that is contrary to the 
ideals and practices of his polis?  Much of the extant literature emphasizing Socrates’ negative 
and abstentious relation to the polis in the Apology suggests that his stance towards politics stems 
from his unique moral integrity and a commitment to avoiding injustice.  In fact, this reading of 
the Apology has become so ubiquitous that its characterization of Socrates’ stance toward the 
polis has been labeled “Socratic Citizenship.”12  This commentarial tradition suggests that 
Socrates resolves the tension between his commitment to justice and the seemingly unavoidable 
injustice required by politics by abjuring the practice of politics.  Scholars point to Socrates’ own 
argument for political abstention: 
Know well, men of Athens, if I had long ago attempted to be politically 
active, I would long ago have perished, and I would have benefitted 
neither you nor myself…. For there is no human being who will preserve 
his life if he genuinely opposes either you or any other multitude and 
prevents many unjust and unlawful things from happening in the city.  
Rather, if someone who really fights for the just is going to preserve 
himself even for a short time, it is necessary for him to lead a private 
rather than a public life. (31d–32a).13 
 
                                                 
11 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin, 1972), 147. 
 
12 See e.g., George Kateb, “Socratic Integrity,” in Nomos XL: Integrity and Conscience, 40, (1998): 77–112; Villa, 
Socratic Citizenship.   
 
13 See e.g., Kateb, “Socratic Integrity,” 82; Villa, Socratic Citizenship, 25–26. 
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Socrates seems to ground his abstention from politics in the belief that one cannot be politically 
involved while being committed to justice, without endangering his own life.  Socrates’ moral 
integrity would seem to require political abstention. 
 Political abstention, however, is not always possible.  As a result, those who emphasize 
Socrates’ moral integrity and commitment to justice posit that when political action is 
unavoidable, Socrates maintains that it is best to act in an almost entirely negative fashion, so as 
to avoid being complicit in injustice.  Pointing to the two instances Socrates mentions where he 
was forced to involve himself in politics, these scholars maintain that Socrates chooses the 
negative stances of dissent and noncompliance in order to avoid being a party to acts of injustice.  
The first example Socrates provides is when he was elected by lot to serve on the Council, the 
administrative body overseeing the domestic political affairs of the city during Athens’ 
democratic period.  Socrates was elected during the Peloponnesian war and, as part of his duties, 
was called upon to judge the conduct of ten generals who had been accused of neglecting their 
duties during the war.14  Socrates relates that although the Council wished to judge the ten 
generals “as a group,” which was contrary to Athenian law, he alone opposed the Council and 
voted against their action (32b).  Thus, George Kateb concludes that “Socrates risks life and 
                                                 
14 Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West relate the events that comprise the background to Socrates’ political 
activity: “Two years before the end of the [Peloponnesian] war, in 406, the Athenians won a major victory in a naval 
battle fought near the Aegean island of Arginusae.  However, on account of the confusion following the battle and a 
storm that arose afterwards, the disabled ships and the Athenians still at the scene of the battle, both alive and dead, 
could not be rescued as the ten generals had intended.  When the generals returned to Athens, eight of them were 
accused by Theramenes, an unscrupulous and ambitious politician, of neglecting their duty….  Theramenes cleverly 
manipulated the Assembly of the people, and it was led to condemn the eight to death as a group, although it was 
evident that many or perhaps all of them were innocent of wrongdoing.  Socrates … maintained that such a 
procedure was against the law on the ground that the generals should have been tried separately.  His protest was 
ineffectual, for his fellow prytanes easily yielded to the loud threats of the politicians and the Assembly.” Four 
Texts, 84 n. 58. 
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freedom in situations in which no one else does. He stands alone, as one person, as his naked 
moral self. He has only himself to fall back on. His courage is for the sake of refusing to be an 
instrument of injustice.”15 Thus, Socrates’ negative morality mandates that he oppose the unjust 
political action of the Council by choosing to dissent boldly from their action.  Although 
Socrates’ dissent may be ineffectual, Kateb concludes that he would rather maintain his moral 
integrity than lend support to their injustice.   
 The second example where Socrates acts in a negative manner is the arrest of Leon the 
Salaminian, which occurred during the oligarchic reign of the Thirty Tyrants.  He relates that the 
Thirty ordered him and four others to arrest Leon, a man reputed to be perfectly just, and bring 
him from Salamis to die.16  Socrates relates, “That government, as strong as it was, did not shock 
me into doing anything unjust….  The other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I 
departed and went home.  And perhaps I would have died because of this, if that government had 
not been quickly overthrown” (Apol. 32d).  Here, rather than engage in what he considers to be 
an unjust act, Socrates refuses to comply with the order.  Dana Villa writes that Socrates’ 
noncompliance bespeaks “the seriousness with which he takes the imperative of avoiding 
injustice, while reflecting the awareness of how the life of active citizenship … constantly 
generates injustice.”17  Avoidance of injustice may seem to be the primary driver of Socrates’ 
negative and abstentious relation to politics.  
                                                 
15 George Kateb, “Socratic Integrity” 84. 
 
16 Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West note that “the arrest and execution without trial of Leon, who was reputed 
to be a perfectly just man, was one of the harshest of the many injustices committed by the oligarchy.” Four Texts, 
84 n. 59. 
 
17 Villa, Socratic Citizenship, 26. 
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 Based on Socrates’ stance toward politics, advocates of the “Socratic Citizenship” 
interpretation suggest that Socrates evinces a type of citizenship that is “moderately alienated” 
from the polis.  For the most part, these readings emphasize that it is Socrates’ commitment to 
avoiding injustice that leads him toward a politics of abstention and negation.  For example, 
Hannah Arendt argues that Socrates’ approach to politics paralyzes political action.  For Arendt, 
Socrates’ negative, dissolvent approach to politics “slows people down in their potentially unjust 
pursuits.”18  Similarly, George Kateb argues that when Socrates “engages in worldly action in 
acts of citizenship, his whole concern is to avoid injustice.”19  And Dana Villa suggests that “the 
avoidance of injustice, where the sense of injustice is plain and reflects widely held standards, is 
the heart of Socratic virtue.”20  According to these commentators, Socrates’ strong commitment 
to avoiding injustice leads to a “moderately alienated citizenship” that is inherently skeptical of 
existing claims to justice.  While not each of these scholars agrees that Socratic Citizenship is 
possible, or desirable,21 all see in the figure of Socrates the archetype of a politics of negation 
and abstention that is based on the avoidance of injustice.   
                                                 
18 Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture,” Social Research 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1971): 423. 
 
19 Kateb, “Socratic Integrity,” 80. 
 
20 Villa, Socratic Citizenship, 27. 
 
21  Dana Villa emphasizes his disagreement with Hannah Arendt.  He writes that for Arendt, “Socrates cannot serve 
as a model of citizenship, philosophical or otherwise, precisely because his care for his soul undermines the citizens’ 
care for the (public) world.  Socratic conscience is, at bottom, self-interest.”  Villa counters this by posting that 
Socratic citizenship is a salutary orientation toward the world of politics whereby “one best pursues one’s 
responsibility to the world, to the claims of citizenship, by cultivating a certain distance between the self and the 
passions and energies of the demos.” Socratic Citizenship, 52–53.  Thus, for Villa, Socrates’ private actions have a 
public benefit.  However, Socrates never states that he intends to benefit the city as a whole.  To be sure, he likens 
himself to a gadfly who has been “set upon the city by the god, as though upon a great and well-born horse” (Apol. 
30e).  However, he follows this up by reverting to a non-collectivist description of his mission, stating, “I awaken 
and persuade and reproach each one of you” (ibid., 30e–31a).  The remainder of this chapter will argue that 
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 The notion that Socrates’ stance to politics stems from a desire to avoid injustice is, as far 
as it goes, correct.  However, it fails to present the full picture of why Socrates employs the 
stance toward politics that he does.  It is noteworthy that in the Apology, no definition of either 
justice or injustice is ever advanced.  Furthermore, in this same dialogue, Socrates never claims 
that his abstention from political activity results from a clash between his commitment to 
avoiding injustice and the inevitable injustice that the practice of politics involves.  Instead, he 
notes that his abstention is a product of the daimonic voice:   
The cause of this [abstention from politics] is what you have heard me 
speak of many times and in many places, that something divine and 
daimonic comes to me, a voice…. This is something which began for me 
in childhood: a sort of voice comes, and whenever it comes, it always 
turns me away from whatever I am about to do, but never turns me 
forward.  This is what opposes my political activity. (31c3–d6). 
 
It is the daimonic voice that is specifically credited as opposing Socrates’ political activity. 
Socrates’ avoidance of injustice seems to be simply an effect of the daimonion’s counsel to 
abstain from politics. 
 If the daimonion is Socrates’ individuated conscience as numerous scholars have 
suggested, then it is possible that Socrates’ desire to avoidance injustice is simply the product of 
his daimonion, or conscience.22  However, a number of factors indicate that the relation between 
                                                 
Socrates’ negative and private approach stems from a concern that the city interferes with the health of the soul, or 
that there is a disharmony between the city and the soul. 
 
22 The central role that Socrates’ daimonion plays in the Apology, along with the relatively scant information we 
receive about it in the entirety of the Platonic corpus, has led to much academic speculation over what precisely 
Socrates’ daimonion is.  Today, most scholars assume, in accordance with Hegel, that the daimonion represents 
Socrates’ individuated conscience. See G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane, 
vol. 1, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955), 421–25.  For a contrary perspective, which emphasizes the 
religious character of the Socratic daimonion, see Vlastos, Socrates, 158.  References to Socrates’ daimonion in the 
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Socrates’ daimonion and his desire to avoid injustice are somewhat more complex.  First, while 
the daimonion is cited as being the cause of Socrates’ abstention from political activity, 
Socrates’ contention that one cannot both act justly and preserve one’s own life while engaging 
in political activity is only cited as evidence that the daimonion’s opposition is “altogether 
noble” (31d, emphasis added).23  He does not cite this fact as the cause of his abstention for 
political activity.  In fact, in introducing the two examples from his own life that show that one 
cannot be both committed to opposing injustice and be politically active without endangering 
one’s life, Socrates states, “I for my part will offer great proofs of these things for you—not 
speeches, but what you honor, deeds” (32a; emphasis in original).  He goes on to say, “I will tell 
you vulgar things, typical of the law courts, but true” (32a–b).  While the examples that Socrates 
provides of his commitment to moral integrity are honorable according to Athenian standards, 
they are in his estimation vulgar and paltry.24 
 Socrates’ depiction of the Athenian conception of justice as vulgar, combined with the 
fact that the Apology contains no definition of justice raises the questions: what is Socrates’ real 
reason for abstaining from politics?  Why does the daimonion oppose his involvement in 
politics? And, what is Socrates’ conception of justice?  The platonic corpus as a whole provides 
little information about Socrates’ daimonion.  However, the Gorgias does offer a suggestion as 
                                                 
works of Plato include Apology 31c–d; 40a–c, Euthyphro 3b, Republic 496c, Thaeatetus 151a, Phaedrus 224b–c, 
Euthydemus 272e, and Theages 128d–131a. 
 
23 The noble (γενναῖος) is an important term and in the Hippias Major its definition proves elusive. 
 
24 Later in his defense speech, Socrates again subtly implies that he values speech over deeds: “If I say that this even 
happens to be a very great good for a human being—to make speeches every day about virtue and the other things 
about which you hear me conversing and examining both myself and others—and that the unexamined life is not 
worth living for a human being, you will be persuaded by me still less when I say these things” (Apol. 38a).  As I 
will make clear, the distinction between speech and deed becomes an important theme in the Gorgias. 
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to why Socrates’ daimonion may oppose his involvement in politics.  As noted above, the 
Gorgias, like the Apology, deals with Socrates’ relation to the polis, but it does so in a more 
private setting, among learned intellectuals.  In the Gorgias, Socrates claims, in what appears to 
be a stark contrast with the Apology, that he is the only person in all of Athens who practices 
politics (Gorg. 521d).  While on the face of it, Socrates’ claim appears to contradict the negative 
and abstentious stance he takes towards politics in the Apology, the claim makes sense in light of 
the Gorgias’ teaching concerning friendship and justice.  Specifically, the Gorgias shows that 
the Socratic understanding of friendship affects Socrates’ approach to politics, rendering it an 
exclusively negative and private matter. 
 
The Gorgias Part I: Phantom Friends and Phantom Politics 
 The Gorgias is ordinarily considered to be Plato’s dialogue concerning rhetoric.  
However, a closer look reveals that the dialogue is nearly equally concerned with friendship and 
justice, or the way one ought to treat a friend.25  The Gorgias is divided into two parts.  In the 
first part, Socrates engages with the well-known sophist Gorgias and his pupil Polus, who are 
visiting Athens; in the second part, he converses with Callicles, the Athenian at whose house 
Gorgias and Polus are staying.  While their conversations cover similar topics, Socrates treats his 
                                                 
25 Roger Duncan notes, “As far as I can determine insufficient attention has been paid, in the interpretation of the 
Gorgias, to the role of φιλία, particularly as it features in that third and longest section of the dialogue where 
Socrates and Callicles confront each other.” “Philia in the Gorgias,” Apeiron 8 no. 1 (1974): 23–25. The 
prominence of the theme of friendship in the Gorgias would be unsurprising if the narrative setting places it as 
occurring immediately after the Lysis, as Catherine Zuckert argues. Plato’s Philosophers, 8–9.  If Zuckert is correct, 
we can surmise that in the Gorgias Plato works out how Socrates’ understanding of friendship articulated in the 
Lysis impacts his relation to the political realm.   
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interlocutors very differently.  At the end of the first part of the dialogue, he seems to send Polus 
back into the city, armed with a rhetoric designed to challenge the city’s conventions.  In 
contrast, toward the end of the second half of the dialogue, Callicles is counseled to avoid the 
conventional practice of politics altogether.  The disparate treatment Socrates affords his 
interlocutors has long been the source of scholarly debate.  I will argue that the difference in 
approach Socrates takes with his interlocutors stems from his understanding of friendship.  
Furthermore, I will show that Socrates’ understanding of friendship also makes sense of 
Socrates’ negative approach to politics and his abstention from the conventional practice of 
politics.  An analysis of Socrates’ discussion with Polus reveals that Socrates’ understanding of 
friendship necessitates a negative approach to politics, in which rhetoric is used to purge the city 
of injustice.  However, Socrates also invokes friendship as grounds for Callicles to avoid the 
conventional practice of politics altogether.  Thus, the Gorgias explains that friendship lies 
behind both Socrates’ negative and his abstentious approach toward politics.26   
 The connection between the themes of rhetoric and friendship comes to the fore near the 
beginning of the dialogue.  Socrates and Chaerephon arrive late at Callicles’ house, and Callicles 
states, “In war and battle, they say, one must take part in this manner” (447a).  We soon learn 
that Gorgias, a sophist visiting from Leontini, has been regaling the crowd inside with rhetoric, 
and that Socrates and Chaerephon have come too late to hear the display of the speeches.  
Callicles’ remark suggests that rhetoric is war—that is, rhetoric necessarily contains a conflict in 
                                                 
26 It might reasonably be questioned how Socrates’ understanding of friendship causes him both to counsel Polus to 
return to the city and use rhetoric to purge it of injustice and to counsel Callicles to avoid politics altogether.  As I 
hope to make clear, Socrates’ ability to argue in this way hinges upon the different character of each of his 
interlocutors.  While neither Polus nor Callicles is impervious to shame, Callicles proves to be much less sensitive to 
shame than does Polus. 
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which one side emerges victorious.  Socrates responds with his own proverb, “Oh, so have we 
then come, as the saying goes, after the feast and too late?” (447a).  In contrast to Callicles’ 
statement, the proverb quoted by Socrates implies that rhetoric is not like war but is more like a 
feast of which all friends can partake.  The opening colloquy sets up the fundamental question of 
the dialogue: Is rhetoric akin to war with its clash of opposing interests, or is it more like a feast 
shared among friends that leaves everyone satisfied? 
 Socrates informs Callicles that he would prefer to skip the feast and learn instead from 
Gorgias “what the power of the man’s art is, and what it is that he professes and teaches” (447c).  
What is the power of Gorgianic rhetoric?  Socrates wishes to know to what extent rhetoric can 
truly reconcile opposing interests and satisfy all parties.27  To begin the inquiry, Socrates 
instructs Chaerephon to ask Gorgias “who he is” (447d).  Perhaps in a bid to put on his own 
display, Polus interjects with an oath, “By Zeus, Chaerephon, test me, if you wish!” (448a).  
Chaerephon obliges and asks Polus what it is that Gorgias ought to be called; just as one who 
knows the art of medicine is called a doctor, and one experienced in the art of painting is called a 
painter, so Chaerephon wishes to know, on the basis of Gorgias’ art, what he should be called.  
As noted above, the question of who Gorgias is has to do with his relation to the city—what is 
Gorgias’ contribution to the city? Or, how does he fit into the whole?28  In providing the example 
                                                 
27 Seth Benardete notes, “The issue in the background of the Gorgias is very simple.  If Gorgianic rhetoric has the 
power Gorgias claims for it, it would necessarily follow that the best city in speech of the Republic could be realized 
anywhere on earth and at any time.” The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991), 5. 
 
28 Gorgias was a famous rhetorician who traveled from city to city selling his knowledge.  Teresa Morgan, “Rhetoric 
and Education,” in A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, ed. Ian Worthington (West Sussex: Blackwell, 2010), 304. The 
question of Gorgias’ relation to the city is, therefore, apposite, as the manner in which Gorgias practices his craft 
transcends political boundaries and loyalties.  Later on, Gorgias will claim that rhetoric ought to be used justly and 
for the benefit of friends (456a–457c).  
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of a doctor and a painter, Chaerephon—perhaps unwittingly—anticipates Socrates’ discussion 
with Gorgias and gets to the heart of the dialogue.  Is rhetoric akin to the knowledge of a doctor 
or is it merely an experience or skill that imitates reality? 
 Polus responds with comic prolixity, saying nearly nothing.29  He simply praises Gorgias’ 
art as “the best,” without saying what it consists of.  However, Polus does choose between the 
two options provided by Chaerephon, “knowledge” and “experience,” noting that art is simply 
experience, and that art (as experience) conquers chance (448c).30 Polus suggests that in the 
absence of the skills obtained through experience, our lives would proceed according to the 
vagaries of fortune.  According to Polus, rhetoric is one of the skills that can conquer chance. At 
this point, Socrates interjects, noting that Polus has engaged in rhetoric—that is, he has simply 
praised Gorgias’ art, without answering what it is.  Socrates knows enough about rhetoric to 
know that it consists in assigning blame and praise, and that it commonly does so without 
knowledge of its object.  Because of Polus’ failure, Socrates begins to engage Gorgias directly.  
After quickly establishing that the art he practices is rhetoric and that, as such, Gorgias can 
rightly be called a rhetor, Socrates asks him, “what of the things that are (τα ὄντα), does rhetoric 
happen to be about?” “About what … is it a science?” (449d).  By characterizing Gorgias’ 
practice in this way, Socrates skillfully shifts the category under which rhetoric falls from art to 
science, and from experience to knowledge.31  By shifting rhetoric’s categorization in this way, 
                                                 
29 “Chaerephon, many arts have been discovered among men experimentally through experiences.  For experience 
causes our life to proceed by art, whereas inexperience causes it to proceed by chance.  Of each of these arts, various 
men variously partake of various ones, and the best men partake of the best; among these is Gorgias here, and he has 
a share in the finest of the arts” (448c). 
 
30 Cf. Aristotle, Meta. 981a1–5.  
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Socrates suggests that he wants to probe the extent to which Gorgias’ practice is directed towards 
truth or towards “the things that are.” 
 Gorgias responds that rhetoric concerns speeches and, when pressed to follow up with 
more specificity, Gorgias states in a manner reminiscent of Polus’ vacuous response, that the 
rhetoric of speeches is concerned with “the greatest of human affairs … and the best” (451d).  
Socrates points out that opinions vary on what is “the greatest of human affairs,” and to illustrate 
he quotes a quatrain from a popular drinking song, which enumerates the various goods people 
claim are best: “‘Being healthy is best, and second is to have become beautiful and third’ as the 
poet who wrote the song says, ‘is being wealthy without fraud’” (451e).  However, Socrates 
omits portions from the song.  The full quotation concerning the second good is “to have become 
beautiful in one’s nature.”  In addition, Socrates completely omits the song’s fourth good, 
namely, “to be in the prime of youth with friends.”32  Both of these omissions are significant 
because, as I will make clear, they go to the heart of the issue of the Gorgias: to what extent is 
rhetoric akin to a war, and to what extent is it akin to a feast shared by friends? 
 Gorgias responds that rhetoric has the power to obtain all the goods mentioned by 
Socrates in the drinking song.  Rhetoric is “able to persuade by speeches” in any political setting, 
                                                 
31 This shift is purposeful, and it betrays Socrates’ efforts to discover whether rhetoric is capable of aiming towards 
what is, or towards truth. Based on the manner in which Socrates appears to try and redirect rhetoric towards the 
things “that are,” some scholars have suggested that Socrates’ purpose is to reform rhetoric. See Devin Stauffer, The 
Unity of Plato’s ‘Gorgias’: Rhetoric, Justice and the Philosophic Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006). 
 
32 E. R. Dodds provides the full quatrain.  He remarks that “the fourth item is omitted by Plato, since it does not 
depend on any τέχνη.” Plato Gorgias: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1959), 200.  However, Dodds does not comment on Socrates’ incomplete quotation of the second good. My own 
view is that Socrates’ omission of the fourth good is meant to raise the question of what role friendship ought to play 
in political life.  On Socrates’ incomplete quotation of the second good, see n. 59 and accompanying text below. 
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enabling one to obtain power over the artisans who produce health, beauty, and wealth (452e).  
Gorgias thus sets up rhetoric as architectonic; it is able to command all other arts and sciences 
and is able to satisfy all bodily desires.  However, rhetoric’s relation to friendship—the fourth 
good of the drinking song that was left unstated by Socrates—remains open.  Is friendship a 
good like health, beauty, and wealth, which can be obtained through rhetoric? Or is friendship 
something altogether different?  Rhetoric’s relation to friendship will soon be raised directly by 
Gorgias himself. 
 Perhaps as a result of Gorgias’ response, Socrates shifts the category again, adopting the 
language of art: “You’re saying that rhetoric is a craftsman of persuasion” (453a; emphasis 
added). It seems that while Socrates is willing to grant Gorgias the benefit of the doubt in 
describing it as a science, Gorgias’ response causes Socrates to relegate it again to the status of 
art.  By switching the status of rhetoric from art, to science, and back again, Socrates signals his 
ambivalence about the status of rhetoric; it may theoretically be possible for rhetoric to be a 
science, but as described by Gorgias, rhetoric is at most an art. 
 The notion that rhetoric is concerned with persuasion is not precise enough for Socrates.  
He notes that while he has a suspicion as to what Gorgias means with this notion, he would like 
to ask Gorgias to clarify it for him by responding to his questions.  The reason he chooses to 
proceed in this manner rather than stating his suspicion outright is, according Socrates, “not on 
account of you, [Gorgias], but on account of the argument, in order that it may go forward so as 
to make what is being talked about as manifest as possible to us” (453c).  Socrates declares, 
perhaps somewhat rudely, that his concern is not for Gorgias, but rather for the truth of the 
argument.  Socrates’ primary interest in speaking with Gorgias, is not to improve Gorgias in 
76 
 
 
 
some way, but is instead self-interest.33  Socrates’ own good—that is, his inquiry into the power 
of rhetoric—rather than a concern for Gorgias’ good, is the primary driver of the conversation.34  
A short while later, Socrates will state forthrightly that he would rather be refuted if he were to 
say something false than refute another’s false statement, for “it is a greater good to be released 
oneself from the greatest evil than to release another” (458a).   
 Upon prompting, Gorgias makes clear that rhetoric is about “persuasion in law courts and 
in other mobs … and about those things that are just and unjust” (454b).  Socrates indicates that 
this is precisely the suspicion he had, but that he had asked for clarity, “not on account of you” 
(i.e., not for Gorgias’ interest), but instead so that the argument can “be brought to a conclusion 
in a consequential manner” (454c).  Again, Socrates makes clear that he is pursuing the argument 
for his own sake, or to attain truth.  This time, however, after noting that he is pursuing the 
argument for the sake of truth, and not for Gorgias’ sake, Socrates adds, “so that we may not 
become accustomed to guessing and hastily snatching up each other’s words” (454c).  Socrates 
makes clear that while his primary concern is with the truth, he would like to remain on friendly 
terms with Gorgias.  Socrates is exploring the main theme of the dialogue: What is the power of 
Gorgianic rhetoric?  Can Gorgianic rhetoric be directed toward the truth (Socrates’ interest) and 
at the same time maintain friendships?  
                                                 
33 Some have argued that the self-interest displayed by Socrates is related to his trial.  According to this line of 
argument Socrates is seeking to reform rhetoric so as to make his trial proceed favorably.  See, Devin Stauffer, The 
Unity of the Gorgias. 
 
34 This primary concern for one’s own good is echoed in the Charmides, “I am examining the argument mainly for 
my own sake, but also, perhaps, for that of my other intimates” (166c7–d4). 
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 Having made clear to Gorgias that he would like their conversation to proceed in a 
friendly manner and wants to aim at the truth, Socrates continues his questioning, extricating 
from Gorgias the concession that rhetoric, in contrast to didactic persuasion, “provides belief 
without knowing” (454e).  Socrates concludes by diplomatically stating the conclusion to their 
colloquy: “The rhetor, therefore, is not didactic with law courts and the other mobs about just 
and unjust things, but persuasive only; for he would not be able, I suppose, to teach so large a 
mob such great matters in a short time” (455a).35  Upon Gorgias’ acceptance of this summary, 
Socrates once again presses Gorgias to define precisely what it is that rhetoric is able to obtain.  
Surely, it is engineers and architects (those with knowledge), not rhetors, who are responsible for 
the walls and harbors of the city.  Therefore, concerning what—aside from the just and unjust—
does rhetoric give counsel? (455d).   Gorgias counters by noting that it is the rhetors, rather than 
the craftsmen, who are responsible for the “coming into being” of walls, harbors, and the like.  
Socrates does not dispute Gorgias’ claim, but encourages him, noting that rhetoric “appears to 
me as a power demonic in greatness” (456a).  
 Gorgias responds to this flattery by giving in to his propensity for loquacity and delivers 
a disquisition on the benefits and purpose of rhetoric, a disquisition that will make clear his 
confused understanding of rhetoric.  Socrates subtly points out that gratification or flattery leads 
another into error.  By encouraging or gratifying him, Socrates goads Gorgias into delivering a 
long disquisition on the powers of rhetoric.  As it turns out, it is precisely this disquisition that 
brings to light Gorgias’ confused and contradictory understanding of rhetoric.   
                                                 
35 James Nichols writes of Socrates’ remark, “Could one imagine a more tactful way of bringing up the rhetor’s lack 
of concern for conveying knowledge about issues of justice?” Plato Gorgias, 37 n. 28. 
78 
 
 
 
 In order to prove the power of rhetoric, Gorgias points to his ability to persuade those 
unwilling to do what is best.  He notes that he has gone with doctors to visit the sick and, while 
the doctors are at times unable to persuade unwilling patients to take their medicine, Gorgias, 
using the power of rhetoric, is able to persuade these patients to take their medicine, for their 
own benefit.  Rhetoric is, therefore, all-powerful, and can be used to ensure that people 
undertake what is good for them, even if they don’t recognize it as good (456b).  Yet, despite this 
power, Gorgias quickly cautions that it should be used only against one’s enemies, not against 
one’s friends and family.  Just as one who has become skilled in boxing ought not use those 
skills to “beat … his father and mother or some other relative or friend” but ought instead to use 
those skills against “enemies and doers of injustice,” so rhetoric ought to be used in the same 
manner (456d–456e).  In this statement, Gorgias exposes his understanding of justice—an 
understanding that calls to mind Polemarchus’ definition of justice in the Republic: one ought to 
do good to friends and harm enemies.   
 Three fundamental and connected themes emerge from Gorgias’ disquisition: the good, 
justice, and friendship.  Gorgias’ statement that rhetoric can persuade those who are unwilling to 
take their medicine reveals a recognition that rhetoric can and should be aimed toward the good. 
However, Gorgias also displays a devotion to friendship, or the principle that one ought to be 
loyal to one’s own.  Tellingly, however, Gorgias allies justice only to friendship, and not to the 
good.  Indeed, he asserts it would be unjust to use rhetoric against one’s friends.36  The rhetor is 
placed in somewhat of a quandary. According to Gorgias’ description, the rhetorician has two 
                                                 
36 We can be skeptical of the extent to which Gorgias, as a traveling rhetorician who sells his wares to the highest 
bidder, truly believes in the existence of justice and friendship.  See above at n. 28 and accompanying text. 
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incompatible goals.  On the one hand, the rhetor is capable of administering treatment to his 
patients, ensuring that those who are unwilling to do what is best for them, will nonetheless do 
so.  On the other hand, Gorgias believes that justice dictates that the rhetor ought not to use his 
skill against his friends.  Of course, if a friend were to fall ill and be in need of medicine, the 
rhetor’s goals would come into conflict.  Friendship may well impede the rhetor’s ability to 
administer medicine in a manner that is conducive to the patient’s health.   
 Socrates very likely realizes that Gorgias’ conception of justice and friendship is in 
tension, if not outright opposition, with his belief that rhetoric ought to aim for the good.  
However, rather than set the good and the just against each other directly, Socrates instead shows 
that the rhetorician could never do an injustice.  After coaxing Gorgias to admit that the 
rhetorician must necessarily know what justice is, Socrates is able to show (not altogether 
convincingly) that as a knower of justice, the rhetorician must therefore be just, do just things, 
and never wish to do injustice (460b–c).  When Gorgias agrees, Socrates concludes that Gorgias 
must have been mistaken in asserting that the rhetor would ever use his art in unjust manner.   
 What is noteworthy about this exchange is that neither Gorgias nor Socrates offers any 
definition of justice.  As Polus will later assert, Gorgias likely does not know what justice is, but 
is shamed into asserting that he is concerned with justice.  As a rhetorician who travels from 
place to place, Gorgias has likely seen that different cities have different conceptions of justice.  
Further, as a rhetorician who sells his services, Gorgias likely adapts his speeches (and thereby 
his conception of justice) to the city he happens to be visiting.  Socrates appeals to Gorgias’ 
sense of shame, inducing him to concede (perhaps falsely) that he is concerned with justice.  As 
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a result, Socrates’ refutation of Gorgias contains no direct conflict between justice, or a 
commitment to one’s friends, and the good. 
 Through an appeal to Gorgias’ shame, Socrates manages to save the phenomenon of 
justice.  However, the relationship of justice to friendship and the good has not yet been 
resolved.  Is justice allied with friendship (as Gorgias indicates) and therefore opposed to the 
good?  Or is justice allied with the good, and therefore something that undermines friendship?  
The question of where justice stands in relation to the good and friendship comes to the fore in 
the next section of the dialogue, which takes place between Socrates and Polus.  Upon 
witnessing Socrates refute Gorgias, Polus interjects with force, arguing that Gorgias is simply 
ashamed to admit that the rhetorician does not also know the “just, noble, and good things” 
(461b), and that it is his sensitivity to shame that has led to his refutation.37 Socrates responds, 
telling Polus that it would be just for Polus to correct him and Gorgias if they have been “tripped 
up in the speeches on some point” (461d).38  Polus agrees and begins to question Socrates on 
what rhetoric is.  Through a series of exchanges in which Socrates tells Polus what questions to 
pose to him, Socrates reveals that he believes rhetoric to be a sort of flattery that is, in fact, a 
“phantom of a part of politics” (463d).  
 When Gorgias intervenes, expressing confusion, Socrates elaborates, noting that the art 
that is directed to the soul is called politics, and that it is comprised of two parts—the legislative 
art and justice (464b–d).  Justice, therefore, is directed toward the improvement of the soul.  
                                                 
37 Polus is likely correct to describe Gorgias’ shame as the cause of his refutation, as Gorgias does exhibit a sense of 
shame at various points of the dialogue (cf. 458d7–458e2). 
 
38 Socrates’ response adumbrates what will later be his definition of justice.  Justice is refuting others (cf. 505b–c). 
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Socrates continues, stating that flattery (the phantom art of politics), is itself divided into two 
parts; sophistry and rhetoric, which are meant to mimic the legislative art and justice.  He states, 
flattery “slipped in under each of the parts” of the art of politics (the legislative art and justice) 
and pretends to be that which it has slipped under.  Thus, sophistry pretends to be the legislative 
art, while rhetoric pretends to be justice. The problem, Socrates notes somewhat perfunctorily, is 
that neither of these parts of flattery give heed to “the best,” but instead “hunt … after folly with 
what is ever most pleasant” (464d). 
 The distinction, therefore, between rhetoric and justice is that while justice aims at what 
is best, rhetoric aims at what is most pleasant.  While Socrates does not yet declare what “the 
best” is, we can surmise that between the two contenders, friendship and the good, Socrates 
means that justice aims at the good.  This supposition is borne out when Socrates invokes the 
analogy to the medical art that Gorgias had raised earlier, and notes that justice is akin to the art 
of the doctor in that it aims at what is best: the health of the patient.  By invoking this analogy, 
Socrates finally dissociates justice from friendship and allies it instead with the good.   It seems 
at this point that rhetoric, which aims only at what is pleasant or that which gratifies, is allied 
with friendship.  However, while Socrates suggests that justice aims at what is best and, 
therefore, at the good, we still do not know of what it is that justice consists.  In fact, Socrates 
remains almost cryptic about what justice is.39 
 Polus, not knowing quite what to make of Socrates’ depiction of rhetoric, seeks to 
burnish the reputation of rhetoric by focusing on the supposedly powerful deeds that the person 
                                                 
39 Cf. Apology, 32a. 
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skilled in rhetoric is capable of accomplishing.  He asks: Don’t rhetors, like tyrants, have the 
capacity to “kill whomever they wish, and confiscate possessions and expel from the cities 
whomever it seems good to them” (466b–c)?  Rather than explain precisely what justice is, 
Socrates explains that Polus has, in fact, asked two questions: “Do rhetors do whatever they 
wish?” and “Do rhetors do what seems good to them?” (466c–d).  Through a series of dialectical 
moves, Socrates shows that the rhetor who engages in these deeds does them only to pursue what 
he perceives to be good for him.  Therefore, if the rhetor engages in one of these acts under the 
mistaken belief that he is doing something good for himself, he does nothing of what he wishes, 
although he certainly does what seems to him to be best (466e).  Given that Polus had earlier 
agreed that having power is good for the person who wields it, Socrates is able to refute Polus’ 
conception of power, concluding, “Do you then think it is good, if someone who does not have 
intelligence does those things that seem to him to be best?  And do you call this having great 
power?” (466e). 
 In response, Polus reveals his commitment to what is pleasant as opposed to what is best.  
He protests indignantly that Socrates himself would “welcome the possibility of doing what 
seemed good” to him, whether it was just or unjust (468e).  In recognition that Polus has not 
been convinced by his refutation—that is, by what is best40—Socrates attempts to gratify him by 
                                                 
40 Socrates has implied, earlier in the dialogue that being refuted is best.  Cf. Gor. 458a (“And of what men am I 
one?  Those who are refuted with pleasure if I say something not true, and who refute with pleasure if someone 
should say something not true—and indeed not with less pleasure to be refuted than to refute.  For I consider it a 
greater good, to the extent that it is a greater good to be released oneself from the greatest evil than to release 
another.  For I think that nothing is so great an evil for a human being as false opinion about the things that our 
argument now happens to be about”).  That Socrates believes that being refuted is the greatest good (greater even 
than refuting another) explains why Socrates earlier insisted that his primary purpose in pursuing the argument was 
for his own sake, and not for the sake of his interlocutors.  Socrates does not primarily pursue the argument to refute 
Gorgias, but to test his own opinions.  See above at n. 34 above and accompanying text. 
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appealing to his desire for punishment.  First, he tells Polus that one ought not admire those who 
do injustice but instead ought to pity them, for they are wretched.  When Polus asks how the 
rhetor who commits great acts of injustice is wretched, Socrates compares the rhetor to a 
common criminal who kills citizens in the market place. In response, Polus protests that this is 
not the type of power he has in mind, because “it is necessary for someone who acts in this 
manner to pay a penalty” (470a).41  This reply reveals that Polus’ earlier shameless disregard for 
justice was feigned; Polus is not so shameless as to praise a petty criminal.  While Polus admires 
rhetors and tyrants who are able to engage in injustice on a grand scale, he has no admiration for 
the common criminal.   
 Having exposed Polus’ shame or sense of decency by appealing to his desire for 
punishment, Socrates seeks to refute Polus on two points.  The first is Polus’ notion that it is 
better to do injustice than it is to suffer injustice (469b), and the second is Polus’ belief that the 
individual who escapes punishment is better off than the individual who pays the penalty for his 
injustice (472e).  In order to prove the first claim, that doing injustice is a greater evil than 
suffering injustice, Socrates begins by establishing that all fine or noble things are called such on 
the basis of either use or pleasure, while the shameful are defined by the opposite, namely, pain 
and badness.  Because Polus agrees that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering injustice, 
the former must surpass the latter either in pain or in badness, or in both.  Furthermore, because 
                                                 
41 In comparing the rhetor to a common criminal who, according to Polus, deserves punishment, Socrates appeals to 
Polus’ moralistic desire for punishment, which will eventually prove necessary to persuade him that the rhetor is 
unjust. However, Polus is unwilling to equate the rhetor with the common criminal and, in support of the contention 
that unjust rhetors are happy, he points to the many unjust deeds that Archelaus the ruler of Macedonia committed in 
order to attain his station.  Socrates never states his agreement with Polus that Archelaus is unjust, or even that he 
has committed injustices. (Gorg. 468e–71d). 
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doing injustice cannot possibly exceed the suffering of injustice in the realm of pain, it must 
surpass it in badness (474e–475b).  As a result, doing injustice must be worse than suffering 
injustice (475d).42   
 Next, Socrates seeks to prove that it is a greater evil to avoid paying the penalty for 
injustice than to be punished for an injustice.  First, he obtains Polus’ agreement that “all just 
things are fine” or noble insofar as they are just (476b).  After this, he asserts that in any action 
that is undertaken, the entity undergoing the action undergoes it in whatever way the action is 
inflicted.  Thus, if someone beats violently, the object that has been beaten will have been beaten 
in a violent manner (476c).  Having secured Polus’ affirmation, Socrates extends this to suffering 
a penalty.  If someone suffers a penalty from one who justly inflicts the penalty, the penalty must 
also be suffered justly.  And, if the penalty is suffered justly, it must also be noble or fine to 
suffer such penalties (476e).  Socrates concludes that it is beneficial to suffer punishments, as it 
releases one from “badness of soul” (477a). 
 By appealing to Polus’ desire for punishment, Socrates partially reintegrates Polus into 
the city.  Polus’ attack on justice has been uncovered as insincere, and Socrates seems to re-
establish the ties of justice between Polus and the city.  However, he does so in a manner that 
ensures that Polus does not simply uncritically accept the city’s conventions.  Indeed, if it is 
better to suffer punishment than to escape punishment, it is necessary that one seek to administer 
justice—and therefore punishment—both on oneself and one’s friends.  The relationship of 
                                                 
42 There is reason to believe that Socrates does not, himself, agree with this argument, as it relies on the claim that 
the fine or noble is equivalent to the good, a distinction which is challenged in the Hippias Major.  James Nichols 
notes that “in the Hippias Major, Socrates investigates just what the fine (noble, beautiful) is; it proves very difficult 
to state.” Plato Gorgias, 61, n. 54. 
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justice to friendship is finally revealed.  While Socrates had earlier revealed that justice is allied 
with the good, we now see that it is allied with the good against friendship.  One ought to act like 
a doctor that administers medicine.  To act justly means removing injustice from one’s own the 
soul and from the souls of one’s fellow citizens.  As a result, Socrates states the following 
concerning rhetoric: 
For speaking in defense of one’s own injustice, therefore, or that of 
parents or comrades or children or fatherland when it does injustice, 
rhetoric will be of no use to us, Polus; except if someone takes it to be of 
use for the opposite purpose, supposing that he must most of all accuse 
himself, and then whoever else of his relatives and friends happens at any 
time to do injustice, and not hide the unjust deed but bring it into the 
open so as to pay the just penalty and become healthy, and compel both 
himself and others not to play the coward but to grit his teeth and submit 
well and courageously as if to a doctor for cutting and burning. (480b–c). 
  
Socrates appeals to Polus’ desire to punish, noting that if rhetoric is to have any use at all, it 
would be to accuse oneself, one’s friends, and one’s own city.   
 Because Socrates suggests that one ought to accuse oneself, one’s friends, and one’s own 
city, some scholars have suggested that Socrates is sending Polus back into the city to administer 
justice and purge it of its unjust practices.43   However, a close look at Socrates’ statements 
concerning justice reveals that this is only partially correct.  Socrates does not seem to be 
particularly concerned with what are conventionally or vulgarly considered to be the unjust 
practices of politics.44  For example, when Socrates demurs from Polemarchus’ assertion that 
Archelaus, the ruler of the Macedonians, is unjust, Polus responds incredulously, “But how on 
                                                 
43 Nichols, “The Rhetoric of Justice in Plato’s Gorgias,” in Plato Gorgias, 139. 
 
44 Cf. Apology 32a–b. 
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earth could he not be unjust?” (471a).  Polus then conveys a litany of conventionally unjust 
practices that Archelaus has committed, including the illicit attainment of the throne of 
Macedonia and the killing of both his master and his master’s bloodline (471a–c).  Socrates 
responds, “I certainly do not agree with you on any one of these things that you are asserting” 
(471e).45  Socratic justice, seems to be different from, or beyond, a conventional, vulgar, 
understanding of justice that eschews the practices engaged in by Archelaus.  Thus, it cannot be 
that Socrates simply sends Polus back into the city to reform its unjust practices. 
 If Socratic justice differs from the vulgar, common conception of justice with which 
Polus is concerned, what does it consist of?  While Socrates does not provide a definition of 
justice anywhere in his discussion with Polus, he intimates throughout that it is connected to 
speech.  For example, when questioning Gorgias what precisely concerns rhetoric or in what 
areas it persuades, Socrates asks, “Since, therefore, not [rhetoric] alone but also other [arts] 
achieve this work [i.e., persuasion] … we might after this justly ask the speaker further, ‘Of what 
sort persuasion, and of persuasion about what, is rhetoric the art?’  Or doesn’t it seem to you just 
to ask further?” (454a; emphasis added).  Similarly, when Polus angrily interrupts Socrates’ 
conversation with Gorgias, Socrates tells him it is just for him to correct himself and Gorgias if 
they have been “tripped up in the speeches on some point” (461d).  Justice is connected to 
speech; speaking truthfully is just, while falsity (and flattery) are unjust.46 
                                                 
45 Socrates similarly demurs from the statement that “the great king” (i.e., the King of Persia) is unjust, commenting, 
“I do not know how he stands in regard to education and justice” (Gorg. 470e). 
 
46 Cf. 448b: “I’m asking now.  If Gorgias happened to be a knower of his brother Herodicus’s art, what would we 
justly name him” (emphasis added).  Cf. also 465e–466a: “So then, when you are answering, if I too do not know 
what use to make of it, you too extend your speech; but if I do, let me make use of it; for that is just.” 
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 This conception of justice also helps to make sense of Socrates’ argument that it is better 
for one to pay the penalty for injustice than to escape punishment.  According to Socrates’ 
understanding of justice, escaping punishment simply ensures that one maintains a false 
conception of what is, whereas undergoing punishment ensures that one’s false convictions are 
refuted.  This interpretation of Socrates’ understanding of justice is borne out in the dialogue, 
when Polus tells Socrates that even a child could refute him.  Socrates responds, “I shall feel 
much gratitude to the child then, and equal gratitude to you too, if you refute me and release me 
from drivel. So don’t tire of doing good to a man who’s a friend, but refute” (470c; emphasis 
added).  Similarly, immediately before refuting Gorgias, Socrates states, “And of what men am I 
one?  Those who are refuted with pleasure if I say something not true, and who refute with 
pleasure if someone should say something not true….  For I think that nothing is so great an evil 
for a human being as false opinion about the things that our argument now happens to be about” 
(458a–b).  Last, sometime after Socrates has refuted Polus, Socrates states, “Don’t shrink from 
answering, Polus; for you will suffer no harm.  But submit yourself in a nobly born manner to the 
argument as to a doctor, and answer” (475d). Socrates does not believe that justice primarily 
consists either in performing actions that are vulgarly considered to be just deeds or in avoiding 
unjust deeds.  Rather, justice consists in refuting others’ opinions about what is, for it is by 
refuting another—and thereby leading him to a state of perplexity—that a person, is released 
from falsity.47   
                                                 
47 This is finally asserted explicitly toward the end of the dialogue during Socrates’ conversation with Callicles. Cf. 
522d–e.  
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 Socrates’ conception of justice and his approach to Polus mirror the approach undertaken 
in the Lysis.  It will be recalled that in the Lysis Socrates refutes Lysis in a manner that causes 
him to question all his pre-existing friendships.  Socrates leads Lysis to understand that his 
friendships have not been sufficient and that, to the extent that Lysis believed them to be 
sufficient, they were simply “phantom friendships.”  Therefore, through refuting him, Socrates 
releases Lysis from a state of complacency and opens him up to an awareness of need and, 
perhaps, to the good life of contemplation.  In the Gorgias, Socrates undertakes a similar 
approach with Polus.  He refutes Polus and releases him from his erroneous conception of justice 
and rhetoric. For Socrates, justice is allied not with friendship, but with the good.  As a result, 
justice—and rhetoric, if it is to be just—ought to question friendships and the conceptions of 
justice that uphold them.  According to Socrates, a true friend (as opposed to a “phantom friend”) 
is one who questions and exposes the false or “phantom” conceptions of justice, friendship, or 
whatever else that is. In contrast, a “phantom” friend is one who engages in flattery, preserving a 
false conception of what is.  In both dialogues, Socrates can be seen acting as a true friend (under 
the Socratic conception of friendship), who releases his interlocutors from a mistaken conception 
of what is.  While refutation is a painful process—much like the taking of medicine or 
punishment—it leaves one better off, as it leaves one perplexed and therefore desirous of true 
wisdom. 
 Socrates’s negative approach to politics, therefore, is explained by his conception of 
friendship and justice.  His belief that justice consists in refuting a friend in order to free him 
from an erroneous conception of what is, means that Socrates’ approach to politics and the 
practice of justice takes a negative form.  In the name of friendship and justice, Socrates 
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dissolves his fellow citizens’ pre-existing conceptions of who a friend is, and what is just or 
noble.  In this way, Socrates’ claim to be the only person to practice politics is understandable, 
despite his complete avoidance of conventional politics.  This negative approach is not primarily 
due to Socrates’ commitment to avoiding acts that the many consider to be unjust (i.e., vulgar 
justice), nor is it due to a desire to preserve his own life.  Rather, when Socrates relates in the 
Apology that he has never “conceded anything contrary to the just” (33a), what he means is that 
he has never engaged in flattery but has instead always acted justly by dissolving his fellow 
citizens’ erroneous conceptions of what is.   
 Through his refutation of Polus, Socrates is able to show both Gorgias and Polus why 
their practice of rhetoric is unjust.  Flattery, as the phantom part of justice, preserves phantom 
friendships.  Together, flattery and phantom friendships lead to complacency.  Just as the 
phantom friendships described in the Lysis lead one to a false sense of self-sufficiency and 
impede one’s access to the good, so flattery, the phantom part of justice, maintains a false 
conception of what is and maintains those who have been lied to in a state of ignorance and 
complacency (cf. Rep. 382b–c).  In contrast, Socratic justice involves dissolving false 
conceptions of what is.  Of course, by doing so, one also dissolves that which undergirds 
phantom friendships. In Socrates’ view it is by dissolving another’s false conceptions of justice, 
and by dissolving their phantom friendships that one truly acts as a friend.  Thus, it his 
understanding of friendship and justice that prompts Socrates to act as a gadfly who wakens his 
fellow citizens from their slumber by dissolving their pre-existing conceptions of what is (Apol. 
30e).  It is only by dissolving another’s false conceptions of what is, thereby leading him to a 
state of perplexity, that one can open him up to a life of contemplation.  Socrates’ approach to 
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politics is negative because politics, as it is practiced in Athens—and likely as it is practiced in 
all places at all times—relies on flattery (cf. Rep. 414b–c).    
 
The Gorgias Part II:  Socratic Eros and the Private Life 
While Socrates’ conception of friendship and justice explains his negative approach to politics, it 
does not yet explain why Socrates chooses to do this privately, but not in the public manner 
befitting an Athenian citizen (cf. Apol. 31c).  That is, why does Socrates not choose to engage 
himself in the world of politics and publicly dissolve his fellow citizens’ conceptions of what is?  
Some have maintained that it is simply because of the incompatibility of philosophy and 
politics.48  However, Socrates’ discussion with Polus has made clear that rhetoric can potentially 
be used to dissolve people’s false conceptions of justice and of what is (480b–c).  To understand 
why Socrates abstains from publicly engaging in his negative approach to politics, it is necessary 
to turn to his discussion with Callicles, which comprises the second half of the Gorgias.  As we 
shall see, the basis of Socrates’ abstention is found in his conception of friendship. 
 Having heard Socrates explain to Polus that if rhetoric is to have any use in the city at all, 
it ought to be used to punish oneself, one’s friends, and one’s fatherland, Callicles cannot contain 
himself.  He bursts in, asking Chaerephon whether Socrates is serious.49   Somewhat curiously, 
Socrates responds to Callicles by first pointing to something he and Callicles share:  
                                                 
48 E.g., Villa, Socratic Citizenship, 37: “Public address … effectively forbids any fundamental questioning.  Oratory 
is flattery because persuasion, not genuine criticism, is its goal.” 
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Callicles, if human beings did not have some feeling that was the same—
some having one and others another—but if some one of us suffered 
some private feeling different from what the others feel, it would not be 
too easy to point out one’s own affection to the other.  I say this bearing 
in mind that you and I now happen to have suffered something that is the 
same: we are two lovers. (481c–d). 
 
Socrates points out that he Callicles are similar in that they are both erotic individuals.  Given the 
distinction between “phantom friends” and erotic desire formulated in the Lysis, Socrates seems 
to be indicating that Callicles, like he himself, is aware that he is in some way incomplete and in 
need.  Neither Socrates nor Callicles suffer from the complacency brought on by the illusions of 
self-sufficiency associated with phantom friendships.  Like Socrates, Callicles is a desirous 
individual.  Thus, we can already surmise that Socrates’ interaction with Callicles will not 
consist of a simple refutation in order to perplex him and lead him to a state of desire.   
 After this initial statement pointing out their similarities, Socrates quickly goes on also to 
explicate the differences between them by pointing to the objects of their love.  While Socrates 
loves Alcibiades and philosophy, Callicles is in love with the Athenian people and with Demos 
the son of Pyrilampes.50  It seems that in their desirous nature, Socrates and Callicles are similar, 
but not identical to one another.  Of course, this was the final definition of friendship tentatively 
put forward, yet not fully explored, at the end of Lysis.  As I will make clear, by having Socrates 
                                                 
49 Nichols relates that Chaerephon’ s response, “there’s nothing like asking the man himself,” mirrors Callicles’ 
response to Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue suggesting “that the dialogue is to begin anew here.” Gorgias, 
n. 61. 
 
50 The son of Pyrilampes was called Demos, which is of course the same word for the Athenian people (demos).  
Demos the son of Pyrilampes “was famous for his beauty and also for lack of intelligence.” Nichols, Plato Gorgias, 
70 n. 65.  
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emphasize both their similarities and their differences, Plato alludes to the possibility of a 
rapprochement, or friendship, between these two individuals.   
 However, Socrates does not seek a rapprochement between himself and Callicles.  
Instead, he confronts him in a very personal way by suggesting that his own philosophic way of 
life is superior to the active life practiced by Callicles, due to the stability of philosophy.  While 
the fickleness of the Athenian people causes Callicles constantly to say different and discordant 
things, Socrates’ own love, philosophy, always says the same thing.  Socrates challenges 
Callicles to refute the philosophic principle that has come to light in his discussion with Polus, 
“by showing that doing injustice and not paying the just penalty when one does injustice are not 
the utmost of all evils” (482b).  He concludes that if Callicles fails to refute this principle, he will 
continue to say discordant things and “will be dissonant in his whole life” (482b).  It is only by 
either proving the superiority of his life or redirecting his desires from a love of the people to a 
love of philosophy that Callicles’ soul will be made harmonious (Cf. Rep., 443c–e).   
 Taking up the challenge, Callicles responds by appealing to a sense of natural justice.  He 
asserts that the only reason Socrates has been able to refute both Polus and Gorgias, was that he 
shifted the grounds of the debate from what is natural to what is conventional, thereby appealing 
to his interlocutors’ sense of shame.  It was their shame that caused Gorgias and Polus to shrink 
from saying what they truly believe and compelling them to say contradictory things.51 
                                                 
51 For a convincing analysis of the role of shame in Plato’s Gorgias, see Richard McKim, “Shame and Truth in 
Plato’s Gorgias,” in Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings, ed. Charles L. Griswold, Jr. (New York: Routledge, 
1988), 34–48.  McKim argues that Socrates uses the concept of shame as a weapon of psychological warfare in 
order to maneuver his interlocutors into acknowledging that, deep down, they do hold Socrates’ way of life to be 
superior. 
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 To avoid the fate of Gorgias and Polus, Callicles seeks to blunt the power of convention 
by attacking it at its roots.  He asserts in what seems to be a proto-Nietzschean fashion that the 
conventional or the lawful is simply a creation of the “weak human beings and the many” 
(483b).  The lawful, according to Callicles, is simply a tool by which the weak frighten away the 
strong so that the many may have an equal share.  In contrast to what is conventionally lawful, 
Callicles holds that the law of nature reveals that it is just “for the better to have more than the 
worse and the more powerful than the less powerful” (483d).  A truly great individual, asserts 
Callicles, is one who transcends the conventional morality of the weak and rises up “to be 
revealed as our master” (484b).  Thus, by engaging in the greatest of illegalities, an individual is 
only acting in accordance with what is naturally just.52 
 Callicles continues, arguing that it is only once Socrates gives up the philosophic life in 
favor of the political life that he will come to recognize the truth of natural justice.  He warns of 
the dangers of devoting oneself exclusively to philosophy, noting that a person who does this 
will lack experience in political affairs and, as a result, will necessarily appear ridiculous when 
he attempts to engage in them, just as a man who devotes himself exclusively to political 
practices will appear ridiculous when he seeks to engage in philosophy.  The individual who 
avoids public life, he intimates, is unable to help himself or his friends.  He concludes, in a 
manner that is likely meant to foreshadow Socrates’ trial and death, that Socrates’ way of life is 
                                                 
52 There is a wide range of scholarship that interprets Callicles to be a simple immoralist.  See Werner Jaeger, 
Paedeia, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press 1943), 125–41; Eric Voegelin, Order and History, vol. 3 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), 24–45; George Klosko, “The Refutation of Callicles in Plato’s 
Gorgias” Greece and Rome 31, no. 2 (1984): 126–139.  In contrast, Devin Stauffer argues that Callicles’ appearance 
as a cynical immoralist “hides his deepest convictions” and that deep down Callicles does have some standard of 
virtue. “Socrates and Callicles: A Reading of Plato’s Gorgias,” in The Review of Politics 64 no. 4 (2002): 627–57.  
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shameful.  If anyone ever seized Socrates, claiming that he was doing an injustice, he would be 
left “dizzy and gaping, without anything to say” (486a–b).  Thus, Callicles urges him to “stop 
refuting” and to “‘practice the good music’ of affairs” (486c). 
 In the middle of his harangue, Callicles quotes a line from Euripides’ play, Antiope. 
Noting that those who exclusively pursue philosophy appear ridiculous when they enter into 
political action, and similarly that political men appear ridiculous when they enter into 
philosophic pastimes, Callicles states: 
For Euripides’ saying comes to pass: each one is brilliant in this, and 
presses on to this, “allotting the greatest part of the day to this, where he 
happens to be at his best.” And he flees from wherever he is 
undistinguished and reviles this, but praises the other thing out of 
goodwill toward himself. (484e–485a). 
 
The quotation cited by Callicles is the first of many references in the Gorgias that comes from 
Euripides’ lost play Antiope.53  Why would Plato draw our attention to this play?   The 
significance of these references is revealed by the play’s dramatic plot, which centers on the 
tension between the active life and the contemplative life.  According to the existing fragments, 
two brothers, Zethus and Amphion, sons of Antiope, the rightful Queen of Thebes, must rescue 
their mother from their murderous uncle.  However, before they are capable of doing so, they 
must put aside their disagreements as to which of their two ways of life is superior.  While 
Zethus maintains that the practical life devoted to political affairs is superior, Amphion holds 
that the life of philosophy and music is superior.  Zethus’ powerful arguments win, and Amphion 
accedes that the active life is better.  Together they arrange their mother’s rescue, and Amphion, 
                                                 
53 See 484e, 485e–486a, 486b, 486c. 
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having been won over to the active life, is just about to put their uncle to death when the god 
Hermes intervenes as a deus ex machina.  Hermes re-establishes order by restraining the brothers 
and establishing them as rightful joint-rulers of Thebes.54    
 The dramatic struggle between Zethus and Amphion depicted in Antiope mirrors the 
struggle between Callicles and Socrates.  Not only does Callicles explicitly invoke Zethus as 
representative of his type of life, but the two value many of the same things, including hard 
work, manly strength, and the ability to help oneself and one’s family.55   In contrast, Socrates, 
who leads a life of political abstention and pursues the pleasurable practice of philosophy, is akin 
to Amphion.  According to one of the extant fragments, Amphion states that “anyone who 
engages in many activities that he need not engage in is foolish, when he can live free from 
business in a pleasant fashion.”56  Nightingale suggests that both Amphion and Socrates believed 
that despite their political abstention, they were capable of providing the greatest benefit for the 
city through their philosophy.57  Furthermore, Socrates later forthrightly identifies himself with 
                                                 
54 This brief synopsis of the work comes from E. R. Dodds’ commentary on the Gorgias, 275–76. For a full account 
of the plot, Dodds directs the reader to N. Wecklein, “Die Antiope des Euripides,” in Philologus, 79 (1923) 51–69; 
A. W. Pickard-Cambridge in J. U. Powell, ed., New Chapters in Greek Literature, 3d series (Oxford, 1933), 105–
113. 
 
55 Callicles’ commitment to manliness and the ability to help oneself and one’s family and friends is explicitly stated 
at 485c and 486a respectively.  His commitment to hard work is intimated by his denigration of childish play at 
485b.  John Gibert notes that “Zethus advocates hard work, manly strength, care of property, and the ability to help 
oneself and one’s family and friends both privately and publicly” (“Euripides’ Antiope and the Quiet Life,” in The 
Play of Texts and Fragments: Essays in Honor of Martin Cropp, ed. J. R. C. Cousland and James R. Hume [Leiden: 
Brill, 2009]).   The extent to which Zethus is an exact representative of Callicles is debated.  Andrea Nightingale 
points to some apparent differences between Zethus and Callicles by noting that Callicles “does not suggest, as 
Zethus did, that the life he advocates is for the good of the city, for he would be hard pressed to prove that a self-
seeking tyrant is good for a state.” “Plato’s ‘Gorgias’ and Euripides’ ‘Antiope’: A Study in Generic 
Transformation,” Classical Antiquity 11 no. 1 (1992): 127.  However, Devin Stauffer argues convincingly that 
Callicles is not simply a self-seeking tyrant. See n. 51 above. 
 
56 Nightingale, “Plato’s ‘Gorgias’ and Euripides’ ‘Antiope,’” 127. 
 
57 Ibid., 128. 
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Amphion when he informs Callicles that he would have liked to give “him back the speech of 
Amphion for the speech of Zethus” (506b).  Thus, it seems that Plato refers to Euripides’ play to 
suggest that Zethus and Amphion are representative of Callicles and Socrates, respectively. 
 However, the resemblance between Euripides’ Antiope and Socrates’ encounter with 
Callicles is limited to this similarity between the characters.  The conclusion of Euripides’ play 
differs significantly from the conclusion of the debate between Socrates and Callicles.  The 
conclusion of Antiope suggests that it is best for active and for contemplative individuals each to 
perform that to which they are by nature predisposed.  The establishment of Zethus and Amphion 
as joint rulers at the end of the play points toward the necessity of both Zethus and Amphion.  As 
John Gibert notes, Zethus and Amphion “express complementary ideals, neither of which, in the 
partial and undeveloped form in which it is presented and exemplified by the inexperienced 
young men, is conspicuously beneficial to the polis.”58  The play, therefore, points toward the 
coincidence of power and wisdom in the figures of Zethus and Amphion.  Both are in some way 
good and necessary for the city.  As noted above, this notion also characterizes the definition of 
friendship that was raised, but not fully explored, in the Lysis.  As will be recalled, near the end 
of the Lysis, Socrates suggests that friendship may exist between those who are akin to one 
another.59  The implication (an implication that Socrates ignored) is that friendship may consist 
in the relation of two individuals who are akin (or who belong to each other) and who are both 
good in their own way, or according to his own nature.60   By alluding to Antiope, Plato may be 
                                                 
58 Gibert, “Euripides’ Antiope,” 34. 
 
59 Specifically, Socrates states “what is akin is something other than the like” (Lys. 222c3–4). 
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drawing our attention to a potential reconciliation between Callicles and Socrates that may serve 
as a foundation for political life.    
 As we shall see, however, no reconciliation between power and wisdom is forthcoming in 
Socrates’ encounter with Callicles, as neither Callicles nor Socrates agrees with Euripides’ 
assessment.  For his part, Callicles argues that it is precisely the predilection to favor one’s 
strengths and ignore one’s weaknesses that leads to ridicule.  To avoid the ridicule, Callicles 
argues that it is best for a serious man to gain experience in political affairs. While it is fitting 
and noble for a free man to partake of philosophy when he is young, beyond this he ought to 
focus on becoming highly distinguished in political affairs.  For Callicles, if someone fails to 
practice philosophy when young, he “will never deem himself worthy of any fine and noble 
affair” (485d).  That Callicles believes one ought to practice philosophy when young shows that 
he is not completely oblivious to its merit and its use.  However, by recognizing its use in 
preparing men for “fine and noble affair[s]” (485d), Callicles relegates philosophy to an inferior 
status.  For Callicles, philosophy ought to be ministerial to the practice of politics.  
 In response to Callicles’ disquisition, Socrates exclaims his good fortune in having fallen 
in with Callicles.  He goes so far as to proclaim Callicles to be a touchstone on which Socrates 
will be able to test his soul.  Callicles, he asserts, has the three characteristics of “knowledge, 
goodwill, and outspokenness,” by which Socrates will be able to “make a sufficient test of a 
soul’s living correctly” (487a).  While Gorgias and Polus were wise and friendly toward 
Socrates, they were “too sensitive to shame” (487b).  In contrast, Socrates notes that Callicles is 
                                                 
60 The notion that people may be good “in their own nature” is the good that Socrates misquotes in his quotation of 
the drinking song listing the various things that are said to be good. See above at n. 32 and accompanying text. 
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sufficiently educated, has goodwill toward him, and is outspoken, or not entirely restricted by a 
sense of shame.  The extent to which Socrates is being ironic in praising Callicles has been a 
source of much debate, because Plato makes Callicles’ character the lynch-pin on which hinges 
the question of whether Socrates is correct in exclusively practicing the philosophic life. 61  
Indeed, Socrates relates that because Callicles has all three of these qualities, his agreement with 
Socrates on the things Socrates has opinions about (not knowledge) would signal that Socrates’ 
way of life is correct.  In contrast, his disagreement would signal that Socrates’ way of life is 
incorrect.  Of course, at the end of the dialogue Socrates has not persuaded Callicles of the things 
he has opinions about.62  Thus, if Callicles possesses these three qualities, it would suggest that 
as presented by Plato, Socrates’ way of life is incorrect.   
 The first quality, Callicles’ knowledge, seems to be immediately called into question by 
Socrates. Indeed, after calling Callicles knowledgeable, Socrates follows this up by telling him 
that he has “been sufficiently educated, as many of the Athenians would say” (487b).  
Furthermore, Socrates relates that he once overheard Callicles urging his friends not to become 
“wise… beyond what is needful” (487d).  Many scholars agree that Socrates’ appeal to what “the 
                                                 
61 McKim argues that Callicles does not have any of the three characteristics Socrates ascribes to him. “Shame and 
Truth,” 40; Benardete argues that “Callicles has neither wisdom nor frankness, but he does seem to have goodwill.” 
Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 68.  Stauffer suggests that “while it may be reasonable to take Callicles’ 
speech as evidence of his outspokenness,” Callicles manifestly lacks wisdom, and likely goodwill as well.  He 
concludes that Socrates may mean to indicate by his “proof” that Callicles does not possess what is necessary to 
pursue the truth to its attainment, and thus that the truth will not come fully to light in their conversation.” The Unity 
of Plato’s Gorgias, 93–94; finally, E. R. Dodds holds that that while Socrates is being ironic in calling Callicles 
wise, he genuinely believes that Callicles has goodwill toward him and is outspoken, but that this belief is mistaken. 
 
62 Toward the end of the dialogue Callicles states, “In some way, I don’t know what, what you say seems good to 
me, Socrates; but I suffer the experience of the many—I am not altogether persuaded by you” (513c).  Plato’s 
ambiguity in regard to Callicles’ character, as well as the way in which Callicles is depicted as not being altogether 
impervious to Socrates’ arguments, may point to Plato’s hesitancy, or skepticism regarding Socrates’ way of life or 
his relation to politics.  
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many” would say, as well as his admonition not to become too wise, suggests that he is being 
ironic in calling Callicles knowledgeable.  However, while it is true that Callicles may not be 
wise, this does not preclude him from having a certain type of knowledge, or intelligence, in the 
form of prudence.  Indeed, while Callicles may lack wisdom, he does not lack prudence, or a 
concern for the human things, as is evidenced by his concern for Socrates’ safety.63  In this way, 
Callicles can be seen to have knowledge, the first characteristic necessary to test Socrates’ way 
of life. 
 Socrates further relates that Callicles does have goodwill toward him and is outspoken.  
As evidence of Callicles’ goodwill, Socrates points to the fact that he has heard Callicles give his 
friends the same counsel that he had just conveyed to him, namely, to stop philosophizing 
beyond what is necessary, and to take greater care for his own safety.  Some scholars point to the 
fact that later in the dialogue, Callicles will act in a way that causes Socrates to revoke whatever 
friendship he believed they had (499b–c).  However, goodwill and friendship are distinct.64  
Thus, while Callicles likely is not Socrates’ friend, this does not preclude his goodwill toward 
him.  In addition, Socrates suggests that Callicles’ outspokenness, or immunity to shame, has 
been established by his speech praising natural justice.  Thus, Callicles does possess the 
characteristics necessary to test Socrates’ way of life.  
                                                 
63 Cf. Aristotle, NE 1140a24–1140b30.  
 
64 Cf., Aristotle, NE 1158a1–1158a12, where Aristotle argues that goodwill is the necessary precursor to friendship, 
it is not a sufficient condition for the existence of friendship, as friendship requires spending time together. Seth 
Benardete suggests that the goodwill displayed by Callicles is akin to tolerance: “If push comes to shove, [Callicles] 
would not help Socrates; but his tolerance insofar as it represents the atmosphere of Athens, suffices to guarantee the 
survival of Socrates.” Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 69. 
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 In any case, Socrates begins by taking on Callicles’ assertion that according to what is 
naturally just the stronger and the superior ought to rule and have more than the inferior.  The 
obvious difficulty with this position is that according to nature the many, when joined together, 
are stronger than the one.  As a result, the laws they institute, including the laws that “doing 
injustice is more shameful than suffering injustice,” are not only just by convention, but are just 
by nature as well (489a–b).  In response, Callicles asserts that by superior he does not 
exclusively mean stronger but refers to those who are more intelligent (φρόνιμος).  Thus, asserts 
Callicles, the more intelligent individual ought to rule and ought to have more than the ruled.  
Socrates seizes on Callicles’ contention that the intelligent ought to have more and asks whether 
a doctor, having intelligence concerning a person’s diet, ought to have more food than others or 
whether, through his ruling, he ought to distribute the food to everyone, according to his 
intelligence.  Earlier in the dialogue Socrates had compared justice to the art of medicine—while 
the art of medicine concerns the body, justice is directed toward the health of the soul.  Socrates’ 
example is intended to expound on this corollary, while also pointing out that Callicles is too 
preoccupied with external goods such as food, rather than with what is good for the soul. 
 Displaying his lack of philosophic acumen, Callicles retorts, “You are talking of food and 
drink and doctors and drivel; but this is not what I mean” (490c–d).  At this point, likely in 
recognition of Callicles’ ignorance, Socrates becomes ironic with Callicles.  He asks him 
whether those who are most intelligent and superior in weaving or cobbling ought to have the 
biggest cloak or the biggest shoes.  In frustration, Callicles asserts that by those who are more 
intelligent and stronger he means “neither cobblers nor cooks, but those who are intelligent in 
regard to the affairs of the city and in what way they may be well governed” (491a–b).  Callicles, 
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does not leave it at this, however, adding that the intelligent and strong are “not only intelligent 
but also courageous, being sufficient to accomplish what they intend” (491a–b).  It is precisely 
these individuals—those who are intelligent in regard to the affairs of the city and courageous—
who ought to rule.  Callicles concludes, “The just is this, that these, the rulers, have more than 
the others, the ruled” (491d). 
 Devin Stauffer notes that by asserting that it is just for the superior to rule and for the 
rulers to have more than the ruled, Callicles provides a natural segue for the conversation to turn 
to the question of justice.65  However, rather than do so, Socrates instead turns to the question of 
moderation, asking whether the ruler also ought to rule his own desires (491d). Why does 
Socrates turn to the topic of moderation?  As will be made clear, part of the reason is Callicles’ 
excessive concern with external goods, or the goods of the body.  By turning to the issue of 
moderation, Socrates seeks to show Callicles not only that that there is a greater good than these 
external goods, but also that the acquisition of these external goods necessarily requires some 
involvement with evil.  Socrates seeks to redirect Callicles’ desires from external goods to an 
unalloyed good that is not dependent upon evil.   
 In response to Socrates’ suggestion that rulers ought to be moderate, Callicles asserts 
vehemently that one who controls his desires and appetites is a slave.  Instead, he argues that one 
ought to allow one’s desires to be as great as possible and that the ability to satisfy these desires 
leads to happiness. Socrates, in turn, praises him for his outspokenness before asking whether 
Callicles believes that in order to satisfy these desires one ought to “prepare satisfaction for them 
                                                 
65 Stauffer, “Socrates and Callicles” 640–41.  For this next portion of the chapter concerning Callicles’ desire for a 
good that is independent of evil, I am indebted to Stauffer’s insights. 
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from any place whatsoever” (492d–e). When Callicles agrees, Socrates in turn asks whether 
those who are in need of nothing are, therefore, not happy.  Callicles responds, “No, for in this 
way stones and corpses would be happiest (492e).66  Surprisingly, Socrates does not deny the 
charge, but instead points out the equal wretchedness of those who continuously need to satiate 
their desires without end.  He compares the life of the intemperate man to a man with perforated 
and decayed jars.  In a quest to fill his jars, the intemperate man continuously works to fill them 
and is in pain when they are not filled.  In contrast, the life of the orderly and moderate man is 
like a man with healthy jars who, upon having filled his jars, gives them no more thought and is 
at rest (493a–d).  Callicles remains unpersuaded, noting again that the life of the moderate man is 
like that of a stone, for “when one has been filled up,” he no longer rejoices nor feels pain 
(494b).  Unable to convince Callicles, Socrates seeks to shame him, comparing the life described 
by Callicles first to a stone curlew, a bird who excretes as he eats, and next to a life of constant 
scratching (494b–c).  In the face of both examples, Callicles remains outspoken and unashamed, 
asserting that “he who scratches, too, would live pleasantly” (494d).  However, when Socrates 
finally turns to the “culmination of such things as these, the life of catamites,” Callicles exclaims, 
“Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to lead the arguments into such things?” (494e).  While some 
have maintained that this betrays Callicles’ sense of shame, it is equally plausible that Callicles is 
attempting to shame Socrates.  If so, Callicles can be seen to be turning Socrates’ own tactics 
against him.  Just as Socrates had appealed to conventional justice and shame to refute Gorgias 
                                                 
66 Aristotle, at the end of book VII of the Ethics, seems to agree with Callicles: “Hence the god always enjoys a 
pleasure that is one and simple, for there is an activity not only of motion but also of motionlessness, and pleasure 
resides more in rest than in motion.  But “change in all things is sweet,” as the poet has it, on account of a certain 
defective condition.  For just as the defective person is a human being who readily undergoes change, so also the 
nature in need of change is defective, for it is neither simple nor decent” (1154b26–32). 
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and Polus, Callicles now seeks to use shame to refute Socrates.  Again, Plato seems to be 
pointing to the similarity between Socrates and Callicles. 
 Socrates, of course, is impervious to Callicles’ attempt to shame him.  Instead, he simply 
notes that Callicles is the one who has led the argument to this point by refusing to distinguish 
between good and bad pleasures. Socrates now turns to the question of whether the good and the 
pleasant are the same or different.  If the good and the pleasant are the same, the shameful 
examples provided by Socrates could, perhaps, be classified as good, whereas if the good and the 
pleasant are different, the examples would be classified as pleasurable, but not as good.  In a bid 
to remain consistent, Callicles asserts that he will hold to the position that the good and the 
pleasant are the same.  While Callicles’ answer suggests that Socrates’ examples have convinced 
him that the pleasant and the good are not the same, he asserts that he will maintain his former 
argument.  Callicles is not willing to be shamed into abandoning his position.  Rather, he will 
follow the argument to its conclusion.  Callicles’ desire leads the way; he is not held back by 
shame.  
 What follows is a somewhat odd colloquy, in which Socrates tells Callicles that if he is 
speaking contrary to his own opinion, he would be “corrupting the first speeches” and “would no 
longer be sufficiently examining with me the things that are” (495a; emphasis added).  When 
Callicles replies, “And you too,” Socrates coyly responds, “Well then, I too am not doing what’s 
correct, if indeed I do this, nor are you” (495b).  Through a series of dialectical moves, Socrates 
will go on to elicit from Callicles that the good and the pleasant are different.  Of course, earlier 
in his conversation with Polus, Socrates led Polus to the conclusion that the good and the 
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pleasant are the same.67  It seems that Socrates and Callicles agree that neither of them is going 
to be examining what is.  Callicles will assert contrary to his true belief that the pleasurable and 
the good are the same, while Socrates, perhaps in contrast to his true beliefs, will attempt to lead 
Callicles to the belief that the pleasurable and the good are different. 
 As part of his refutation, Socrates distinguishes between the good and the bad on the one 
hand, and the pleasant and the painful on the other hand.  According to Socrates, the good and 
the bad are completely distinct—that is, they are obtained and lost separately.  As evidence, he 
points to health and sickness; when one becomes healthy, he is released from sickness.  It is 
impossible to suffer what is good (health) and bad (sickness) at the same time.  In contrast, the 
pleasant and the painful are necessarily mixed.  When one obtains pleasure from eating or 
drinking, for example, this implies the need and desire of hunger or thirst, which is painful. 
 Socrates’ ostensible purpose is to critique Callicles’ thorough-going hedonism by 
pointing out that pleasure cannot be identical to the good because pleasure is necessarily mixed 
with pain, while the good is wholly free of need, or lack.  However, Socrates’ critique suffers 
from a number of flaws.  As Dustin Stauffer points out, it is not true that health and sickness 
cannot coexist, as one can suffer varying degrees of sickness and health throughout life.68  
Furthermore, Socrates never proves that an unalloyed good, free of any bad, can exist.  In fact, as 
was shown above, in the Lysis Socrates calls into question whether such a good can exist at all in 
the present life.69  However, Callicles does not raise these problems.  Instead, when Socrates asks 
                                                 
67 See above at n. 40 and accompanying text. 
 
68 Stauffer, “Socrates and Callicles,” 644.  
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him whether he agrees that there is a good, independent of bad, Callicles asserts emphatically, “I 
do agree, extraordinarily so” (496c).  Callicles’ assertion is significant, as it reveals his desire for 
a good that is free of evil.70 
 By way of the distinction between the pleasant and the good, Socrates is able to refute 
Callicles.  Through a series of moves, Socrates shows that if the pleasant and the good are indeed 
the same, then the intelligent and the courageous (those revered by Callicles as good and 
deserving to rule) are no different from the foolish and the cowardly, as both experience the 
same amount of pleasure.  Callicles is shown to have no basis on which to ground his admiration 
for intelligence and courage.  At the end of this exchange and in response to the refutation, 
Callicles asserts that he has not been forthright with Socrates in asserting that all pleasures are 
the same, but that he has, instead, been joking.  In response, Socrates cries out: 
Oh! Oh! Callicles, how all-cunning you are and how you treat me like a 
child—at one time claiming that things are this way, and at another time 
that the same things are otherwise, deceiving me!  And yet I did not think 
at the beginning that I was to be deceived by you voluntarily, since you 
were my friend.  But now I have been played false, and it looks like it’s 
necessary for me—according to the old saying—to make do with what is 
present and to accept from you this that is given. (499b–c). 
 
                                                 
69 See above at pp. 45–49. 
 
70 Stauffer argues that Callicles’ desire for a such an unalloyed good indicates that Callicles is not a simple hedonist 
but has a commitment to virtue. “Socrates and Callicles,” 645.  As indicated in Chapter 1, in the Lysis Plato subtly 
raises the possibility that friendship between two individuals who are good, each in his own way, may be a good that 
is free of evil.  
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Socrates points out that Callicles has deceived him and, therefore, can no longer be considered a 
friend.  Of course, as noted above, Callicles was never said to have friendship with Socrates, he 
was only credited with having goodwill toward him.71 
 In any case, while Socrates claims to have exposed Callicles’ friendship as fraudulent, it 
is significant that almost immediately prior to this, Socrates uncovers Callicles’ desire for an 
unalloyed good.  We have already seen that near the beginning of their discussion, Callicles 
shows himself to be a desirous individual.  However, his desire was directed solely to the 
extrinsic goods that rhetoric and the conventional practice of politics are able to provide.  At this 
point in the dialogue, Callicles’ desire for the good is revealed to be so great that he believes in 
the existence of a good independent of any evil.  In the next portion of the conversation, Socrates 
will lead Callicles to the conclusion that the attainment of such a good is, in fact, impossible.  
 Based on Callicles’ distinction between good and bad pleasures, as well as his belief in 
the existence of an unalloyed good, Socrates steers Callicles to accept the proposition that 
pleasures and pains are good only to the extent that they are directed toward the good.  Next, 
Socrates asserts that it requires an artful man to distinguish pleasant things that are good from 
pleasant things that are bad.  Tying the conversation back to the theme of rhetoric, he reminds 
Callicles that he had earlier designated rhetoric as an experience rather than an art, on the basis 
that rhetoric concerns itself only with flattery, or pleasure, irrespective of whether the pleasure 
aims at the good.  He concludes by asking Callicles whether the “rhetoric directed toward the 
Athenian people and the other peoples of free men in the cities” is anything other than simple 
                                                 
71 See above, n. 63 and accompanying text. 
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flattery aimed at gratifying the people (502e).  In response, Callicles asserts that it depends on 
the rhetor; some care for the citizens, while others are precisely as Socrates describes. 
 Perhaps surprisingly, Socrates does not deny the existence of the art of rhetoric Callicles 
describes, instead noting that if such an art were to exist, its goal would be to make the “citizens’ 
souls to be as good as possible” (503a).  However, Socrates quickly follows up on this comment 
by noting that this rhetoric has never yet come to pass.  He continues his description of this 
“noble” rhetoric by noting that the rhetorician who “speaks with a view to the best” would seek 
to arrange and order the citizens’ souls in a healthy way, namely, by instilling justice and 
moderation into them, and by removing injustice and intemperance (504d–e).  Socrates notes, 
however, that moderation is not chosen simply for its own sake.  Rather, just as doctors “allow a 
healthy man to satisfy his desires” and deny the same to a sick man, so the rhetor will allow 
healthy souls to pursue their desires, while keeping base souls away from their desires.  By 
keeping the base soul away from these desires, the rhetor will improve it.  When he agrees, 
Socrates concludes by asking Callicles to agree also to the proposition that keeping the base soul 
“away from the things it desires” is punishment and that being punished is “better for the soul 
than intemperance” (505b).  Of course, by leading Callicles to this conclusion, Socrates has 
bested him.  Socrates has shown Callicles to be unable to meet the challenge posed at the 
beginning of their conversation: to show that doing injustice and not paying the just penalty 
when one does injustice are not the utmost of all evils.   
 Callicles, however, refuses to be refuted, claiming that he does not know what Socrates is 
saying.  In response to this feigned ignorance, Socrates states, “This man here does not abide 
being benefitted and suffering for himself this thing that the argument is about, being punished” 
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(505c).  Despite the logic of Socrates’ argument, Callicles remains unpersuaded and refuses to 
take his medicine.  Socrates now indicates that his argument is only half over because Callicles’ 
intransigence is frustrating its development.  At this point the dialogue takes a turn.  Socrates 
asserts it is “not righteous to abandon even myths in the middle” and proposes to take over the 
argument by posing questions and answering them in turn (505c–d).  In what follows Socrates 
shift from a dialogic style of argumentation to a disquisitional, or rhetorical one, to finish the 
argument.  However, Socrates, explains that what he is about to say is not said with knowledge.  
Furthermore, he indicates that he would have preferred to continue speaking with Callicles until 
he had “given him back the speech of Amphion for the speech of Zethus” (506b).  In this way, 
Plato suggests that the disquisition that Socrates is about to deliver cannot be characterized as 
Socrates’ true belief—or that he is unsure of its truth. 
 Socrates begins by fairly accurately recounting the conversation he has just finished with 
Callicles.  He distinguishes the pleasant from the good and states that the pleasant must be done 
for the sake of the good.  Furthermore, he notes that things are made good by the presence of 
some virtue and that the virtue of the soul is moderation.  At this point, however, Socrates 
deviates from the conversation he has had with Callicles.  Whereas up to this point, Socrates has 
held that moderation is directed toward the good, he now holds that the moderate soul is good 
(507a).  Given Socrates’ insistence that philosophy always says the same thing, we may conclude 
that Socrates does not truly believes the rhetorical display he is delivering and that what he is 
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about to say is simply a noble myth (505d).72  As we shall see, this rhetorical display is designed 
to appeal to Callicles’ desire for an unalloyed good. 
 Socrates continues by noting that the ordered, moderate soul is the basis for the ordered 
whole of nature, as moderation leads to happiness between men and the gods.  The moderate 
man, Socrates states, would do “fitting things concerning both gods and human beings,” and he 
would, in fact, be “the completely good man” (507a–b).  Therefore, if one wishes to be happy 
and good, he must “pursue and practice moderation, and each of us must flee intemperance as 
fast his feet will carry him” (507d).  At the center of this noble myth are the virtues of justice and 
moderation.  Wisdom and its concomitant desire are not even mentioned.73 
 Socrates then ties the noble myth back to the philosophic principle that he has maintained 
throughout the dialogue; one ought to avoid the practice of injustice, and one must punish the 
evil doer, even if the evil doer is oneself or “some other of one’s own” (507d).  Invoking the 
wise (σοφοί), Socrates states that “heaven, earth, gods and human beings are held together by 
community, friendship, orderliness, moderation, and justness; and on account of these things, 
comrade, [the wise] call this whole an order, not disorder and intemperance” (507e–508a).  As a 
result, the immoderate evildoer, who is incapable of friendship and community, ought to be 
punished if this happy state of order is to be maintained: “If oneself or some other of one’s 
own—whether private man or city—needs it, one must apply the just penalty and punish, if he is 
to be happy” (507d).  According to the myth put forward by Socrates, a natural harmony obtains 
                                                 
72 Cf. Rep. 382c–d.  Commenting on this section of the dialogue, Seth Benardete notes, “Philosophy always says the 
same; Socrates does not.” Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 90. 
 
73 Cf. Rep. 504d, where Socrates indicates that “there is something yet greater than justice.” 
110 
 
 
 
between the whole and the human soul; the soul is a microcosm of the whole.  Although 
Socrates’ account is simply a myth, the philosophic principle he has maintained throughout the 
dialogue remains the same: injustice ought to be avoided, and the evildoer must be punished.  
Thus, Socrates constructs a myth that is as close to the truth as possible.74   
 Socrates’s myth, which holds out the possibility of a wholly-ordered and wholly-good 
universe, is designed to appeal to Callicles’ desire for an unalloyed good.  Socrates himself, 
however, does not actually believe in the existence of such a universe.  As we shall see, for 
Socrates there is no natural compatibility between the individual soul and the whole; the soul is 
not, in fact, a microcosm of the whole.  As a result, Socrates, in contrast to Callicles, does not 
believe in the existence of an unalloyed good. 
 As noted, Socrates’ myth is based on an understanding of nature and the whole 
articulated by “the wise” (σοφοί).  This reference to “the wise” is significant because, as 
indicated above, these same wise (σοφοί), who “converse and write about nature and the whole,” 
are invoked in the Lysis in support of the proposition that “like is always necessarily a friend to 
its like” (Lys. 214b2–6). As argued above, Plato suggests in the Lysis that Socrates does not quite 
fully understand these “wisest ones.”  As will be recalled, I have argued that Plato’s purpose in 
the Lysis is subtly to imply that Socrates’ inattention to nature and the whole causes his inquiry 
into the definition of friendship to flounder.  It is perhaps no surprise, then, that almost 
immediately after providing this appealing account of an ordered whole of nature Socrates 
implicitly denies its possibility by appealing to the concept of friendship.   
                                                 
74 Cf. Rep. 382d. 
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 Socrates begins his denial of the myth by recounting Callicles’ charge against him.  Let 
us examine, he says, on the basis of the myth, “whether what is said is fine or not: that I am 
unable … to help either myself or anyone of my friends or relatives, or to save them from the 
greatest dangers, but am at the mercy of whoever wishes” (508c).  As the myth has indicated, 
and as Socrates has continuously maintained, doing injustice and failing to pay the just penalty is 
the greatest evil or harm that can befall a person.  Furthermore, he contends that the greatest help 
one can provide for oneself and for one’s friends is to turn away the greatest harm; in turn, the 
second greatest benefit “would be help against the second evil, third against the third, and so on” 
(509b–c).  The nobility of the benefit corresponds to the greatness of the evil turned away.  
When Callicles assents, Socrates notes that it is, therefore, necessary to prepare a power so as 
neither to do injustice nor to suffer injustice.   
 He begins by analyzing the power necessary to avoid suffering injustice.  The power 
consists in either taking up rule in the city (perhaps even as a tyrant) or being a friend of the 
existing regime (510a).  Not surprisingly, Callicles agrees emphatically.  Next, Socrates asks 
whether Callicles also agrees that “each man is the friend of another to the greatest possible 
degree, who the ancient and wise said was the friend: like to like” (510b).  As will become 
evident, the introduction of friendship and, in particular, the introduction of this definition of 
friendship, is crucial.  As noted, in the Lysis, Socrates’ understanding of this concept is depicted 
as, at best, incomplete.  Not only does Socrates deny there the possibility of two individuals 
having a self-sufficient friendship that entails an appreciation for each other simply on account of 
one another’s goodness, but he also guides the conversation in such a manner that at its end 
friendship is subsumed within the ambit of erotic desire (ἔρως).   
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 When Callicles agrees to the definition of friendship provided by the wise—like is friend 
to like—Socrates continues, stating that neither a good nor a lowly man would be able to become 
the tyrant’s friend “with his whole mind” (510b–c).  The tyrant would either fear the good man 
or despise the lowly.  The only individual who could be a friend with the tyrant, suggests 
Socrates, is the man “who, being of the same character and praising and blaming the same 
things, is willing to be ruled and to be submissive to the ruler.  This man will have great power in 
that city” (510c–d).  As a result, the only way an individual is able to obtain power in a city ruled 
by a tyrant—and thus be able to prepare a power to avoid injustice—is by becoming as much 
like the tyrant as possible.  The obvious result of preparing such a power, concludes Socrates, is 
that great injustices will also have been committed and, therefore, the greatest evil will have 
befallen the individual who has obtained power in the regime.  Such an individual will have 
harmed “his soul through imitation of the master and through power” (511a). 
 In effect, Socrates’ understanding of friendship denies the possibility of the unalloyed 
good he had earlier proffered in the form of the noble myth.  At the end of the Lysis, Plato points 
toward the unsettling political ramifications that the Socratic understanding of friendship entails.  
In the present dialogue, Plato makes clear how the Socratic understanding of friendship unsettles 
the cohesion of the regime.  The myth of an ordered and complete whole depends on the 
phenomenon of friendship: “The wise say … that heaven, earth, gods, and human beings are held 
together by community, friendship, orderliness, moderation, and justness” (507e–508a; emphasis 
added).  If political community and the order of the cosmos depend on friendship, Socrates’ 
understanding of friendship implies that the myth does not adequately describe reality.  Indeed, 
Socrates’ understanding of friendship suggests that there is, in fact, no harmony between the 
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individual soul and the political community.  As a result, he counsels Callicles to avoid the life 
of politics and instead to pursue the Socratic way of life; the private life of contemplation.  While 
the life of politics (including befriending the demos) may protect one from the lesser evil of 
suffering injustice, it does so only “at the cost of the things dearest to us” (513a).  The Socratic 
life is unable to ensure that one does not suffer injustice; it does ensure that one avoids 
committing injustice, which is the greatest harm that can befall a person.   
 Upon the conclusion of Socrates’ speech, Callicles seems to be only partially persuaded.  
He states, “In some way, I don’t know what, what you say seems good to me, Socrates; but I 
suffer the experience of the many—I am not altogether persuaded by you” (513c).  In reply, 
Socrates states “if we investigate these same things often, and better, perhaps you will be 
persuaded” (513c–d).  Perhaps a better rhetorician would be capable of persuading Callicles.  In 
any case, as we saw above, Socrates began the conversation with Callicles by noting that due to 
his goodwill, outspokenness, and knowledge, Callicles could serve as the touchstone for 
Socrates’ way of life.  Socrates had declared that if he could convince Callicles to agree with him 
on the thing about which he holds opinions, it would vindicate his way of life.  Now, near the 
end of the dialogue, Callicles remains unpersuaded, suggesting that Socrates’ way of life has not 
been vindicated.  By drawing our attention both to Callicles’ character and to the fact that 
Callicles remains unpersuaded, Plato seems to be suggesting that Socrates’ approach to the 
debate between politics and philosophy—or the debate between Zethus and Amphion—is, in 
fact, not the correct approach.  Given Plato’s critique of the Socratic understanding of friendship 
leveled in the Lysis, as well as the role that Socrates’ understanding of friendship plays in the 
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Gorgias, it is fair to conclude that Plato believes the Socratic understanding of friendship is not 
only incomplete, but that it negatively impacts his relation to the polis.  
 The manner in which Socrates introduces the myth at the end of the Gorgias bolsters this 
interpretation.  The myth itself concerns the judgement of human beings in the afterlife, and it 
relates how it came to be that men are judged on the basis of their soul alone, rather than on 
account of their wealth, beauty, or political connections.75  The myth is meant to underscore the 
message Socrates has conveyed throughout the dialogue: the care for one’s soul ought to come 
before a concern for the external goods provided by politics, and, to the extent that the external 
goods are obtained at the expense of an upright soul, they ought to be considered worthless.  
Socrates introduces the myth by alluding to a passage in the Iliad concerning the division of rule 
among the gods.  He states, “For just as Homer says, Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto divided the rule 
among themselves, after they took it over from their father” (523a).  As James Nichols notes, this 
is a reference to Book XV of the Iliad, in which Poseidon complains of being unjustly stripped 
by Zeus of his right to jointly rule the land.  According to the account in the Iliad, Zeus orders 
Poseidon to leave the fighting at Troy.  In response, Poseidon angrily states that he is of equal 
honor to Zeus.  Poseidon recounts that he, along with Zeus and Pluto (Hades) had divided up the 
rule they had taken over from their father Cronos, such that while Pluto would have control of 
                                                 
75 According to the myth, during the early portion of Zeus’ rule, the fate of individual men was decided while they 
were still living, and it was decided by other living men.  The result was that “the judgments were decided badly.”  
Pluto, the god of the underworld and those in charge of “the islands of the blessed” informed Zeus that the judges 
were deciding the fates wrongly and that “unworthy human beings were frequenting them in both places.”  To 
rectify this, Zeus ordered that going forward, the men being judged should be dead and naked.  For under the 
previous practice, many “who have base souls are clothed in fine bodies, ancestry, and wealth.”  Furthermore, the 
judges were also previously clothed “with eyes and ears and the whole body, like a screen, covering their soul.”  The 
problem with the previous practice is that all these coverings—both those of the judges and those of the men being 
judged—stand in the way and result in poor judgements.  Thus, by judging the soul alone, without any of the 
sensible accoutrements concealing its true state that, the judgements will be made correctly. (Cf. 523a–524a). 
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the underworld, Zeus would have control of the heavens, and Poseidon would have control of the 
seas.  Meanwhile, they would all have equal access to the land and to Mount Olympus.  As a 
result, Poseidon suggests that Zeus is committing a grave injustice by ordering him to stop 
interfering in the land battle between the Achaeans and the Trojans, as they have an equal title to 
jointly rule the land.  Despite this fact, Poseidon leaves the battle on account of Zeus’ superior 
force.   
 Why does Plato allude to this story?  Of course, it introduces the myth in a way that sets 
up Zeus’ ability unilaterally to alter the method of judging human beings without interference 
from Poseidon, so that they are judged on the basis of their soul alone.  Throughout the dialogue, 
Socrates has attempted to convince his interlocutors that the soul alone is important, suggesting 
that the Zeus depicted in the myth is representative of Socrates.  Like Zeus, Socrates changes the 
standards of judgment such that the soul alone is of importance, while external or necessary 
goods are counted as worth nothing.  Socrates believes that only his way of life is good.   
 Plato’s allusion to Zeus’ banishment of Poseidon and the myth told by Socrates at the end 
of the dialogue seem to offer a substitute ending to that of Antiope, the Euripidean play alluded 
to at earlier points in the dialogue.  It will be recalled that in Antiope, Zethus, the political man of 
action (who is meant to represent Callicles), and Amphion, the philosophic man of 
contemplation (who is meant to represent Socrates), argue about whose life is superior.  At the 
end of the play, Hermes enters and restores order by granting them the power to rule jointly.  As 
we have seen, this is decidedly not how the dialogue between Callicles and Socrates ends.  While 
Socrates does not persuade Callicles of the superiority of his way of life, he is unambiguously 
the victor of the conversation. Socrates ensures that the standards by which his way of life is 
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judged, are recognized as the only standards.  The fact that Plato introduces the final myth told 
by Socrates by alluding to Zeus’ unlawful act of depriving Poseidon of his share in their joint-
rule suggests that he believes that Socrates also commits an injustice in denying any merit to 
Callicles’ concern for the external (or necessary) goods. Could it be that Plato believed that some 
sort of joint-rule is necessary between politics and philosophy?  Or that the coincidence of power 
and wisdom is necessary?   
 
Conclusion: Friendship and the Coincidence of Power and Wisdom 
 The Gorgias details the way in which the Socratic understanding of friendship developed 
in the Lysis directly impacts Socrates’ approach to politics.  At the end of the Lysis, Socrates’ 
ambivalence about friendship is made clear.  On the one hand, he tells Lysis and Menexenus that 
he counts himself as one of them, suggesting that they have become friends.  On the other hand, 
he immediately follows this up by stating that they have not yet discovered what a friend is.  It 
was earlier noted that the conclusion of the Lysis suggests that at the end of the dialogue Socrates 
considers himself to be a friend of the boys only because he has “refuted them” and has inculcatd 
in them an awareness of their deficiency and of their metaphysical incompleteness—he has 
stoked in them a desire for the good.   
 In the Gorgias, Socrates’ understanding of friendship is seen to impact his approach to 
politics.  In the first half of the dialogue, Socrates’ understanding of friendship, as well as his 
declaration of friendship to Polus and Gorgias, leads him to refute them.  By refuting them he 
seeks to remove their false conceptions of what is.  First, he refutes Gorgias by exposing his 
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deficient and contradictory understanding of the nature and purpose of rhetoric.  Next, he refutes 
Polus, showing him that it is better to suffer injustice than it is to do injustice, and that it is better 
to pay the just penalty for injustices committed than it is to escape punishment.  In the same way 
that Socrates refuted Lysis, he refutes Polus and Gorgias.  Furthermore, just as in the Lysis, in 
which Socrates’ refutation of the boys caused them to rebel against the established authorities, so 
in the Gorgias, Socrates sends Polus back into the city armed with a rhetoric designed to refute 
the city rather than flatter it.  For Socrates, it is just to refute both oneself and one’s friends; 
friendship consists in refuting or removing the lie that exists in one’s soul.  This ensures that any 
approach to politics is necessarily negative and destructive of the bonds of the city.  Socrates’ 
interaction with Gorgias and Polus shows how his conception of friendship has the effect of 
destroying the city and how his conception of friendship causes his interaction with it to be 
negative. 
 In the second half of the dialogue, Socrates counsels Callicles to avoid politics on the 
basis of his understanding of friendship.  How is it that Socrates’ understanding of friendship can 
cause him both to send Polus back into the city armed with a rhetoric meant to refute it and to 
counsel Callicles to avoid politics altogether?  The answer is related to the difference in character 
between Polus and Gorgias, on the one hand, and Callicles, on the other.  Callicles is, in some 
ways, very similar to Socrates.  While Polus and Gorgias both suffer from a strong sense of 
shame, Callicles and Socrates are both more outspoken.  As a result, while Polus and Gorgias are 
not capable of overcoming the conventional understanding of justice due to their shame, 
Callicles and Socrates—perhaps to differing extents—are able to overcome these conventions.  
Indeed, both are shown to be highly erotic individuals, and it is their erotic desire for what is 
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good that enables them to “shake… off and break… through all” the conventional taboos that 
stand in their way (484a).  In fact, Callicles’ desire for the good is so great that he believes in the 
existence of an unalloyed good independent of any evil.  As a result, under the Socratic 
conception of friendship, which holds that like is a friend to its like, Socrates asserts that 
Callicles ought to avoid politics altogether, for it is only by becoming like the regime that 
Callicles will come to have power in the city.  Gorgias and Polus are both wedded to 
conventional conceptions of justice.  Therefore, Socrates is not depriving them of the good by 
undertaking a life that requires them to challenge and refute the existing conventional 
understanding of justice.  In contrast, Callicles’ erotic desire and his devotion to natural justice 
suggests that he ought to avoid politics altogether. 
 Neither Socrates’ negative approach to politics nor his attempt to avoid politics altogether 
is due primarily to a desire to avoid the conventional, vulgar conception of injustice.  Rather, the 
Socratic approach to politics stems from his conception of friendship.  While the destructive 
effect of his understanding of friendship is hinted at near the end of the Lysis, it is made explicit 
in the Gorgias.  There is no self-sufficient basis for friendship that is grounded in a simple 
conception of another’s goodness.  Rather, to the extent that friendship exists, it consists in 
refuting the lie in another’s soul and awakening in him a desire for completeness—a 
completeness that lies outside the realm of friendship and politics altogether. 
 Plato’s treatment, however, suggests that the Socratic conception of friendship may be 
mistaken.  In the Lysis, Plato alludes to the fact that there may be a basis for friendship between 
two people who both are good but who are good each in his own way.  The friendship between 
Lysis and Menexenus is portrayed as potentially being one of such friendships.  The soft-spoken, 
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thoughtful Lysis is contrasted with the more brash Menexenus.  This allusion to a self-sufficient 
friendship independent of need is continued in the Gorgias.  Socrates and Callicles are depicted 
as being in some way similar to one another.  Both are erotic, relatively shameless individuals 
who have a strong desire for the good.  However, each is devoted to a different mode of life, 
Callicles to the active the life of politics, and Socrates to the quiet life of contemplation.  By 
presenting Socrates and Callicles in this way—as similar, yet in some way different—Plato 
seems to be suggesting that their lives may be complementary.  Could it be that Socrates and 
Callicles are good, each in his own way?     
 Given both Plato’s depiction of the Socratic understanding of friendship in the Lysis and 
the way that friendship works to destroy the myth in the Gorgias, it seems that for Plato the 
seeds for a reconciliation between power and wisdom lie in a correct understanding of 
friendship.  In both the Lysis and the Gorgias, Plato points to the danger that Socrates’ 
understanding of friendship carries for politics.  The manner in which Socrates subsumes 
friendship into the ambit of erotic desire for the good ensures that there is no friendship 
independent of need, a friendship that appreciates another solely for the other’s own good 
qualities.  Furthermore, as a result, the pursuit of the good through philosophic contemplation 
becomes a personal endeavor, and a concern for the good of another interferes with that 
endeavor.  Socratic philosophy, in its attempt to discover the right way of life through dialogue 
with others, ends up being parasitic on politics, as it questions the conventions and practices that 
hold a city together.  At the same time, Plato’s purpose in these dialogues is not simply to point 
to the danger of philosophy—a teaching certainly worth bearing in mind—but he simultaneously 
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points toward a reconciliation between politics and philosophy through the medium of 
friendship, a reconciliation that he leaves for Aristotle fully to develop.
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CHAPTER THREE.   ARISTOTLE’S FRIENDSHIP OF THE GOOD 
 
Politics and Philosophy: An Unresolved Tension 
In Book I of the Politics, Aristotle traces the emergence of the polis, or how the polis comes to 
be established.  In the overview provided, Aristotle stresses the role that necessity plays in the 
process.  He notes that the most basic unit of the polis, the individual, unites with other 
individuals in order to counter necessity.  As evidence of this, he points both to the natural 
coupling of male and female, who come together “from a natural striving to leave behind” 
offspring, and to the conjoining of master and slave, both of whom use their distinct functions to 
preserve themselves as well as the other.  From these relationships arises the household, which 
exists in order to satisfy “the needs of daily life” (Pol. 1152b13).  Thus, the household exists to 
counter day-to-day necessities.  However, Aristotle continues by noting that a household is not 
on its own self-sufficient but is still subject to necessity of “non-daily needs” and, as a result, 
various households join together to constitute the village.  In turn, several villages come together 
to comprise “the complete community”—the polis. The polis, Aristotle states, is completely self-
sufficient and exists “by nature.”  From this brief sketch it seems that for Aristotle the polis 
arises naturally in order to counter necessity.  Man is by nature a political being, because man is 
by nature not self-sufficient on his own. 
 If, however, necessity is the only basis for the development of the polis, it is not entirely 
clear why several villages would come together to form a polis.  Indeed, as Aristotle makes clear, 
the household and the village together already provide for both man’s daily and non-daily needs.  
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Thus, it is already at the level of the village that necessity has been overcome.  To what end do 
villages join together to form a polis?  In his brief depiction of the development of the polis 
Aristotle hints that the polis has an end beyond simply countering necessity; while the polis 
comes “into being for the sake of living, it exists for the sake of living well” (1252b25–30).  The 
city, therefore, has an end beyond merely securing the existence of its members and countering 
necessity.  Aristotle initially suggests that the end of the city is justice.  Pointing to man’s 
capacity for speech, he notes that man, in contrast to other “herd” animals, has the ability to 
distinguish between good and bad, justice and injustice, and furthermore has the capacity to 
institute its judgements concerning the just into custom and law.  Justice seems to be the natural 
end of the city.1   
 Based on the city’s complete and full self-sufficiency, Aristotle argues that it is “prior by 
nature to the household and to each of us” (1253a20).  The whole is prior to the part.  As a result, 
man’s full existence depends on his relation to, and participation in, the polis in the same way 
that a foot or a hand depends on the existence of whole body. Aristotle seems to suggest that it is 
in the city that man finds completion or perfection as a human being.  Specifically, it is by being 
an active participant in the shaping and promulgation of the city’s laws concerning what is just 
and unjust, and furthermore by obeying these laws, that man fulfills his purpose.  In contrast to 
Socrates, Aristotle presents the individual as having the same end as the city. In Book I of the 
                                                 
1 Nevertheless, as Susan Collins points out, “Aristotle’s ‘natural beginning’ is a bit of a red herring:  The city 
presents its justice as the natural completion of a human being, yet the city is not simply natural in one respect: It 
must be constituted.” Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
19.  The fact that justice is not strictly speaking a natural end of the city is hinted at already in Book I of the Politics.  
After suggesting that man’s capacity for speech or reason is what sets him apart from other “herd animals,” Aristotle 
states that this capacity “is what makes a household and a city” (1253a19).  This, of course, suggests that the city is 
not distinguished from the household on account of justice and political virtue.  At this point, the distinct end of the 
polis has not yet been revealed. 
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Politics, Aristotle seems to imply that there is a natural harmony between the individual and the 
city.   
 The remainder of the Politics, however, complicates this picture.  In Book VII, Aristotle 
specifically raises the question of what the best life is for the individual and whether it is the 
same for the individual as for the city.  We are again told that the city has an end beyond itself; it 
aims at living well, not mere existence.  Both the city and the individuals that comprise it ought 
to aim at living well.  
 What it means to live well, however, is not entirely clear.  While Aristotle makes clear 
that to live well means to live a life of virtue,2 he notes that there is debate over which virtue. It is 
at this point that Aristotle deals head-on with the question that had been debated by Callicles and 
Socrates in the Gorgias: 
There is dispute among those who agree that the most choiceworthy way 
of life is that accompanied by virtue as to whether the political and active 
way of life is choiceworthy, or rather that which is divorced from all 
external things—that involving some sort of study, for example—which 
some assert is the only philosophic way of life. (1324a26–29).  
 
The political and the philosophic life are here juxtaposed, and, after spending some time 
distinguishing the various modes of active life, Aristotle involves himself in the debate between 
the proponents of these two types of life.3  Aristotle lays out the various opinions before 
                                                 
2 In a passage that mirrors the division of goods in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle divides good things into three: 
property, the goods of the body, and the goods of the soul.  Through a series of arguments, Aristotle concludes that 
the goods of the soul (i.e., virtue) are superior to other goods. Cf. Pol. 1323a24–1323b21. 
 
3 Before turning to the merits and demerits of each life, Aristotle first distinguishes between two types of active, or 
political life.  On the one hand, there is a life dedicated to ruling as a master over one’s neighbors in a despotic 
fashion.  On the other hand, there is rule in a “political fashion,” which seems to be rule in accordance with law.  
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investigating them.  He first puts forward a position that is nearly identical to the Socratic 
position as presented in the Gorgias before contrasting it with the position held by Callicles.  He 
notes that some eschew the active life on the grounds that “the way of life of the free person [is] 
different from that of the political ruler and the most choiceworthy of all,” and that the political 
life is an impediment to one’s own well-being (1325a17–22).  In contrast, others consider the 
active life to be best, due to the fact that “it is impossible for one who acts in nothing to act well, 
and that acting well and happiness are the same thing” (1325a22–24).4   
 In the last book of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle conspicuously concludes that the 
philosophic life is superior to the political life.  This same conclusion is expressed in Book VII of 
the Politics as well.  Thus, while Aristotle’s statement that “happiness is a sort of action” may 
seem to settle the debate between the two lives in favor of the active life of politics, Aristotle 
famously re-defines the life of philosophy to be a life of action.  The active life, he states, is “not 
necessarily in relation to others” (1325b17).  Aristotle suggests that the active life can also be 
practiced in a private manner, rather than simply in a public or political manner.   The 
philosophic life is active as well because thought itself is an activity.  In fact, Aristotle goes so 
far as to say that those thoughts “that are complete in themselves, and the sorts of studies and 
                                                 
Aristotle lays out three sets of opinions regarding the merits of these two types of active life.  Some, Aristotle notes, 
believe neither type of rule is good; they maintain that while the tyrannical rule over one’s neighbors is accompanied 
by great injustice, rule “in the political fashion” is simply “an impediment to one’s own well-being” (1324a36–39).  
This first opinion encapsulates Socrates’ position in the Gorgias.  Others, Aristotle notes, hold that the “political 
life” is the only life for a man (1324a40–41).  This opinion seems to encapsulate Callicles’ assertion that the man 
who fails to engage in politics will never amount to much.  Last, Aristotle notes, are those who assert that “the mode 
of regime involving mastery and tyranny is the only happy one” (1324b3–4).  Aristotle concludes that the while the 
opinion that rule always involves mastery and tyranny is the most common and even accords with nature to some 
extent, this is not the city’s highest aim.  Aristotle will later explain that the city’s ultimate aim is, instead, “the 
actualization and complete practice of virtue” through the institution of laws and education (1332a9–10).  
 
4 Cf. Gor. 485d–e. 
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thoughts that are for their own sake” are “much more” active than those thoughts that are 
pursued for some other activity (1325b18–21).  This statement mirrors Aristotle’s argument 
Book X of the Ethics that the philosophic life is the happiest due to its greater self-sufficiency 
and the fact that it is sought as an end in itself.  The Politics ends with the same conclusion as the 
Ethics: the philosophic life is the most active life. 
 While Aristotle is explicit in his assertion that the philosophic life is superior to the 
political life, he nevertheless emphasizes in the Politics that cities can also partake in the action 
of thought.  Positing the existence of an “isolated city” that intentionally chooses to live alone, he 
writes that this type of city is also active, “for activity can come about relative to a city’s parts: 
there are many sorts of shared activities undertaken by the parts of the city in relation to one 
another” (1325a3–4).  While this passage is somewhat cryptic, what Aristotle seems to have in 
mind is education.  As Susan Collins notes, Aristotle “suggests that the political community may 
be organized so that its highest aim is action understood in [the] sense” of study and thinking.5  
The life of political rule—understood as the improvement of souls—shares in the active life of 
the philosopher by aiming at the life of study and thought. It is for this reason that the last book 
of the Politics covers the education that ought to be instituted in the best regime.  Aristotle 
concludes that in this way, the aim of the best regime and the aim of the individual are the same; 
both partake of the activity of thought. 
 A number of indicators suggest, however, that harmony between the individual and the 
city is not so easily achieved.  First, the education described by Aristotle is not simply 
                                                 
5 Collins, Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship, 116. 
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philosophic.  In fact, Aristotle’s views on philosophic education mirror those of Callicles.  It will 
be recalled that Callicles believed that while some education in philosophy was necessary and 
suitable for the young, one ought not pursue education beyond what is necessary.  Aristotle 
relates similarly that one ought not to “persevere overly much in the [liberal sciences] with a 
view to proficiency” (1337b17). Commenting on the education in Aristotle’s best regime, Susan 
Collins writes that the education Aristotle lays out aims at “a life of leisure in which the arts and 
music figure most prominently.  This life is neither wholly political nor wholly philosophic—
neither wholly devoted to the city nor separated from it.”6  Of course, this seems to be in stark 
contrast to Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, where the life of theoretical contemplation is 
unambiguously held to be the best life, for sake of which all other actions are undertaken.   
Robert Bartlett concludes that “the discussion of ‘leisure’ in [Book] VII is arguably the peak of 
the Politics, not because it outlines the genuinely satisfactory end of life but because it points to 
the true peak, the truly satisfying and altogether private activity of philosophic contemplation.”7  
If Bartlett is correct, it would seem that the aim of the individual and the aim of the city are not 
the same, as the aim of the city is not strictly philosophic in the way it is for the individual.8   
 Furthermore, to the extent that education in the best regime is philosophic, we have to 
wonder what causes the city to be concerned with philosophy.  That is, while the necessity that 
characterizes the pre-political state is the impetus that animates the city’s concern for justice, it 
                                                 
6 Ibid.  
 
7 Robert Bartlett, “The ‘Realism’ of Classical Political Science,” 394. 
 
8 If this conclusion is correct, it may well call into question Aristotle’s description of man as a political animal.  
Indeed, if the end of man is different from the end of the city, it would seem that man is not by nature directed 
toward participation in the city. 
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remains an open question what it is that animates and orients the city toward philosophy.  Last, 
Aristotle fails to make clear why the philosopher should be concerned with the well-being of the 
city.  It will be recalled that in his discussion concerning the relative worth of the political and 
philosophic life, Aristotle had raised the Socratic objection to the political life that political rule 
is simply an impediment to one’s own well-being (1324a38–39).  However, he does not (in the 
Politics) directly respond to this criticism.  Given that Aristotle spends the last book of the 
Politics giving political advice on how to institute an educational system that is concerned with 
the improvement of the souls of other people, it would seem fair to question whether Aristotle’s 
pursuit of the good is undermined or tainted in some way by political concerns.9  We may 
conclude, therefore, that, in the context of the Politics, Aristotle’s attempt to resolve the tension 
between the philosopher and the city appears to be at most a superficial solution.  Analogizing 
the leisure of the city to the theoretical speculation of the philosopher does not fully reconcile the 
city and the philosopher. 
 The Politics does, nonetheless, hint at a resolution to the problem regarding the 
philosopher’s estrangement from the city.  In introducing the educational system of the best 
regime, Aristotle raises the question of why one would do, or learn, something if it does not 
directly benefit oneself.  He writes, “It makes a difference, too, for the sake of what one does or 
learns something.  What is for one’s own sake or for the sake of friends or on account of virtue is 
not unfree, while the person who does the same thing on account of others would often be held to 
do something characteristic of the laborer or the slave” (1337b18–22).  It seems that the 
                                                 
9 Strauss, The City and Man, 29. 
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philosopher needs to obtain some benefit from instituting the educational system if he is not to be 
doing something “characteristic of the laborer or the slave.”  As the quotation indicates, it is the 
concept of friendship that is able to answer the questions of why the city is concerned with 
philosophy and why the philosopher is concerned with the education of his fellow citizens.  As 
will later be made clear, friendship is concerned both with one’s own good and the good of 
another. Like the city itself, friendship is ordered toward two ends.   
 
Friendship and The Structure of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
Fully to understand the way in which friendship mediates the tension between the political and 
philosophic life, it is necessary to turn to the Nicomachean Ethics, in which Aristotle unpacks his 
conception of friendship in detail.  It is a discussion that has traditionally received little attention.  
This lack of attention is curious, given that the two books on friendship, Books VIII and IX, 
together constitute a full fifth of the Ethics.  To see how Aristotle’s discussion of friendship 
figures into the debate between proponents of the life of politics and proponents of the private 
life of contemplation, it will be helpful to look to the structure of the Nicomachean Ethics as a 
whole.  The first book of the Ethics states Aristotle’s intention “in outline.”  In this book, 
Aristotle notes that his goal is to find “the human good” (NE, 1094b7).10  Based on an argument 
that assumes the teleological character of the entirety of nature, Aristotle holds, somewhat 
ambiguously, that the human good is “an activity of soul in accord with virtue, and if there are 
                                                 
10 Unless otherwise indicated all citations to the Nicomachean Ethics will be based on the translation provided by 
Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011). 
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several virtues, then in accord with the best and most complete one” (1098a17–18).  Of course, 
as the Ethics continues it quickly becomes clear that there is more than one virtue; Aristotle 
distinguishes the moral virtues, discussed in Books III through V, and the intellectual virtues 
discussed in Book VI. 
 The ambiguity surrounding the human good—and whether it consists in the practice of 
moral virtue or the practice of intellectual virtue— does not appear to be resolved until Book X, 
the last book of the Ethics, in which Aristotle straightforwardly states that the philosophic life of 
contemplation is the highest life, while the life of moral virtue is happy “only in a secondary 
way” (1178a8–9).  Given Aristotle’s somewhat abrupt conclusion and the apparent ambiguity 
surrounding the way in which his discussion of the moral virtues fits together with his account of 
the philosophic life described at the end of the Ethics, some scholars have despaired of finding 
any unity at all in the Ethics.11    
 Many political interpretations of the Ethics have sought to resolve these difficulties by 
reading the Ethics in light of the debate that is raised in the Politics; the relation between the 
active life devoted to politics and the private contemplative life of philosophy.12  One standard 
political interpretation of Aristotle’s Ethics holds that Aristotle recognizes the tension between 
philosophy and politics but seeks to alleviate it in various ways, all the while maintaining the 
                                                 
11 J. L. Ackrill, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Otfried Hoffe, trans. Fernbach 
(Leiden: Brill, 2010), 33–52; John Cooper, Reason and the Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1975), 156–77; Thomas Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” Phronesis 17 no. 3, (1972): 252–59; 
Henry Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, [1886], 1902),70.  
 
12 See Bodéüs, The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s ‘Ethics’; Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates; Jaffa, 
Aristotelianism and Thomism; Strauss, The City and Man; Tessitore, Reading Aristotle’s Ethics. 
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superiority of philosophy.13 According to this interpretation, the Ethics can be seen as containing 
two complementary parts.  While the first half deals with the political life characterized by moral 
virtue, the second half is concerned with the philosophic life. This interpretation has much to 
offer in that it is able to make sense of the way the moral virtues relate to the life of philosophic 
contemplation.  Specifically, this reading holds that Aristotle presents the life of moral virtue in a 
way that emphasizes its nobility, while also exposing its limitations.  This ensures that the well-
bred Greek gentleman (καλοσκάγαθος), if he is a sufficiently attentive reader, will recognize that 
the true benefit of moral virtue is that it points beyond itself toward philosophic virtue, which is 
self-sufficient and capable of being practiced alone.14   
 While this interpretation provides much purchase, it suffers from two drawbacks.  First, it 
struggles to make sense of Aristotle’s stated intention in Book I to define the human good.  In 
describing his intention at the outset, Aristotle argues that the end of human action—the human 
good—falls under the architectonic art of politics, and that the good of a nation or city is “nobler 
and more divine” than the good of any single individual (1094b10–11).  How can the good of the 
city be “nobler and more divine” than the good of a single individual if the Ethics ends with the 
conclusion that the solitary life of contemplation is the human good?  Second, it runs into a 
difficulty similar to that noted above concerning the conclusion of the Politics—namely, if the 
                                                 
13 See, Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates; Jaffa, Aristotelianism and Thomism; Strauss, The City and Man; 
Tessitore, Reading Aristotle’s Ethics. 
 
14 For example, Strauss writes, “When the philosopher Aristotle addresses his political science to more or less 
perfect gentlemen, he shows them as far as possible that the way of life of the perfect gentleman points toward the 
philosophic way of life; he removes a screen.” The City and Man, 28. Similarly, Tessitore argues that “Aristotle 
attempts to offer guidance for those who are disposed to an active life of political involvement … [while] at the 
same time … point[ing] his most gifted students to … contemplate something of the radical and more fully 
satisfying character of the philosophic life.” Reading Aristotle’s Ethics, 20. 
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human good is the solitary life of contemplation, why does Aristotle concern himself with 
directing the Greek gentleman toward the life of contemplation?  Last, and perhaps most 
problematically, this political interpretation gives short shrift to Aristotle’s two books concerning 
friendship.  The standard political approach typically treats these two books as an exhortation 
meant to prepare the reader for Aristotle’s somewhat startling claim that the philosophic life is 
the happiest life.15 
 It is my contention that, in light of Aristotle’s discussion of friendship, the Ethics does 
not end with the conclusion that the solitary life of contemplation constitutes the human good.  
Rather, I will show that Aristotle views the political life of moral virtue and the philosophic life 
of contemplation as complementary.  Focusing on Aristotle’s account of friendship not only 
allows us to see the Ethics as a single, unified, work, but it also is able to account for why 
Aristotle asserts that the philosopher is concerned with the political realm.    
 
The Ascent to Friendship via Magnanimity 
 Aristotle famously holds that true friendship, or friendship in the primary sense, is the 
friendship of good human beings (1157a30–32).  If so, it would seem that the highest friendship 
would be a friendship between those who are characterized by magnanimity or those who are 
‘great-souled’ (μεγαλοψυχία), as Aristotle considers these individuals to be completely virtuous 
                                                 
15 For example, Tessitore suggests that Aristotle’s reflections on friendship have, “in the measure possible, prepared 
readers for his concluding endorsement of the rare but simply best way of life available to human beings.  His 
subsequent demotion of the life of moral virtue in light of the superior happiness afforded by the contemplative 
pleasures of philosophy is perhaps less strange and less jarring because it is prefaced with a consideration of 
friendship.” Reading Aristotle’s Ethics, 95.   
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(1123b36–1124a2).  Therefore, when we turn to Aristotle’s discussion of magnanimity, we are 
perhaps unsurprised to see that friendship makes an appearance.  At the same time, however, its 
appearance in the discussion of magnanimity is striking given Aristotle’s depiction of the great-
souled man.  He is described as haughty and somewhat aloof (1124a20).  One commentator has 
gone as far as to say that Aristotle’s magnanimous man is “self-absorbed.”16  And yet, Aristotle 
writes that the magnanimous man “is incapable of living with a view to another—except a 
friend—since doing so is slavish” (1124b28–1125a1).  Why does the topic of friendship appear 
at this juncture of the Ethics?  Even more curiously, why does it appear as part of the description 
of an individual who seems to be most self-sufficient and is “incapable of living with a view to 
another”?  The question is related to Socrates’ inquiry in the Lysis: what need could a self-
sufficient, good individual have of another? 
 The answer, I hope to make clear, will become apparent once we understand who 
Aristotle’s magnanimous man is.  However, the identity of the magnanimous man is itself a 
vexing question, as Aristotle never provides a definition of the virtue of magnanimity; nor does 
he give an unambiguous indication in the Ethics of who the magnanimous man is.  To 
understand the identity of Aristotle’s magnanimous man requires that we look outside the 
confines of NE 4.3 and examine first the virtue of courage, as well as Aristotle’s depiction of the 
magnanimous man in the Posterior Analytics.  As will be made clear, Aristotle’s account of 
courage reveals the need that a city may occasionally have for an individual who is capable of 
transcending its standards.  While the great-souled man would seem to fit the mold of an 
                                                 
16 David Ross, Aristotle, 6th ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), 208. 
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individual who is not beholden to the city’s standards, Aristotle’s depiction of the great-souled 
man in the Posterior Analytics shows the dangers such a man poses to the city.17  I contend that 
when Aristotle’s account of magnanimity in NE 4.3 is read in the light of these other passages, it 
becomes clear not only who the magnanimous man is, but also why friendship is introduced at 
this point of the Ethics, and what role friendship plays in Aristotle’s political philosophy in 
general. 
 Courage is the first moral virtue that Aristotle covers in the Ethics and, contrary to what 
some have insisted, his of treatment of courage is far from a conventional re-telling of the Greek 
conception of courage.18  On the contrary, as we shall see, Aristotle’s account of courage in 
Book III is meant subtly to bring into focus the limits of the conventional Greek understanding of 
courage. Aristotle seeks to expose these limits in order to make clear to the reader the need for 
the virtue of magnanimity, which is introduced in Book IV.    
 Aristotle initially indicates that courage “is a mean with respect to fear and confidence” 
(1115a7–8).  However, what this mean entails is never fully resolved in Aristotle’s discussion of 
courage.  This lack of resolution is due, in part, to the interrelation between two aspects of 
courage: (1) the courageous man’s desire for honor; and (2) his lack of concern with ill-fortune.  
The courageous man’s desire for honor is initially portrayed as laudable—indeed, one ought to 
                                                 
17 Given Aristotle’s famous dictum that the individual “who is in need of nothing through being self-sufficient is no 
part of a city, and so is either a beast or a god” (Pol. 1253a28–29), it would seem that any attempt to invoke the 
assistance of a magnanimous man who is unbounded by the conventions of the city is, at the very least, fraught with 
danger. 
 
18 For an excellent rejoinder to the view that Aristotle’s listing of the moral virtues in Books III and IV is simply an 
account of the qualities admired by the Greeks during Aristotle’s time, see Collins, Aristotle and the Rediscovery of 
Citizenship, 47–52. 
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be fearful of disrepute (1115a10–15).  The courageous man’s lack of concern with ill-fortune is 
similarly suggested to be laudable (1115a15–17).  Aristotle suggests that perhaps one should not 
be fearful of things such as poverty or sickness, as these are outside of one’s control.  It seems, 
then, that courage is primarily concerned with pursuing that which is noble and honorable and 
remaining impassive in the face of the vicissitudes of fortune.   
 As Aristotle’s account of courage develops, however, he indicates that the relationship 
between honor and ill-fortune is somewhat troublesome and that the common conception of 
courage is problematic.  Toward the end of the first chapter on courage, Aristotle defines courage 
“in the authoritative sense,” by noting that “a courageous man could be said to be someone who 
is fearless when it comes to a noble death and to any situation that brings death suddenly to 
hand,” such as illness or death at sea (1115a33–35). This seems simply to bolster the 
observations made earlier—the courageous man is concerned with honor and is unmoved in the 
face of ill-fortune.  Aristotle, however, follows this definition of courage “in the authoritative 
sense” by noting two things.  First, when faced with the prospect of death at the hands of ill-
fortune, the courageous man “despairs of his preservation” (1115b3).  Of course, this pulls back 
on the observation that a courageous man ought to remain impassive when confronted with ill-
fortune.  Rather than remain unaffected by ill-fortune, the courageous man “despairs of his 
preservation” and ought to be “disgusted with [the] sort of death” brought on by ill-fortune 
(1115b2–3). Second, Aristotle notes that while “the courageous act like men (ἀνδρίζονται) in 
circumstances where prowess in battle is possible or dying is noble,” in situations of illness or 
sea, “neither such prowess nor nobility is possible” (1115b6–7).  Aristotle subtly suggests that 
the virtue of courage is not exhausted by the manly acts of valor that are considered noble—true 
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courage seems to extend beyond that which the many consider noble.  For Aristotle, neither 
excessive concern with honor nor insufficient concern with one’s fate is indicative of true 
courage.  
 This interpretation receives added credence from Aristotle’s depiction of the five types of 
specious courage that merely resemble courage in the authoritative sense.  The first of these 
types of specious courage is the “courage found in the citizen” who “endures dangers” for the 
sake of honor (1116a17–20).  Aristotle uses Hector and Diomedes from Homer’s Iliad as 
examples of this type of courage.  According to the lines Aristotle selects to portray Hector and 
Diomedes as exemplars of civic courage, both warriors indicate that they will maintain their 
stations in battle so as to avoid reproach or scorn.  These are, of course, somewhat odd examples 
of specious courage, as both Hector and Diomedes are warriors undertaking great acts of valor 
on the battlefield—precisely the situation described by Aristotle as that in which the courageous 
man is capable of displaying his virtue.  Why are these examples provided to illustrate the 
courage that only seems like virtue in the authoritative sense, when they seem to fit all the 
criteria for a courageous act?19 
 The answer becomes evident when one examines the wider context in which these lines 
are spoken.  The first line is part of a dialogue Hector has with himself as he is preparing to face 
Achilles on the battlefield: “Polydamas will be the first to lay a reproach upon me” (1116a24). 
The ending of the line—which Aristotle does not quote—is as follows: “…for that he bade me 
                                                 
19 Aristotle notes that of the five types of courage that merely resemble true courage, “this most closely resembles 
the courage [in the authoritative sense], because it arises through virtue, that is through a sense of shame and longing 
for what is noble (since it is for honor) and through avoiding reproach, since it is shameful” (1116a26–29). 
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lead the Trojans to the city during this fatal night, when goodly Achilles arose. Howbeit I 
hearkened not—verily it had been better far!”20  Hector is portrayed as a hero with a tragic flaw.  
His devotion to reputation and honor is so great that he cannot heed the advice of others and, as a 
result, puts the welfare of his entire city at risk.  Hector’s good (as he perceives it) conflicts with 
that of his city.  This tragic flaw prevents him from acting for the welfare of his city, as he places 
his own sense of honor above that of the common good.   
 The second example Aristotle provides is that of Diomedes, who states, “For Hector will 
one day declare among the Trojans, speaking in the assembly, ‘The son of Tydeus, by me…’” 
(1116a25).  Diomedes makes this statement as he is attempting to pursue Hector on the 
battlefield.  Each time he attempts to do so, however, Zeus thwarts his advance with a “white 
lightning-bolt.”21  When Nestor recognizes that the gods are against them and advises Diomedes 
to turn and flee, Diomedes initially refuses because of a concern about what Hector will say of 
him.  Like Hector, Diomedes is incapable of heeding advice because his reputation and honor are 
at stake.  Aristotle uses the example of Diomedes as an instance in which pride and concern for 
honor can result in a failure to acknowledge one’s limitations.  Diomedes’ pride and his 
excessive concern for honor cause him initially to spurn Nestor’s advice in favor of the belief 
that he can oppose the will of the gods, or challenge fortune.  Diomedes’ failure to heed Nestor’s 
advice evinces equanimity in the face of ill-fortune of a kind that is destructive of his own self-
preservation and serves as a detriment to his fellow Greeks.   
                                                 
20 Homer, Iliad, trans. A. T. Murray, vol. 2, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924) 22:100. 
 
21 Ibid., vol. 1, 8:130. 
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 These two examples, coupled with what follows, indicate why civic courage is not the 
same as courage in the authoritative sense.  Aristotle immediately follows up these examples of 
civic courage by comparing them to examples of men whom it is necessary to compel to fight.  
He writes, “Someone might put in the same category also those who are compelled by their 
rulers [to fight]” (116a30–31).  The only difference between those operating under the auspices 
of civic courage and those who must be compelled to fight is that while the former fight out of a 
sense of shame, the latter fight on account of fear of the penalties involved.  The city, it seems, 
has two ways to induce men to fight for its interests: by holding out honor or by the threat of 
penalties.  
 While Aristotle flatly states that having to be compelled to fight by the threat of penalties 
is not noble (1116b4), he indicates that the former method is also problematic.  Indeed, the very 
concern for honor that the city seeks to inculcate in its citizens so as to induce them to fight for 
its security and continued existence, can undermine that same goal as well.  The corollary of 
honor is shame and, as the examples of Hector and Diomedes make clear, an excessive concern 
with honor and shame (the standards of the city) can cause men to act in ways that are contrary 
to the good of the city.  While Hector and Diomedes may obtain honor and glory by facing their 
foes on the battlefield (and avoid the shame that attends leaving the battlefield), their conduct is 
destructive of both themselves and the city.  Through these examples, Aristotle makes clear that 
the very sense of honor and shame that the city inculcates in its citizens can lead to its ruin as 
well.  To secure its existence, it seems that the city may at times require an individual who is 
capable of transcending the city and its standards.  Aristotle’s depiction of civic courage as 
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deficient points to the need for a more developed account of the proper relation to honor and 
fortune, one that is not tied to the standards of the city.   
 Aristotle’s account of civic courage directs the reader’s attention to the need for an 
individual who is capable of transcending the standards of the city.  It is precisely this individual 
whom Aristotle describes in his portrait of the great-souled man in Book IV of the Ethics.  
However, while Aristotle’s account makes clear that the magnanimous man transcends the city 
and is capable of bestowing great benefits on the city, the questions of who this magnanimous 
man is and what type of benefits he provides have long been the subject of debate.  Some have 
argued that the great-souled man represents the height of moral achievement that is capable of 
being attained by an individual devoted to the life of politics, such as a statesman or general.22  
Others have suggested that Aristotle is referring to the philosopher who is devoted to the life of 
contemplation.23 
 Strong arguments have been raised in favor of both positions.  For example, those 
insisting that Aristotle’s great-souled man is intended to depict a man of great moral or political 
achievement point to Aristotle’s placement of this virtue among the so-called moral or political 
virtues and to the fact that the magnanimous man is concerned with great actions.  In addition, 
                                                 
22 W. F. R Hardie, “‘Magnanimity’ in Aristotle’s Ethics,” Phronesis 23 no. 1, (1978): 63–79; Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros., 1948), II-II. Q. 
129, Art. 1–3), and Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C. I. Litzinger (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964), 
vol. 1, lectures 8–11; Carson Holloway, “Aristotle’s Magnanimous Man,” in Magnanimity and Statesmanship ed. 
Carson Holloway (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008), 13–28; Jaffa, Aristotelianism and Thomism. 
 
23 René Antoine Gauthier, Magnanimité: L’Idéal de la grandeur dans la philosophie paīenne et dans la théologie 
chrétienne, (Paris: Vrin, 1951), 104–17; J. A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1892), 1:334–46.  
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the magnanimous man is said to be eager to help others and willing to face great dangers.24  In 
contrast, others have suggested that the great-souled man is the philosopher par excellence, with 
some going so far as to maintain that he is intended to represent Socrates.  Pointing to Aristotle’s 
statement that magnanimity is a “kind of ornament” that only attends those who have complete 
virtue (1123b36–1124a2) and to his statement that the life of theoretical contemplation is the 
happiest life (and hence the most virtuous), these scholars conclude that the magnanimous man is 
meant to represent the philosopher.25  In addition, some have noted that the magnanimous man’s 
idleness and proclivity to irony also favor the view that magnanimity is at root a philosophic 
virtue.26 
  Further debate has surfaced as to whether Aristotle views the magnanimous man as 
unambiguously good or whether he presents him as suffering from a tragic flaw.27  For example, 
Harry Jaffa suggests that the fault of the magnanimous man is his “overweening” concern with 
“his own greatness.”28  In contrast, Holloway argues that this “overweening concern” is 
“compatible with and may arise from his moral seriousness and not from a merely personal 
preoccupation with his own status.”29  Others, such as Hardie, have suggested that the tragic fault 
                                                 
24  Hardie, “Magnanimity,” 70. 
 
25 Gauthier, Magnanimité, 106. 
 
26 Tessitore, Reading Aristotle’s Ethics, 33. 
 
27 For a succinct overview of the debate about whether Aristotle’s magnanimous man is a statesman/general or a 
philosopher, and about whether Aristotle finds fault with the magnanimous man, see Jacob Howland, “Aristotle’s 
Great-Souled Man,” Review of Politics 64 no. 1 (2002): 29.   
 
28 Jaffa, Aristotelianism and Thomism, 140–41. 
 
29 Holloway, “Shakespeare’s’ Coriolanus and Aristotle’s Great-Souled Man.” Review of Politics 69 no. 3 (2007): 
355. 
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of the magnanimous man lies not in his intolerance of insults but in his refusal to recognize “the 
contribution of luck and nature to his achievement.”30  According to this view, the tragedy of the 
magnanimous man is his inability to recognize his indebtedness to the role of fortune.  
 It is my contention that in his account of the virtue of magnanimity in NE 4.3 Aristotle 
proposes to describe both the philosopher and the statesman.  Building on Aristotle’s discussion 
of magnanimity in the Posterior Analytics, in which Aristotle suggests the possibility that there 
may be two types of magnanimity, I will argue that his depiction of the great-souled man in NE 
4.3 is intended as a response to the difficulties posed by the virtue of magnanimity in the 
Posterior Analytics.31  Specifically, I will argue that the Posterior Analytics suggests that 
magnanimity can be ascribed to the apex of the moral life exemplified by the politically active 
man as well as to the philosopher.  As depicted by Aristotle in the Analytics, both the individual 
at the apex of the moral life and the individual at the height of the contemplative life have a 
correct estimation of the great benefits they are capable of providing to the city; yet both suffer 
from a tragic flaw that causes them to act in a socially destructive manner.  Last, I will argue that 
in NE 4.3 Aristotle provides a solution to this tragic flaw in the form of friendship.  It is through 
friendship and the recognition of each other’s virtues that Aristotle is able to reorient the 
magnanimous man’s lack of concern with the standards of the city for the common good.   
                                                 
30 Hardie, Magnanimity, 74. 
 
31 I am indebted to Howland’s article “Aristotle’s Great-Souled Man” for the following discussion concerning 
Aristotle’s reference to magnanimity in the Posterior Analytics.  My own account of Aristotle’s discussion of 
magnanimity takes a similar starting point as that of Howland—Aristotle views the magnanimous man as tragically 
flawed and he holds out friendship as the antidote to this flaw.  However, my interpretation differs from Howland in 
my conclusion regarding Aristotle’s appraisal of Socrates.  See below at n. 45 and accompanying text.   
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 Aristotle’s discussion of the virtue of magnanimity in the Posterior Analytics occurs in a 
passage that is ostensibly meant to provide a simple overview of how to attain the definition of a 
genus that covers more than one species.  The virtue of magnanimity is provided as an example 
(Post. An. 97b7–28).32  Aristotle maintains that to obtain a definition of magnanimity it would be 
necessary to compare two groups of individuals who are held to be magnanimous on account of 
different traits, to see what they have in common.  If we take our bearing from Alcibiades, 
Achilles, and Ajax, we are led to the conclusion that magnanimity consists in an intolerance of 
dishonor, as it was intolerance that caused Alcibiades to go to war, roused Achilles’ wrath, and 
drove Ajax to commit suicide (97b20–21).  In contrast, if Lysander and Socrates are held to be 
magnanimous, it seems that magnanimity consists of being indifferent (ἀδιάφοροι) to good and 
ill fortune.33  Aristotle concludes his brief discussion of magnanimity by stating that to obtain a 
definition common to these two groups, it would be necessary to “inquire what common element 
have equanimity (ἀπάθεια) amid the vicissitudes of life and impatience of dishonor” (97b23–26).  
If they have nothing in common, Aristotle concludes that there would be two genera of 
magnanimity. 
 If Aristotle’s discussion of magnanimity in NE 4.3 is intended as an attempt to discover a 
common trait that applies to both groups of men mentioned in the Posterior Analytics, it would 
initially seem to be failure.  Indeed, as Howland notes, “If one reads the passage from  the 
Posterior Analytics at face value, such an attempt [to find a common trait] must fail: anyone who 
                                                 
32 All citations are taken from G. R. G. Mure’s translation of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics in The Basic Works of 
Aristotle, ed. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941). 
 
33 While Aristotle provides evidence of the fact that Alcibiades, Achilles, and Ajax are intolerant of insults, he 
provides no similar evidence regarding the indifference to fortune displayed by Lysander and Socrates. 
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is intolerant of insults after the manner of Alcibiades, Achilles, and Ajax is not truly indifferent 
to fortune.”34  However, before making a judgement as to whether NE 4.3 does, in fact, apply to 
both groups of magnanimous men, it is necessary to inquire into the two groups themselves to 
discover all the commonalities that the members of each respective group share.  Aristotle 
provides the following advice for attaining a common, universal, definition: 
It is also easier by this method to define the single species than the 
universal, and that is why our procedure should be from the several 
species to the universal genera—this for the further reason too that 
equivocation is less readily detected in genera than in infimae species.  
Indeed, perspicuity is essential in definitions … and we shall attain 
perspicuity if we can collect separately the definition of each species 
through the group of singulars which we have established … and so 
proceed to the common universal with a careful avoidance of 
equivocation. (97b28–38). 
Thus, Aristotle states that we must first inquire into all the aspects that the members of each 
respective group share in common with one another, maintaining an especial vigilance for 
equivocation, before examining what it is that the members of both groups have in common.   
 When we turn to the individuals who comprise the first type of magnanimity—those 
intolerant of insults—their commonality seems straightforwardly political.  As Tessitore notes, 
Alcibiades, Achilles and Ajax were all great Greek warriors who “embody a conception of 
greatness that expresses itself in action and battle.  Each is characterized by a desire for glory 
that exhibits itself in conquest and implacable resistance to dishonor.”35  Thus, it is clear that the 
first type of magnanimity is, at root, political.  All the individuals that comprise this group are 
capable of providing great benefits in war and battle for their respective political communities.  
                                                 
34 Howland, “Aristotle’s Great-Souled Man,” 35. 
 
35 Tessitore, Reading Aristotle’s Ethics, 32. 
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However, as Aristotle intimates, while their concern for honor can lead them to confer great 
benefits on their community, it can also lead them to inflict great harm on their community due 
to a tragic flaw (ἁμαρτία): stubbornness, and an inability to listen to advice. 
 A brief analysis of each of the three politically magnanimous men shows that knowledge 
of their own greatness and of the honors that they are due, combined with an inability to heed 
advice, causes them to inflict great damage on their community.  Ajax is famous for attempting 
to kill the Greek generals Menelaus and Agamemnon after they fail to grant him the honor he 
feels he is due.  According to Sophocles’ rendering of the story, as Ajax prepares to leave his tent 
in order to avenge his dishonor, his concubine, Tecmessa, attempts to dissuade him.  Ajax 
replies, “Woman, silence is the grace of woman.”36  Later, when the plan goes awry due to the 
intervention of the gods, Ajax plans to kill himself.  Again, Tecmessa seeks to dissuade him, 
asking, “Wilt thou not heed?”37  Again Ajax spurns her advice, telling her, “Too much hast thou 
spoken already.” 38  Ajax shortly does, indeed, commit suicide.   
 Similarly, when Agamemnon deprives Achilles of the war prize he believes he has rightly 
merited during battle, Achilles refuses to continue fighting with the Greeks against the Trojans, 
thereby depriving them of their greatest warrior.39  When Odysseus and Phoenix seek to 
persuade him, Achilles refuses to be reconciled with Agamemnon, recounting instead the 
                                                 
36 Sophocles, “Ajax,” in The Complete Greek Drama, trans. R. C. Trevelyan, ed. Whitney J. Oates and Eugene 
O’Neill, Jr. (New York: Random House, 1938), 1:325. 
 
37 Ibid., 334. 
 
38 Ibid. 
 
39 Homer, Iliad, vol. 1, 1:160–245. 
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dishonor that Agamemnon had done him.40  This failure to heed their advice results not only in 
the death of a great many Greeks, but also of his dear friend, Patroclus.41  Last, Alcibiades’ 
failure to listen to Socrates’ moderating advice leads to his notorious political enterprises.42  In 
his pursuit of political glory, Alcibiades betrayed the Athenians by aiding the Spartan forces in 
their war efforts against the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war.43  All three of these great 
warriors were very much attuned to the honors they were due, and this self-knowledge, 
combined with an incapacity to heed moderating advice, caused them to inflict great harm on 
their community. 
 While it is relatively straightforward to determine what connects the individuals 
comprising the first type of magnanimity, it is more difficult to discern what holds Lysander and 
Socrates together.  Socrates the philosopher and Lysander the Spartan general initially appear to 
have little in common, aside from an ability to bear the ill-fortune of poverty with equanimity.44  
As a result, some have maintained that Lysander’s love of honor and supposed intolerance of 
dishonor suggest that he actually belongs with Alcibiades, Achilles, and Ajax, while Socrates 
                                                 
40 Ibid., vol. 1, 9:165–665. 
 
41 Ibid., vol. 2, 16:20 – 45; 780–865. 
 
42 On Alcibiades’ failure to listen to Socrates’ advice, see Andre Archie, “Listening to Plutarch’s Alcibiades in 
Plato’s Alcibiades Major,” in Politics in Socrates’ Alcibiades: A Philosophical Account of Plato’s Dialogue 
Alcibiades Major” (New York: Springer, 2015), 101–21.  Michael Gargin traces Alcibiades’ political failures to 
Socrates’ hubris. See “Socrates’ ‘Hybris’ and Alcibiades’ Failure,” Phoenix 31 no. 1 (1977): 22–37. 
 
43 Plutarch, “Alcibiades,” in The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, trans. John Dryden, rev. by Arthur Hugh 
Clough (New York: Random House, 1864), 248–50. 
 
44 Plutarch, “Lysander,” in Lives, 525–26; Plato, Apol. 31b–c, 36d; and Xenophon, Mem. 1.6. Jacob Howland argues 
against viewing their easy acceptance of poverty as the basis for Lysander’s and Socrates’ magnanimity because this 
trait “is hardly the basis on which one would pick out both Lysander and Socrates as great-souled men.” “Aristotle’s 
Great-Souled Man,” 36.    
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comprises a class all on his own.45  Others have suggested that Lysander is merely included as “a 
more accessible but less perfect introduction” to the philosophic magnanimity of Socrates.46   
 The inclusion of Socrates as representative of the second type of magnanimity suggests 
that Aristotle does intend to draw our attention to the fact that this type of magnanimity can take 
a philosophic form.  However, while Aristotle may seek to draw our attention to the philosophic 
form that this type of magnanimity can take, it is still necessary to account for the reason 
Aristotle chooses to include Lysander the Spartan general (who was not known in any way for 
his philosophic acumen) as opposed to some other philosopher.  If we follow Aristotle’s advice 
and proceed “from the several species to the universal genera” while maintaining an eye for 
“equivocation,” we will see that Lysander and Socrates have more in common than simply an 
ability to bear poverty with equanimity.  Following Aristotle’s method allows us to avoid the 
premature conclusion that Aristotle has either misplaced Lysander or has included him as simply 
a “more accessible” introduction to philosophic magnanimity.   
 In addition to having an ability to bear the ill-fortune of poverty with equanimity, 
Lysander and Socrates share in common that they are both excluded from rule on account of 
                                                 
45 Howland, “Aristotle’s Great Souled Man,” 36 (“A more adequate division would separate Socrates from 
Alcibiades, Achilles, Ajax, and Lysander.  These four are all marked by the love of honor and the intolerance of 
dishonor, but Socrates shares neither trait; he is indifferent to good and bad fortune, and therefore also to the cards 
that fortune deals him with respect to honor and dishonor”).  Lysander’s inclusion with Socrates is confusing, given 
the fact that he does seem to have more in common with Alcibiades, Achilles, and Ajax.  However, as I hope to 
make clear, if we follow Aristotle’s instructions on how to come to a common definition, it is possible to find a 
commonality between Lysander and Socrates: an ability to persevere in the face of the ill-fortune of an ignoble birth. 
 
46 Tessitore, Reading Aristotle’s Ethics, 32. Tessitore explains that while Plato never refers to magnanimity, “he 
does have Socrates speak of philosophic magnificence.  As part of his account of philosophic virtue, Socrates 
explains that nothing human seems great, and that even death itself is not terrible for one who contemplates all being 
and all time (Rep. 486a–b).”  Cf. NE 1124b7–9 (“The great-souled man is not one to hazard trifling dangers and he 
is not a lover of danger either, since he honors few things.  But he will hazard great dangers, and when he does so, 
he throws away his life, on the grounds that living is not at all worthwhile.”). 
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their status in society.47  However, in contrast to their easy acceptance of poverty, both Socrates 
and Lysander did not easily accept the ill-fortune of their low-born status.  Instead, they both 
believed themselves to be superior to others and deserving of honor and rule.  We have already 
seen in our analysis of the Gorgias and the Apology that Socrates views his manner of life to be 
superior to the political life due to his commitment to avoiding injustice, and that he thinks he is 
worthy of honor for the benefits he is capable of bestowing on the city.48  Callicles tells Socrates 
that his philosophizing causes him “to become unmanly (ἀνάνδρῳ)” as he flees “the central area 
of the city and the agoras” (Gorg. 485d 5–7).  He presciently declares that Socrates’ 
preoccupation with philosophy at the expense of practicing the more manly art of rhetoric and 
politics ensures that if he is ever accused of doing an injustice, he would stand in the lawcourt 
“dizzy and gaping, without anything to say” (486b1–2).  Of course, in the Apology, Socrates 
does attempt to use rhetoric to make the case that his way of life is superior to the active life.  As 
part of his defense speech, he seeks to justify his way of life by telling the jurors that he 
constantly philosophizes because the oracle at Delphi had ordered him to do so, but he fails to 
persuade the requisite number of jurors of his innocence.49  Given the depiction of Socrates in 
                                                 
47 For an account of Socrates’ poverty and low-birth see Eduard Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, trans. 
Oswald J. Reichel (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1877), 54, n. 1; Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols or 
How to Philosophize with a Hammer, trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 11–12. For an 
account of the way Lysander’s birth excluded him from rule in Sparta, see Plutarch, “Lysander,” in Lives, 541.   
 
48 For Socrates’ belief in the superiority of the philosophic life over the political life, see above at pp. 112–113.  In 
the Apology, Socrates relates that he is someone who has committed “no injustice,” and that as a result of his manner 
of life he is worthy to be honored with free meals in the Prytaneum, an honor reserved for Olympic heroes (cf. Apol. 
36d–37a).   
 
49 In the Apology Socrates expresses surprise at the closeness of the verdict.  After the jury finds him guilty, Socrates 
states, “Many things contribute to my not being indignant, men of Athens, at what has happened—that you voted to 
convict me—and one of them is that what has happened was not unexpected by me.  But I wonder much more at the 
number of the votes on each side.  For I at least did not suppose it would be by so little, but by much” (Apol. 35e–
36a).  Plato may be indicating that Socrates has underestimated the power of rhetoric. 
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the Gorgias, as well as Socrates’ inability to persuade the jurors in his trial, we can conclude that 
Socrates’ failure was largely the result of his inability to take seriously the necessity of courage 
and rhetoric in political affairs. 
 Lysander’s low-born status similarly prevented him from obtaining the honor and 
privilege that he deserved.  To rectify this perceived injustice, Plutarch relates that Lysander 
“formed a design to remove the government from [those who ruled Sparta], and to give it in 
common to all … Spartans,” so that he might have a share in ruling.50  The plan, as recounted by 
Plutarch, is strikingly similar to the story that Socrates relates at his trial concerning the oracle at 
Delphi.  According to Plutarch, Lysander sought to trick his fellow citizens into believing that it 
was the will of the gods that political rule ought to be decided on the basis of merit rather than 
nobility.  To this end, he conjured up oracles from Apollo to “alarm and overpower the minds of 
his fellow-citizens by religious and superstitious terrors, before bringing them to the 
considerations of his arguments.”51  However, as Plutarch relates, Lysander’s plan fell through 
due to the lack of courage of one of its participants.52 Thus, both Lysander and Socrates 
audaciously sought to use the religious customs of the people to implement great change in the 
                                                 
50 In a passage detailing Lysander’s plan to change the constitution, Plutarch relates that Lysander “first attempted 
and prepared to persuade the citizens privately….  Afterwards perceiving so unexpected and great an innovation 
required bolder means of support, he proceeded, as it might be on the stage, to avail himself of machinery, and to try 
the effects of divine agency upon his countrymen.  He collected and arranged for his purpose answers and oracles 
from Apollo [so as to] first alarm and overpower the minds of his fellow-citizens by religious and superstitious 
terrors, before bringing them to the considerations of his arguments” (Plutarch, “Lysander” in Lives, 541).  The 
parallel to Socrates’ use of the Delphic oracle as recounted by Plato is striking.  Socrates also first sought to 
persuade the citizens of Athens privately to care only for virtue, and eventually used the oracle at Delphi to persuade 
to his fellow citizens. Cf., Apol. 36c. 
 
51 Plutarch, “Lysander,” 541. 
 
52 Ibid., 542. 
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order of the city, and both failed due to a lack of courage on the part of the participants involved 
in the plan. 
   The commonality between Lysander and Socrates is all the more striking in light of the 
fact that the term “ἀδιάφοροι” is equivocal and can mean different things in different 
circumstances.  When paired with “poverty,” “ἀδιάφοροι” describes one who is “indifferent” to 
poverty.53  However, when  paired with “adversity,” it means to be “steadfast” or unwearying.”54  
In light of Aristotle’s advice that one ought to avoid equivocations when making the requisite 
comparisons necessary to arrive at a common definition, it seems that we have to choose from 
among the two meanings of the word “indifferent.” Aristotle means to draw our attention either 
to the capacity of Lysander and Socrates to be indifferent to poverty or to their ability be 
steadfast and persevere in the face of their low-born status.   
 It is likely that Aristotle intends to highlight the ability of Lysander and Socrates to 
persevere in the face of their low-born status, as this seems to be a more fitting basis for 
magnanimity than their ability to suffer poverty with equanimity.55  In addition, viewing Socrates 
                                                 
53 Liddell and Scott, Greek English Lexicon, 22. 
 
54 Ibid., 23. 
 
55 Further indication that Aristotle intends the basis for the second type of magnanimity to be an ability to persevere 
in the face of misfortune is found in his description of the method one ought to employ when seeking to arrive at a 
“common universal” definition.  After noting that it is important to avoid equivocation, Aristotle writes, “We may 
add that if dialectical disputation must not employ metaphors, clearly metaphors and metaphorical expressions are 
precluded in definition” (Post. An. 38–40).  When describing Lysander and Socrates, Aristotle initially notes that 
they are both indifferent or steady (ἀδιάφοροι) in the face of good and bad fortune.  Shortly after, he notes the same 
thing, but this time he uses the word ἀπάθεια instead of ἀδιάφοροι to describe their relation to fortune.  To be 
“indifferent (ἀπάθεια) to poverty” is, according to Aristotle, a metaphorical expression.  In the Eudemian Ethics 
Aristotle writes, “Again, the man that endures no pain, not even if it is good for him, is luxurious; one that can 
endure all pain alike is strictly speaking nameless, but by metaphor he is called hard, patient or enduring 
(κακοπαθητικός)” (EE. 2:1221a).  The root of κακοπαθητικός is the same as that of ἀπάθεια.  Thus, where Aristotle 
indicates that Lysander and Socrates are “indifferent to fortune,” he cannot mean that they are “enduring” poverty, 
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and Lysander from this perspective not only elucidates what they have in common, but it also 
makes clear what unites the first type of magnanimity with the second, allowing us to obtain a 
common, universal definition of magnanimity.  Indeed, the members of both groups believe 
themselves to be great and, therefore, to be worthy of great things.56  Achilles, Ajax, and 
Alcibiades were all outstanding in battle, and because of an awareness of their own great worth, 
they spurned their political community when it deprived them the honor that they were due.  
Socrates and Lysander were similarly aware of the outstanding benefits they were capable of 
bestowing on their political community.57  To ensure that they, or their way of life, would be 
accorded the honor it was due, each attacked the foundations of their respective regimes.58  If the 
second group of magnanimity is intended to be, at root, philosophic, Aristotle seems to indicate 
that while those who are philosophically magnanimous may have the capacity to undertake great 
deeds for their community, their awareness of this fact, coupled with adverse fortune, can lead 
them to attempt to conquer fortune in a way that is inimical to the well-being of the city. 
                                                 
as this is a metaphorical expression and metaphorical expressions are “precluded in definition.”  We are left with the 
conclusion that when Aristotle states that Lysander and Socrates are indifferent (ἀδιάφοροι) to fortune, he means 
that they are capable of persevering in the face of adversity. 
 
56 This is the very first characteristic Aristotle uses to describe the magnanimous man in NE 4.3. Aristotle writes, 
“He, then, who deems himself worthy of great things and is worthy of them is held to be great souled” (NE, 1123b3–
4). 
 
57 Plutarch relates that when Lysander “had risen into great renown for his exploits, and had gained great friends and 
power, was vexed to see the city, which had increased to what it was by him, ruled by others not at all better 
descended than himself” “Lysander,” 541.  In the Apology, Socrates relates that he is capable of performing “the 
greatest benefaction” (Apol. 36c). 
 
58 Socrates hints that he is well aware of the destructive tendency his way of life has.  After the jury has sentenced 
him, he states, “For you have now done this deed supposing that you will be released from giving an account of your 
life, but it will turn out much the opposite for you, as I affirm.  There will be more who will refute you, whom I have 
now been holding back; you did not perceive them.  And they will be harsher inasmuch as they are younger, and you 
will be more indignant” (Apol. 39c–d). 
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 The men who are provided as examples of the two types of magnanimity (political and 
philosophic) in the Posterior Analytics have a correct estimation of their worth.  However, while 
they rightly recognize that their virtue is worthy of great honor, they mistake their own virtue for 
the whole of virtue.  Those who are politically magnanimous mistake their courage and the 
benefits it provides for the city as the whole of virtue.  Therefore, when they are not afforded the 
honors they are due, they fail to take advice from those who have knowledge and end up acting 
in a socially destructive manner.  Similarly, those who are philosophically magnanimous fail to 
recognize the necessity of political courage, and, therefore, they seek to usurp the existing order 
of the city.  As great-souled individuals, all five of the magnanimous men listed in the Posterior 
Analytics stand above the standards or conventions of the city; yet each has a tragic flaw causing 
him to be destructive of the health of the city. 
 
 
Curing the Magnanimous Man 
  Based on the portraits that he provides of civic courage in the Ethics and of magnanimity 
in the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle seems to be in a bit of a quandary.  On the one hand, his 
portrait of civic courage points to the need for a type of courage that transcends the conventions 
and standards of the city.  Indeed, it is the excessive concern with the honor and shame that the 
city fosters in its citizens that causes Hector and Diomedes (both of whom embody civic 
courage) to spurn advice and act in a way that is inimical to the well-being of their respective 
cities.  On the other hand, the magnanimous men described in the Posterior Analytics do 
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transcend the standards of the city.  While they are not motivated by shame (as are Hector and 
Diomedes)—instead, they have an accurate knowledge of their own worth—they also end up 
acting in socially destructive ways when they fail to receive what is their due.  Perhaps it is the 
destructive tendency of these magnanimous men that causes Aristotle to conclude his discussion 
of magnanimity in the Posterior Analytics by suggesting that if there is one definition of 
magnanimity, the medical treatment for each will be the same.  He states, “Besides, every 
definition is always universal and commensurate: the physician does not prescribe what is 
healthy for a single eye, but for all eyes or for a determinate species of eye” (96b26 – 28).  As we 
shall see, in the Ethics, Aristotle hints that the prescription for the socially destructive propensity 
of magnanimous men is friendship. 
 An initial reading of Aristotle’s account of magnanimity in NE 4.3 reveals a number of 
contradictions, particularly in regard to the magnanimous man’s orientation toward honor and 
fortune.  Aristotle does not begin his discussion by disabusing the magnanimous man of the 
notion that he is worthy of great honor.  Instead, he starts out by reaffirming his worth.  The 
magnanimous man “deems himself worthy of great things and is worthy of them” (1123b3–4).  
However, as Aristotle continues, his focus shifts from the honors that attend greatness to the 
underlying basis of that honor, namely, virtue. As Ryan Hanley notes, “As the account of the 
magnanimous man’s attitude to honour develops it becomes clear that greatness of soul consists 
not in equal parts claiming and deserving honour; true magnanimity has instead everything to do 
with the latter and little to do with the former.”59  In fact, near the end of his discussion of honor, 
                                                 
59 Ryan Patrick Hanley, “Aristotle on the Greatness of Greatness of Soul,” History of Political Thought 23 no. 1 
(2002): 5.  
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Aristotle forthrightly states that the magnanimous man’s virtue is so great that no honor could be 
worthy of it (1124a8).  It seems that Aristotle transitions from a concern for honor to a concern 
for virtue.   
 Based on this shift, some have suggested that Aristotle’s purpose is to cast the virtue of 
magnanimity initially in such a light as to appeal to ambitious honor-loving individuals.  Once 
this appeal is made, Aristotle subtly shifts the emphasis from honor to the underlying virtues that 
accompany honor.  According to this interpretation, Aristotle is simply preparing the reader for 
the claim that is to come later in the Ethics: that the life of theoretical virtue is the best life.60  
One of the difficulties posed by this interpretation, however, is that the shift from honor to virtue 
is not sharply drawn.  Indeed, while the magnanimous man is said to have “complete contempt” 
for honors that come from people at random, or for small honors, the magnanimous man has a 
moderate disposition toward the honor that comes from “serious human beings,” taking pleasure 
from such people in a measured way (1124a5–12).  Thus, it is not the case that Aristotle 
unambiguously and absolutely shifts the magnanimous man’s concern from honor to virtue 
alone.  Aristotle remains purposefully ambiguous. 
                                                 
60 Ryan Hanley, Carson Holloway, and Harry Jaffa all make this argument, albeit in different ways.  Hanley notes, 
“It is not the magnanimous man but some other in whose direction the magnanimous man merely nods who is 
independent of fortune altogether….  One has to wait until Book X of the Ethics to meet the fully self-sufficient 
man.” “Aristotle on the Greatness of Greatness of Soul,” 14–15.  Holloway writes that the magnanimous man has a 
“deficiency” that stems from his “unfamiliarity with philosophy.”  “Aristotle’s Magnanimous Man,” 27.  Jaffa 
states, “The traits which Aristotle ascribes to the magnanimous man are those which he evidently believes on the 
basis of observation actually do characterize the highest human type, as viewed within the dimension of morality.  
To measure this type by a higher standard is to transcend this dimension.  But if we transcend this dimension we no 
longer see things as they appear within the dimension.  The magnanimous man’s world is in one respect at least like 
the world of the child.” Thomism and Aristotelianism, 140. 
 153 
 
 
 
 
 Similar ambiguity surrounds Aristotle’s depiction of the magnanimous man’s orientation 
to fortune.  First, we are told that the magnanimous man takes a measured approach to good and 
bad fortune as well as to wealth and political power, neither being overjoyed by good fortune nor 
despairing of ill-fortune (1124a12–17).  Next, he connects the gifts of fortune to honor, stating 
that the magnanimous man “is not disposed even toward honor as though it were a very great 
thing, and political power and wealth are choiceworthy on account of the honor they bring” 
(1124a17–18).  On the basis of this statement the magnanimous man seems to be concerned with 
fortune because of the honors that attend good fortune.  However, Aristotle soon shifts, noting 
that “in truth only the good human being is honorable” (1124a25–26).  This would seem to 
suggest that one ought not to direct any attention to the gifts of fortune or the honors they bring, 
as it is only the underlying character trait or virtue that is of real worth.  Rather than ending with 
this conclusion, however, Aristotle instead follows up by noting that “he who has both goodness 
and good fortune is deemed even worthier of honor” (112426–27).  That Aristotle calls attention 
to the fact that some people believe those with good fortune are more worthy of honor than those 
with ill-fortune, suggests that the beliefs of these people matter.  Thus, in the same way that the 
magnanimous man ought to accept honor from those who are “serious,” he also needs to dispose 
himself to fortune in a proper manner, since fortune is productive of honor. 
 Why would Aristotle maintain such an ambiguous stance on the magnanimous man’s 
relation to honor and fortune?  If it is truly only the magnanimous man’s underlying virtue that is 
good, rather than the honors that attend this virtue, why does Aristotle go out of his way to 
maintain that the magnanimous man is concerned with honor from those who are serious and to 
suggest that good fortune can affect other people’s perceptions of one’s magnanimity?  The 
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answer has to do with the phenomenon of friendship.  As noted above, friendship makes a 
curious appearance in Aristotle’s discussion of magnanimity.  Indeed, Aristotle states that the 
magnanimous man is “incapable of living with another—except for a friend—for to do so is 
slavish” (1124b31–1125a1).  As will shortly be made clear, Aristotle believes that the two types 
of magnanimous men listed in the Posterior Analytics are well-suited for friendship. 
 As I noted above in Chapter One, in the Lysis, Socrates fails to arrive at a definition of 
friendship.  Nevertheless, in that dialogue, Plato intimates that friendship may come to exist 
between two individuals who are similar, yet different in some way from one another.  It is 
precisely this type of friendship that Aristotle suggests as the cure for the socially destructive 
tendencies of the two types of magnanimous men listed in the Posterior Analytics.   The two 
groups of magnanimous men listed in the Posterior Analytics are similar in that they are all 
magnanimous and capable of bestowing great benefits on their community, though the benefits 
they are capable of bestowing differ in kind.  As we have seen, however, the individuals that 
comprise the two groups of magnanimous men all suffer from a tragic flaw.  Their awareness of 
the honors they are due causes Alcibiades, Achilles, and Ajax to spurn prudent advice, leading 
them to act in socially destructive ways.  Similarly, while Socrates and Lysander have the 
knowledge and wile to reform the social order, their plans result in failure due to lack of courage.  
It seems, therefore, that each type of magnanimous man is well-suited to befriend the other, as 
each makes up what is lacking in the other.   
 Bearing in mind the suitability of friendship between these two types of magnanimous 
men helps to make sense of the apparent contradictions in Aristotle’s account of magnanimity in 
NE 4.3.  Aristotle’s account of honor and fortune both indulges and tempers the magnanimous 
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man’s excessive concern with honor and his perseverance in the face of adversity.  Aristotle 
indulges the magnanimous man by insisting that he is great and is deserving of great things.  In 
this way, the magnanimous man avoids the strictures and standards of the city; he is not 
beholden to the city’s standards concerning honor and shame in the way that Hector and 
Diomedes are.  At the same time, the magnanimous man is not a law unto himself.  Aristotle 
tempers the destructive tendency of the magnanimous man by ensuring that he be concerned with 
the honor of a few serious people.  In the case of those magnanimous men that are “intolerant of 
insults,” Aristotle’s method ensures that they will maintain a concern for the opinion and, indeed, 
the advice of serious people, while thinking nothing of the honors or dishonors that come “from 
people at random” (1124a10).  To the extent that he is concerned with the opinion of other 
serious or magnanimous individuals, Aristotle’s magnanimous man is open to persuasion and 
advice.  
 Similarly, Aristotle’s ambiguous treatment of the magnanimous man’s relation to fortune 
is meant to both indulge and temper those magnanimous men who have the ability to persevere 
in the face of ill fortune.  Aristotle’s statement that “in truth, only the good human being is 
honorable” indulges the magnanimous man’s belief that he is worthy of honor (and perhaps rule) 
independent of any ill-fortune regarding birth, status, or wealth.  At the same time, Aristotle 
draws attention to the fact that some people esteem those with good fortune.  To the extent that 
the magnanimous man cares for the honor of “serious people,” Aristotle’s remark has the effect 
of tempering the magnanimous man’s desire to upend the social order in his pursuit of that which 
is his due.  Aristotle’s account of magnanimity in NE 4.3 can be seen as an attempt to lead these 
magnanimous men to recognize the social conventions that honor those who are well-born, 
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powerful, and courageous.  The magnanimous man must, to some extent, accept the existing 
social order.  According to Aristotle, fortune is something that ought to be worked with rather 
than conquered.  Of course, being able to recognize the good attributes of another is the 
definition of a friendship based on the good.  
 When read in light of the topic of friendship, Aristotle’s discussion of magnanimity can 
be seen as part of his “cure” for the magnanimous men listed in the Posterior Analytics.  By 
being complete or self-sufficient in their own nature, each type of magnanimous man described 
in the Analytics is good.  Yet, to the extent that these magnanimous men mistake their own virtue 
for the whole of virtue, they are tragic figures that cause grief for their communities.  It is only 
by recognizing the virtues and claims of other magnanimous men who are similar to themselves, 
yet differ in some point of virtue, that the magnanimous man is able to avoid tragedy.61  By 
indulging his concern for honor, Aristotle ensures that the magnanimous man stands above the 
conventions of the city.  At the same time, Aristotle tempers the magnanimous man’s concern for 
honor such that he is concerned only with the honor of “serious people.”  In this way, Aristotle 
sets the ground for friendship, which alone can act as the cure for the socially destructive 
tendencies of the magnanimous man; a cure that is more fully developed in Books VIII and IX. 
 
                                                 
61 Howland points out that “At Iliad 7.302, Ajax and Hector, having dueled, part “in friendship.”  Hector gives Ajax 
his sword and receives a belt in exchange.  In Sophocles’ Ajax, Ajax kills himself by falling on Hector’s sword.  
This gesture points toward the death he should have died—death at the hands of his only equal, who is paradoxically 
both friend and enemy.” “Aristotle’s Great-Souled Man,” 51 n. 40.  I would add that this points toward the fact that 
true friendship can exist only between those who are similar to one another yet differ in point of virtue.  Indeed, 
friendship between those who are identical is unlikely to develop, as neither is able to provide anything the other is 
lacking.  See below n. 76 and accompanying text. 
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Friendship: Book VIII – A Self-sufficient Friendship 
Already in the first chapter of Book VIII, it becomes apparent that Aristotle’s discussion of 
friendship seeks to engage in the same inquiry as that undertaken by Socrates in the Lysis: is 
there a friendship that is not rooted in each friend’s deficiencies, but instead is based on an 
appreciation of one another solely for their own sake?  Yet, in contrast to Socrates, who was 
unable to discover a definition of friendship and, therefore, placed it within the ambit of erotic 
relationships characterized by desire and need, Aristotle does provide a definition of friendship.  
Building on the framework of Plato’s Lysis, Aristotle develops an understanding of friendship 
that is based not on a lack or need, but instead on a reciprocal appreciation of another’s 
goodness.   
 In stark contrast to Socrates’ decision to preface his inquiry into friendship by setting two 
friends against one another, Aristotle begins by emphasizing the utility of friendship.  Friendship 
“is most necessary with a view to life,” and “without friends, no one would choose to live” 
(1155a5–6).  Aristotle indicates that friendship is useful not only for the young and the old but 
also for those who are in their prime to perform noble actions (1155a13–15).  In support of this 
contention he cites the Iliad: “For ‘two going together’ are better able both to think and to act” 
(1155a15–16).  This citation from the Iliad is spoken by Diomedes as he is about to go on an 
excursion at night to seek information regarding the movement of the Trojan troops.62  Diomedes 
chooses Odysseus to come with him, whom he describes as having a “heart and proud spirit … 
                                                 
62 Homer, Iliad, vol. I, 10:220–30.  The entire line is as follows: “When two go together, one discerneth before the 
other how profit may be had; whereas if one alone perceive aught, yet is his wit the shorter, and but slender his 
device.” 
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beyond all others eager in all manner of toils” and being “wise above all … in understanding.”63   
On their excursion, Diomedes and Odysseus not only learn of the Trojan troop movements but 
are also able to sneak into the Trojan camp and abscond with some fine horses.64  Together, the 
wily Odysseus and the courageous Diomedes are able to provide great benefits for the city, 
which redound to their own honor. 
 While Aristotle’s preface differs from Socrates’ initial foray into the subject by 
emphasizing the utility of friendship, he quickly runs into the same dilemma as Socrates: what is 
friendship?  Aristotle initially puts forward two potential options.  He notes that while some 
argue that friends are “those who are alike,” others stress the complementarity of opposites 
(1155a33–1155b7).  Of course, both options were explored and found wanting in the Lysis.  In 
the Lysis, Socrates found that neither provides the means for elevating the basis of friendship 
beyond mere utility or need.  However, Aristotle provides a further definition of friendship—a 
definition that was raised but not fully explored by Socrates in the Lysis: Aristotle notes that 
aside from those who cite the previous two definitions of friendship, there “are still others, 
including Empedocles, who claim that like aims at like” (1155b7–9).  Of course, in the Lysis, this 
quotation—“like aims at like”— was used as the launching pad for much of the inquiry into 
friendship.  However, while in the Lysis the expression is interpreted as suggesting that those 
who are identical to each other are friends, in the Ethics the quotation appears to describe a 
middle approach between the friendships of those who are identical to one another and the 
                                                 
63 Ibid., vol. 1, 10:240–50.  As described by Diomedes, Odysseus is not only wise, but also capable of persevering in 
ill-fortune.  
 
64 Ibid., vol. 1, 10:465–540. 
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friendships of those who are opposites.  This middle approach suggests that those who are 
similar but not identical to one another would be friends.65  That Aristotle introduces a third 
possible definition of friendship, one not fully explored by Socrates, suggests that he intends to 
add to Socrates’ inquiry into friendship, or that he considers Socrates’ inquiry deficient in some 
way.66  
 After raising these three possible definitions of friendship, Aristotle informs us that he 
intends to turn aside from these “perplexing questions bound up with matters of nature” to focus 
instead on those questions that are “bound up with what is distinctively human” (1155b9–10).67  
                                                 
65 This is made clear in both the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia, in which Aristotle provides a brief 
commentary on the statement by Empedocles that “like aims at like.”  Aristotle writes in the Eudemian Ethics: “The 
natural philosophers also arrange the whole of nature taking as a principle the movement of like to like; that is why 
Empedocles said that the bitch sat on the tile, because it had the greatest similarity” (EE, 1235a10–12, as quoted in 
Brad Inwood, The Poem of Empedocles, trans. Brad Inwood (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 159. 
Similarly, he writes in the Magna Moralia: “They say that there was once a bitch who always slept on the same 
piece of tile, and when Empedocles was asked why the bitch slept on the same piece of tile he said that the bitch was 
in some way similar to the tile, as though the similarity caused the bitch to go to the tile” (MM, 1208b11–15, as 
quoted in Inwood, The Poem of Empedocles, 159.  Finally, near the middle of Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
at a portion of the argument where Aristotle again lapses into a discussion of nature, Aristotle states, “Yet perhaps 
one opposite does not aim at the other opposite in itself, except incidentally.  Rather, the longing involved is for the 
middle term, since this is good” (NE 1159b19–21). 
 
66 Further bolstering the possibility that Aristotle views Socrates’ inquiry in the Lysis to be deficient is the fact that 
in the entirety of the Ethics, the only other time Empedocles is mentioned is in the context of Book VII.  Here 
Aristotle explicitly critiques the Socratic thesis that “no one acts contrary to what is best while supposing that he is 
so acting” (1145b26–27).  In this discussion, Aristotle notes that a person who knows the words of something, but is 
ignorant of what they mean, “merely speaks, as a drunk man states the sayings of Empedocles” (1147b12–13).  It 
may be that Aristotle is suggesting that while Socrates knows the sayings of Empedocles, he fails to understand 
them.  Of course, as we’ve seen, in the Lysis Socrates himself raises the possibility that he does not fully understand 
the saying “like aims at like.”  Of the possibility that friendship exists between those who are alike, he states, “Then 
do you also happen to have come across the writings of the wisest ones … namely that what is like is always 
necessarily a friend to its like? And they, I suppose, are the ones who converse and write about nature and the 
whole.”  Socrates goes on to say that these “wisest ones” may “speak well … only we don’t understand them” (Lys. 
214bff).  It was noted above, that Plato suggests that Socrates’ understanding of friendship is deficient due to his 
failure to understand the writings of “the wise” (οί σοφοί), who inquire into nature and the whole.  As Aristotle’s 
discussion of friendship will show, it is precisely this third definition espoused by Empedocles that is capable of 
elevating friendship from a relationship based on mere necessity to one in which two friends love one another on 
account of each other’s goodness. 
 
67 Aristotle may also be subtly critiquing Socrates’ inquiry into friendship by characterizing these possible 
definitions of friendship as “perplexing questions bound up with matters of nature.”  As noted above, Aristotle was 
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As we shall see, however, the “distinctively human” approach that Aristotle adopts is very much 
bound up with nature.  In fact, throughout his discussion of friendship Aristotle will on several 
occasions lapse into a discussion of nature almost as if to remind his audience of friendship’s 
connection to nature.  In this way, Aristotle can be seen to be building on the framework 
established in the Lysis.   
 To see how Aristotle responds to the problems raised in the Lysis, it will be useful briefly 
to recap the difficulties Socrates encounters in his attempt to define friendship.  It will be 
recalled that Socrates first raises the problem of reciprocity.  While it seems natural that if 
friendship is to exist between two people, they need to love one another, Socrates notes that it is 
common to speak of lovers of wine, lovers of gymnastics, or lovers of wisdom, objects that are 
all incapable of reciprocating love.  However, accepting that friendship need not be reciprocal 
would result in the absurd conclusion that those who do not reciprocate love, or even hate their 
lover, are nevertheless friends of their lover. Taking a different tack, Socrates suggests that 
perhaps the wise—those who inquire into nature and the whole—are correct in holding that “like 
is always necessarily a friend to its like” (Lys. 214b5).  The difficulty posed by this definition is 
twofold.  First, Socrates argues that it is impossible for the base to be friends.  Second, even if it 
is assumed that the wise are talking only about the good, Socrates notes that these would not be 
useful to one another.  To the extent that the good are sufficient in themselves, they will not be in 
want of anything and, therefore, will not have any desire for their friend.  Finding this definition 
inadequate, Socrates takes another approach and suggests that perhaps those who are opposite 
                                                 
aware that Socrates “neglect[ed] the world of nature as a whole but [sought] the universal in … ethical matters” 
(Meta., 987b1–3).  
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and wholly unlike are friends with each other.  This suggestion immediately runs into the 
difficulty that hatred is the opposite of friendship.  Finally, Socrates raises the possibility that the 
neutral (those who are neither good nor bad) are friends with the good.  As the dialogue 
continues, it becomes clear that this definition would destroy the phenomenon of friendship, 
because it would mean that, in comparison with the good (which Socrates terms the “first 
friend”), all one’s friends would simply be phantom friends.     
 Aristotle begins by critiquing the notion that there would be a single form of friendship. 
According to Aristotle, there are three forms of friendship, which correspond to the three things 
that are loveable: the good, the pleasant, and the useful.68  Almost immediately, Aristotle points 
to a difficulty: in their love of what is good, “is it the good, then, that people love or is it the 
good for themselves?” (1155b22–23).  This question recalls Aristotle’s discussion of Plato’s 
theory of the forms in Book I, in which he investigates whether the good is one and universal, or 
whether the good differs for different entities.  In Book I, Aristotle does not fully resolve this 
question, but he does note that the way in which various things are said to be good are in some 
way similar to one another.  In the present discussion of friendship, Aristotle again suggests that 
both are possible (i.e., that the good is both universal and differs for various objects or people).  
He writes, “It seems that each person loves what is good for himself and that, while in an 
unqualified sense the good is what is lovable, what is lovable to each is what is good for each” 
(1155b23–25).69  Aristotle suggests that different people are by nature directed toward different 
                                                 
68 Note that in Book II the noble is something that is an object of choice.   
 
69 In contrast to my interpretation, Lorraine Pangle argues that Aristotle is “not making any claim that the simply 
good is good in some absolute way, wholly apart from its being good or pleasant for something, if only for itself.”  
As evidence, she points to the fact that Aristotle includes the pleasant in this discussion, and notes that “it would be 
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things; while the good may be unqualified and universal, the way in which people pursue the 
good may be different or unique. 
 After raising the distinction between the universal good and that which is good for each 
individual—a distinction that will inform nearly the entirety of the rest of his discussion on 
friendship in Book VIII—Aristotle goes on to address the difficulties associated with friendship 
that Socrates raises in the Lysis.   First, Aristotle emphasizes the reciprocal nature of friendship.  
He notes that friendship must involve reciprocated goodwill—that is, one must wish for good 
things for one’s friend, for his own sake.  Explicitly alluding to Socrates’ objection that one can 
be a friend to inanimate objects, Aristotle states, “It is perhaps laughable to wish for good things 
for the wine, but, if anything, one wishes that it be preserved so that one may have it” (1155b29–
30).70  Friendship, Aristotle suggests, must be between people. However, goodwill alone is not 
enough;71 rather, each friend must also be aware of the other’s existence.72  People might well 
feel goodwill for another they have not met but suppose is decent.  It would be absurd, Aristotle 
                                                 
absurd to speak of something as being intrinsically pleasant if it were not pleasant for anyone.” Aristotle on 
Friendship, 38.  However, Aristotle discusses the intrinsically pleasant in Book VII of the Ethics.  In Book VII, 
Aristotle notes that the existence of the gods is intrinsically pleasant.  Specifically, he writes, “Yet the same thing is 
not always pleasant on account of our nature’s not being simple.  Rather, something else is present in us as well 
(hence we are subject to destruction) such that when the one part acts, this is contrary to nature with respect to the 
other nature; and when both are equally balanced, the action performed seems to be neither painful not pleasant.  For 
if someone’s nature were simple, the same actions would always be most pleasant.  Hence the god always enjoys a 
pleasure that is one and simple, for there is an activity not only of motion but also of motionlessness, and pleasure 
resides more in rest than in motion” (1154b21–28).  I suggest that in the same way that the intrinsically pleasant is 
available only to the gods, so the intrinsically good is also available only to the gods. 
 
70 Laughter is, of course, not a convincing form of refutation (cf. Gor. 473e1–3).  This suggests that Aristotle’s full 
explanation regarding the role that reciprocity plays in friendship has yet to be revealed. 
 
71 See above at chapter 2 n. 64. 
 
72 Becoming aware of another’s existence will prove to be major theme in Book IX, in which Aristotle reveals how 
one becomes a friend to another. See below at pp. 214–217. 
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argues, to suggest such people are friends without knowing of each other’s existence. Again, 
Aristotle emphasizes the phenomenological and, thus, human aspect of friendship.  Based on 
these characteristics, Aristotle provides the following description of friendship: “Friends must, 
therefore, have goodwill toward each other and not go unnoticed in their wishing for the good 
things for the other, on account of some one of the [lovable] things mentioned” (1156a3–5).  
 Based on this definition, Aristotle turns in chapter three to distinguish the three forms of 
friendship from one another.  The first two types of friendship—friendships of utility and 
pleasure—exist only on the basis of some advantage or pleasure that each individual comes to 
have from the friendship.  The parties to these two types of friendship “do not love each other in 
themselves but only insofar as they come to have something good from the other” (1156a10–13).  
As a result, once the purpose for which the friendship was entered into ends, these types of 
friendship are prone to dissolve.  In contrast, friendships between “those who are good and alike 
in point of virtue” love each other on account of who they are (1156b7–8).  Aristotle writes that 
these friendships are “stable,” since the underlying basis for the friendship, virtue, is a stable 
thing (1156b12–13).  Thus, in contrast to Socrates, who held that all friendships are based on a 
lack, Aristotle holds that there is a self-sufficient friendship based on an appreciation of the good 
characteristics of each party to the friendship.  The good, or those who are virtuous, love one 
another solely for the other’s sake, insofar as he is good.73  
                                                 
73 Aristotle is quick to add that “friendships of this sort are likely to be rare, since people of this sort are few.  
Further, there is also need of the passage of time and the habits formed by living together” (1156b25–26).  He 
concludes this chapter with what may be taken as a subtle critique of Socrates’ and Callicles’ declaration of 
friendship in the Gorgias (cf. Gor. 485e3; 485c1; 499c2–5): “Those who swiftly make proofs of friendship to each 
other wish to be friends but are not such unless they are also loveable and know this about each other.  For a wish 
for friendship arises swiftly, but friendship itself does not” (ΝΕ 1156b30–33). 
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 Of course, while Aristotle arrives at the precise opposite conclusion of Socrates, he does 
not yet explain how he resolves the fundamental obstacle to his definition of friendship.  
Specifically, why would two good individuals be friends to each other if they are both “good and 
alike in point of virtue”?  What benefit could they provide one another?  Or, as Socrates asserts, 
“How … will those who are good be at all friends to the good, since neither do they long for 
each other when absent—for even apart they are sufficient for themselves—nor do they have any 
use for each other when present?” (Lys., 215b).   Why would these two virtuous individuals 
desire each other’s company?   Indeed, Aristotle simply asserts that good people are both 
beneficial and pleasant to one another, without explaining the basis for this assertion. 
 It has already been noted in the discussion on magnanimity above that Aristotle believes 
those who are magnanimous in the mold of Alcibiades, Achilles, and Ajax to be well-suited for 
friendship with those who are magnanimous in the manner of Lysander and Socrates.  The 
members of the two groups are different from each another, yet they are all self-sufficient and 
good with respect to their own character or virtue.  Moreover, if the second type of magnanimity 
is at root philosophic, then the wisdom it evinces would be well-suited to complement the 
courage that is emblematic of the first type of magnanimity.  If these two types of magnanimous 
men were capable of amicably ruling together, wisdom and power would coalesce in a way that 
benefits the entire political community.  However, as Aristotle subtly indicates in the Posterior 
Analytics, these magnanimous men are not likely to recognize each other’s virtues.  As noted 
above, these magnanimous men suffer from the tragic flaw of mistaking their own virtue for the 
whole of virtue.  Furthermore, we have seen that these two types of magnanimous men stand 
above the standards of the city and, as a result, a utilitarian appeal to the city’s well-being is 
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unlikely to have the persuasive effect necessary to lead them to recognize each other’s virtue or 
claim to rule.  Thus, while the two types of magnanimous men may be well-suited to become 
friends with one another, it seems that they have little inclination to do so. 
 In chapters four through six of Book VIII, Aristotle presents a somewhat cryptic 
argument to explain why it is nonetheless in their own interest for these magnanimous 
individuals to recognize each other’s virtue and claim to rule.  In chapter four, Aristotle sets up 
the basis that will undergird his explanation as to what benefit friendship holds out for 
magnanimous, self-sufficient men.  He begins by reasserting that friendships that are complete 
are both pleasant and useful as well.  However, as he continues, Aristotle begins consistently to 
elevate friendships of pleasure, such that the good and the pleasant turn out to be nearly 
indistinguishable from one another.  Aristotle begins by noting that “among those who seek 
pleasure or utility, friendships endure especially whenever each attains the same thing from the 
other—for example, pleasure—and not only this but whenever it comes from the same type, as 
in, for example, those who are witty” (1157a4–6).  By way of this example, Aristotle points to 
the overlap between the good (virtue) and the pleasant, as wit was identified as one of the social 
virtues articulated in Book IV.  He immediately contrasts this example with the relationship of 
lover and beloved, who do not receive pleasure from the same thing: the lover is “pleased by 
seeing the beloved, the beloved [is pleased] by being attended to by his lover” (1157a6–8).  
While Aristotle initially seems to disparage this type of relationship by stating that it sometimes 
fades “when the bloom of youth fades” (1157a8), he continues by noting that these types of 
friendships can become stable if, through the time spent living together, they begin to develop 
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affection for one another’s character (1157a10–12).  Thus, the time spent together can cause two 
lovers to delight in one another’s character.   
 Turning to complete friendships, Aristotle underscores the way that erotic friendships can 
evolve into friendships of virtue by pointing to the way in which the time spent together 
stabilizes friendship.  He writes, “Only the friendship of the good is secure against slander, for it 
is not easy to trust anyone when it comes to slander about someone who has been tested by 
oneself over a long time” (1157a21–22).  He then concludes that only friendships based on the 
good are complete friendships, and that the other two friendships are friendships “only by way of 
a resemblance” (1157a32).  However, Aristotle follows this up by noting that “what is pleasant is 
a good for the lovers of pleasure” (1157a33).  Here Aristotle seems almost unequivocally to 
suggest that pleasure and the good are, for some, the same.  
 Why does Aristotle elevate friendships of pleasure, such that they become nearly 
identical with friendships of the good?  The answer becomes apparent in chapter five, where 
Aristotle subtly reveals his solution to the difficulty that Socrates encounters in the Lysis: what 
would cause those who are good and self-sufficient to desire another?  Aristotle begins chapter 
five by noting that “just as in the virtues, so too in friendship: some people are spoken of as good 
in reference to the characteristic they possess, others as good in reference to the activity they 
engage in” (1157b5–7).74  Aristotle informs us that virtue or goodness expresses itself in 
                                                 
74 This language mirrors Aristotle’s discussion of what it is that happiness consists of in Book I.  In Book I Aristotle 
writes, “The argument, then, is in harmony with those who say that [happiness] is virtue or a certain virtue, for the 
activity in accord with virtue belongs to virtue.  But perhaps it makes no small difference whether one supposes the 
best thing to reside in possession or use, that is, in a characteristic or an activity” (NE 1098b30–33).  This, of course, 
sets up the fundamental distinction between the moral virtues and the intellectual virtues that undergirds much of the 
rest of the treatise. 
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different ways.  Some are good in reference to their virtuous characters (i.e., their possession of 
moral virtues), while others are good in reference to their activity (i.e., their practice of 
philosophy).  As we shall see, this differentiation in goodness provides the basis for friendship in 
a way that avoids the difficulty encountered by Socrates in the Lysis.   
 After these initial steps towards a solution to Socrates’ dilemma, Aristotle makes a small 
detour, reiterating what he had stated previously, namely, that living together is important to 
friendship.  Those who live together, he states, “delight in and provide good things to one 
another” (1157b8).  Again, pleasure comes to the fore as an important aspect of friendship.  He 
continues, noting that if friends remain separated for an extended period of time, the friendship 
itself can be destroyed.  Thus, Aristotle suggests that even among those who are good, friendship 
cannot exist and be maintained on the basis of the good alone.  Friendship, Aristotle suggests, 
needs the leavening effect of pleasure.  Turning to the elderly’s indisposition to form friendships, 
this point is made even more starkly.  The elderly and the sour, he states, are unlikely to form 
friendships, “for there is little that is pleasant in them” (1157b14–15).  He concludes, “Nature 
appears to avoid most of all what is painful and to aim at what is pleasant” (1157b17).  With this 
short statement, Aristotle both reminds the reader of friendship’s connection to nature (or that 
friendship is natural), and that the basis for friendship cannot be the good alone, but that pleasure 
is a necessary component of friendship—perhaps even more so than the good.75 
                                                 
75 At this point, Aristotle is responding also to Socrates’ ambiguity in the Gorgias regarding the relationship 
between the good and the pleasant.  (Cf. pp 94–98.)  While Aristotle does not come to a definitive conclusion here, 
his discussion anticipates his fuller discussion of the difficulty in Book X. 
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 After having again emphasized the importance of pleasure, Aristotle directly touches 
upon the Socratic dilemma.  He restates the dilemma as follows: 
The friendship of those who are good, then, is friendship most of all, just 
as has been said many times.  For what is good or pleasant in an 
unqualified sense seems to be lovable and choiceworthy, whereas what is 
good or pleasant to each individual seems to be such only to that person.  
But a good person is lovable and choiceworthy to a good person on both 
accounts. (1157b25–29; emphasis added). 
 
Aristotle here restates Socrates’ question of how it can be that someone who is good or pleasant 
in an unqualified sense can also be good or pleasant only for a certain individual.  Would it not 
instead be the case that the good in the unqualified sense be good for all good individuals? 
 Aristotle’s solution to the dilemma is best understood against the backdrop of the 
introductory statement of Chapter five: “Some people are spoken of as good in reference to the 
characteristic they possess, others as good in reference to the activity they engage in” (1157b5–
7).  Aristotle seems to suggest here that in a friendship of the good, each individual is 
unqualifiedly good—and, we may add in light of the subsequent discussion, such individuals are 
also pleasant—and is therefore loveable and choiceworthy.  While it is true that in a friendship 
based on the good, both parties to the friendship are unqualifiedly good and pleasant, each party 
is also different from the other in some way—some being good in character, others in 
philosophic activity.  Each party can therefore be good and pleasant specifically for the other 
party to the friendship.  In this way, Aristotle is able to resolve the Socratic dilemma of why 
those who are good and self-sufficient would ever treasure or love another.   
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 The sort of individuals that Aristotle has in mind as being both good unqualifiedly and 
good for the other party to the relationship seems to be those who best exemplify the moral 
virtues and those who practice the intellectual virtues. This interpretation is bolstered by the 
following paragraph, where Aristotle delineates the role played by each party in a friendship 
based on the good.  He writes, “Friendly affection is also like a passion, whereas friendship is 
like a characteristic: friendly affection exists no less toward inanimate things, whereas people 
reciprocate love as a matter of choice, and choice stems from one’s characteristic” (1157b28–
32).  In this statement, Aristotle indicates that each party will have a different role.  The fact that 
friendly affection is akin to a passion that one may have towards an inanimate object is meant to 
recall the philosopher’s passionate love of wisdom.76  In this way, Aristotle suggests that one 
party to the friendship acts as the passionate philosopher.77 In contrast, the party who 
reciprocates love does so as a matter of choice, which stems from a characteristic.78  Aristotle’s 
terminology here is meant to bring to mind the moral virtues, which are characteristics marked 
by choice.  Aristotle indicates that a friendship based on the good involves an exchange of 
pleasure or delight between the practitioner of the intellectual virtues and the practitioner of the 
moral virtues. 
                                                 
76 Cf. NE 1155b25–30; Lys. 212d6–10. 
 
77 Aristotle notes, however, that “people also wish for good things for those who are loved, for the sake of the loved 
ones themselves, not in reference to a passion but in accord with a characteristic” (1157b32–34).  This suggests that 
even the “active” partner loves not solely in an egotistical way ordered solely towards pleasure, but also for the sake 
of the other, in so far as the other is good. 
 
78 At this point Aristotle finally answers the Socratic inquiry regarding the reciprocity of friendship.  See above at 
pp. 36–37. 
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 It seems therefore, that in a friendship based on the good, one party to the friendship will 
have a passionate love for his friend similar to that which a philosopher has for wisdom, while 
the other party will reciprocate love based on his characteristic.  In this succinct statement on 
friendship, Aristotle points toward a resolution to the Socratic dilemma concerning friendship.  
Each party to the friendship brings a specific good or pleasure to the relationship that is both 
good in and of itself and is also good or pleasant in some specific way for the other party.  He 
concludes, “Each [party], then, both loves what is good for himself and repays in equal measure 
what they wish for the other and what is pleasant.  For it is said, ‘friendship is equality.’”79    
 In the following chapter (Chapter 6), Aristotle discusses the political implications of this 
type of friendship.  Regarding the friendships of “people in positions of authority,” he states the 
following:   
It has been said that the serious person is at once pleasant and useful; yet 
such a person does not become a friend to someone who exceeds him [in 
power], unless [the person in power] is also exceeded [by the serious 
person] in virtue.  But if this does not occur, [the serious person] is not 
rendered equal [to the person of greater power], since he is exceeded in 
the relevant proportion. (1158a33–37). 
 
Aristotle indicates that the powerful, owing to their superiority in power, are unlikely to be 
friends with those who are “serious.”  In fact, it is only when the serious person exceeds the 
                                                 
79 This conclusion points to a further difficulty: the relative inequality of the virtues.  The virtue of wisdom (i.e., 
philosophic virtue) is superior to that of prudence and the moral virtues (i.e., political virtue) (cf. 1143b18–1145a11; 
for further discussion regarding the superiority of wisdom over prudence, see Richard Bodéüs, “The Gods as 
Objects of Imitation,” in Aristotle and the Theology of Living Immortals, trans. Jan Garrett (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2000), 168–79.  If “friendship is equality,” as Aristotle states, how could the wise 
philosopher and the prudent statesman befriend one another?  The answer is hinted at in the following chapter.  
Aristotle will state that superiority in a point of power can render its practitioner equal to a serious person who 
exceeds him in virtue (1158a35). 
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person in power in point of virtue that a friendship may develop, as the differential in virtue is 
able to compensate for the power differential between the two parties.  Again, Aristotle points 
toward a solution to the fundamental political problem: how power and wisdom might coincide 
to realize the best regime possible.  Those who are politically powerful ought to befriend those 
who are “serious.”  The magnanimity of an Alcibiades requires the complementary magnanimity 
of a Socrates.  Of course, Aristotle knows that Alcibiades spurned Socrates’ advice and that the 
powerful are unlikely to befriend the wise.  As a result, Aristotle concludes this brief reveal of 
the political implications of his discussion of friendship with the observation that “[those in 
positions of authority] are not much accustomed to becoming these sorts [of friends to the 
virtuous]” (1158b38–39). 
 In his discussion of friendship, Aristotle has made clear that magnanimous men who are 
politically powerful, well-born, and courageous are well-suited for friendship with 
philosophically magnanimous men who, despite their low-born status, have great benefits to 
offer the city.  Aristotle suggests that the fundamental political problem identified by Socrates 
and Plato—how to ensure the coincidence of power and wisdom—can potentially be resolved by 
the phenomenon of friendship.  Through an appreciation of one another’s virtue, two individuals 
who are self-sufficient and good in their own nature can together ensure the existence of the best 
possible regime.  However, not a few difficulties remain.  First, while Aristotle has hinted that 
pleasure is that which causes the one individual of such a friendship to appreciate the good 
qualities of the other, he has not yet indicated how or why this mutual exchange of pleasure will 
take place.  In fact, the most he has indicated is that those in positions of authority are not much 
accustomed to becoming friends of the virtuous.  It is not until Book IX, in which Aristotle 
 172 
 
 
 
 
finally tackles the fundamental political problem regarding the coincidence of wisdom and 
power, that he explicates how this mutual exchange of pleasure will occur.  
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CHAPTER FOUR.   THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP 
 
In the previous chapter I noted that Aristotle hints that the fundamental problem of politics—
attaining the coincidence of power and wisdom—may be capable of resolution through the 
medium of friendship.  Specifically, by way of friendship, the philosopher can impact the 
policies of those in power.  However, I noted that while Aristotle hints that friendship is a 
solution to the difficulty of attaining the coincidence of power and wisdom, he states quite 
frankly that those in power are not disposed to become friends with serious or worthy people.  
The goal of Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics is to show how such individuals may become 
friends with serious people.  I will argue that it is through a discussion of the giving and 
receiving of benefits, that Aristotle explains how this friendship may come about.1 
 Aristotle’s intention in taking up the discussion of how those in power may become 
friends with the philosopher is indicated in the first sentence of Book IX, which states that its 
subject matter is heterogeneous friendships, in which the goal of each party is different.2 
                                                 
1 In discussing the giving and receiving of benefits, Aristotle is, of course, picking up on a theme that he had earlier 
touched upon in his depiction of the magnanimous man.  In Book IV, Aristotle had noted the following about the 
magnanimous man’s disposition towards the giving and receiving of benefits: “He is also the sort to benefit others 
but is ashamed to receive a benefaction; for the former is a mark of one who is superior, the latter of one who is 
inferior.  He is disposed to return a benefaction with a greater one, since in this way the person who took the 
initiative [with the original benefaction] will owe him in addition and will have also fared well thereby” (1124b9–
13).  The magnanimous man’s attitude toward the giving and receiving of benefits is rooted in a concern with his 
own superiority.  This attitude initially appears to be at odds with Aristotle’s understanding of friendship, which 
entails an appreciation of the other for his own sake.  Book IX of the Ethics should be read as Aristotle’s attempt to 
reconcile the magnanimous man’s concern with his own superiority with the description of friendship in Book VIII.  
 
2 This distinction is made clear both by the concluding sentence of book VIII and by the introductory phrase of Book 
IX.  Book VIII concludes: “Let what concerns these matters, then, be spoken of to this extent” (1163b28).  “These 
matters” refers to “homogeneous friendships,” or friendships in which both parties to the friendship seek the same 
goal—for example, usefulness or pleasure.  The opening line of Book IX reiterates the intention to leave 
homogeneous relationships behind: “In all heterogeneous friendships, what is proportional equalizes and preserves 
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Aristotle begins by providing an example of a political or market friendship between different 
craftsmen.3  This type of friendship is easily equalized through the medium of commerce, as 
each party exchanges his wares according to their value, and Aristotle has discussed this type of 
friendship at length in Book V in connection with justice.4   In contrast, the following example 
that Aristotle provides is a decidedly non-political friendship, which is more difficult to equalize 
and, as a result, is susceptible to dissolution: the erotic friendship consisting of a lover and 
beloved who enter into the relationship for different purposes.  Aristotle notes that such 
relationships will dissolve “when the lover loves the beloved for the pleasure involved, [while] 
the beloved his lover for his usefulness to him, and when both parties do not have what each 
wants” (1164a6–10).  Because neither party to the relationship receives what it desires, the 
relationship ends. 
 By introducing the example of a political or market friendship that is easily equalized 
alongside a decidedly non-political relationship that is difficult to equalize, Aristotle silently 
                                                 
the friendship” (1163b33–34).  Thus, broadly construed, the subject matter of Book IX is that of heterogeneous 
friendships, or friendships in which each party seeks a different goal. 
 
3 Michael Pakaluk notes that this friendship is, strictly speaking, a homogeneous friendship, as both parties seek 
what is useful.  He asserts that Aristotle likely introduces this example by way of contrast with the types of 
friendship that are to follow.  Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics Books VIII and IX (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 
149. 
 
4 In Book V Aristotle notes that the exchange of wares occurs due to the prompting of necessity.  Necessity, he 
argues, prompts people to come together in order to undertake exchange.  As a result, an object’s worth is measured 
by necessity, and money acts as the medium of exchange that is capable of equalizing disparate things that have 
different value (1133a25–b18).  Nevertheless, Aristotle states—almost in passing—that some things have their basis 
in something other than necessity and are incapable of being equalized in this way: “Now in truth, it is impossible 
for things that differ greatly from one another to become commensurable, but it is possible, to a sufficient degree, in 
relation to need” (1133b19–2).  This may suggest that necessity does not hold all things together; some relationships 
have their basis in something other than necessity and, as such, are beyond being made commensurable via the 
virtue of justice.  In this way, Book V’s discussion of justice points toward Aristotle’s discussion of friendship in 
Books VIII and IX. 
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raises the question of whether relationships may exist that are both political and difficult to 
equalize.  Are some political relationships beyond the realm of proportional justice?  The answer, 
it turns out, is yes.  The relationship between those who are in power and those who are wise—
that is, the relationship between those with political ambitions and those who are philosophically 
inclined—is a relationship that is political in nature and is beyond proportional justice.   
 That Aristotle has this relationship in mind is borne out by his subsequent discussion 
concerning the giving and receiving of benefits.  He uses an erotic relationship, in which neither 
party receives what it wishes, as a springboard to launch into the question of who is to decide the 
worth of what is given in a friendship. Ought the person who “takes the initiative in giving” 
assess the gift’s worth, or should it be “the one who is first in receiving” the gift? (1164a23–24).  
Aristotle answers that “he who takes the initiative in giving appears to entrust this assessment to 
the receiver, which is in fact what they assert Protagoras used to do” (1164a24–25).  Aristotle’s 
example of Protagoras is revealing and introduces the subject matter that will silently come to 
dominate the rest of Book IX.  Protagoras, of course, was the philosopher who claimed to have 
the unique ability to teach men “the political art” and how to “make men good citizens” (Prot. 
319a4). By using Protagoras as an example, Aristotle draws attention to the classic theme of the 
relationship between politics and philosophy, a relationship that is both political and difficult to 
equalize.   
 Protagoras, asserts Aristotle, would “bid the learner to estimate how much he held [his 
teachings] to be worth knowing, and that is the amount he used to take” (1164a25–27).  In 
describing Protagoras’s conduct, Aristotle distinguishes him from the Sophists, “who take money 
in advance and then do nothing of what they claimed, because their promises were excessive” 
 176 
 
 
 
 
(1164a27–31).  While the Sophists are rightly accused by those with whom they contract for 
failing to deliver what they promised, those who take the initiative in giving advice for the 
benefit of their partner “do not give cause for accusation” and may instead be practicing the 
highest type of friendship (1164b34–35).5  Thus, Aristotle implies that the philosopher who 
advises with the intention of benefitting the one who receives the advice—perhaps by teaching 
him “the political art” or by making him a “good citizen”—may, in fact, be practicing the highest 
form of friendship (1164a35-36).  
 While the introduction to Book IX strongly suggests that Aristotle intends this section of 
the Ethics to cover the friendship between the magnanimous philosopher and the magnanimous 
statesman, a number of obstacles prevent the easy attainment of this type of friendship.  First, as 
noted above, Aristotle indicates that those in power are not likely to become friends with those 
who are serious.  In fact, those who are in power may have had to engage in decidedly nefarious 
tactics to attain their position and, as a result, cannot be described as virtuous or good.  Thus, it 
can fairly be asked: what would dispose the philosopher to dispense advice to such a person?  As 
will be made clear, Aristotle will first seek to appeal to the philosopher by way of a protreptic 
address to prepare him for the potentially difficult character of the politician.  Second, if the 
friendship between these two magnanimous individuals is a friendship based on the good, 
Aristotle will have to make clear how the philosopher will turn the politician toward virtue, such 
that they may appreciate and take pleasure in each other’s good qualities. Third, even if 
Aristotle’s protreptic address is capable of preparing the philosopher for the politician’s prickly 
                                                 
5 While Aristotle’s evaluation of Protagoras’s art is beyond the scope of this project, his distinction between 
Protagoras and those whom he terms the “Sophists” is striking.  
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personality, it remains to be seen what benefit these magnanimous individuals receive from their 
friendship with one another.  If the magnanimous man is “incapable of living with a view to 
another” (1124b31 – 1125a1), as Aristotle states in Book IV, why would the magnanimous 
statesman and the magnanimous philosopher enter into friendship with one another?  As I hope 
to make clear, Aristotle addresses each of these issues in turn, explaining how and why the 
friendship of the philosopher and the politician can be attained, thereby securing the coincidence 
of wisdom and power in the establishment or direction of the regime. 
 
Taming the Philosopher 
Aristotle’s first task in bringing about a friendship between the philosopher and those who are or 
aspire to be politically powerful is to inculcate a friendly disposition in the philosopher toward 
those who are or who have the ambition to be statesmen.  Through a discussion concerning the 
giving and receiving of benefits, Aristotle seeks to tame the philosopher’s hubristic demeanor 
and show him the advantages of friendship.  After having introduced the theme of the 
philosopher’s relation to the political realm by way of the example of Protagoras, Aristotle 
suggests that the philosopher who provides political advice with the intention of conferring a 
benefit may deserve some sort of repayment from the one who receives the advice.  Of course, as 
noted in the previous chapter, in friendships based on the good, the repayment is what one would 
“wish for the other and what is pleasant,” and this repayment ought to aim to equal the benefit 
that was bestowed (1157b35–1158a1).  The issue of repayment is a difficult one, as it is not 
evident what could possibly count as adequate repayment for the benefit of learning “the political 
 178 
 
 
 
 
art” and becoming a “good citizen.”  It would perhaps not be surprising that the philosopher, in 
recognition of the value of his benefit, might feel slighted either if the benefit he bestows 
remains unrecognized, or if the repayment does not appear to be adequate. 
  The issue of repayment is complex, and Aristotle remains—perhaps purposefully—vague 
in discussing the issue.  Initially, he notes that the gift of philosophy is invaluable, and as such 
the repayment cannot be satisfied by either money or honor, but instead “whatever it is possible 
to repay would be sufficient” (1164b3–5).  However, Aristotle continues, noting that “if the giver 
receives as much as the recipient is benefited (or however much in return the recipient would 
have given in choosing the pleasure involved), the giver will have received what was merited 
from the recipient” (1164b10–13).  The meaning of this somewhat abstruse explanation of 
repayment will later be revealed,6 but at present it suffices to note that Aristotle suggests that 
repayment depends, in part, on the efficacy of the philosophical advice rendered.    
 Before Aristotle expounds on what may count as adequate repayment, he seeks to prepare 
the philosopher for the possibility that those in power may not be receptive or appreciative of his 
advice.  In order to forestall the sullen and bitterly ironic reaction of a philosopher who, in 
response to having his advice rejected, retreats to his own private realm to criticize the political 
community, Aristotle seeks to ground the philosopher in his community, or tame his hubristic 
demeanor.7  As we shall see, he uses a number of tools to accomplish this task.  First, he 
                                                 
6 See below at note 49 and accompanying text. 
 
7 In this way, Aristotle, like Aristophanes, is critical of philosophers who have their heads in the clouds, unaware 
that they have obligations to their political community.  For an analysis of Aristophanes’ criticism of Socrates in this 
regard, see Mary Nichols, Socrates and the Political Community: An Ancient Debate (New York: State University 
of New York Press, 1987), 1–28. 
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indicates that the value the philosopher places on his advice may be mistaken; that is, the 
philosopher may not have an accurate understanding of his worth, or the worth of his advice.8  
Second, he reminds the philosopher that those in power and the political community more 
generally have certain claims that ought to be taken seriously.  Last, he appeals to the 
philosopher’s superiority, entreating him to be patient with those who, due to their limited 
capabilities, are unable to recognize either the benefits of the advice or the good character of the 
one who bestows the advice. 
 Aristotle begins his protreptic approach at the end of chapter one by unequivocally 
stating that in the absence of an express agreement of the gift’s worth, the one who receives the 
gift—or advice—ought to assess its worth in determining repayment.  The rationale, according to 
Aristotle, is that “many things are not valued equally by those who possess them and by those 
who wish to receive them, since what is one’s own and what one gives appears to everyone to be 
worth a great deal” (1164b17–19; emphasis added).  The reference to “one’s own” is the second 
of two references in the totality of the Ethics in which “one’s own” is contrasted with philosophy 
or the truth.  The first reference occurs in Book I, where Aristotle begins his famous critique of 
Plato’s theory of the forms. Prefacing his critique, Aristotle notes that it will be a difficult 
undertaking “because the men who introduced the forms are [friends]” (1096a13–14). He 
continues, however, stating that for philosophers in particular, it may be necessary to “do away 
with even one’s own things,” in order to preserve the truth (1096a14–16).  Thus, while gaining a 
truthful account of things may be difficult, Aristotle leaves us with the impression that such an 
                                                 
8 According to Aristotle’s depiction of magnanimity in Book IV of the Ethics, to the extent that a philosopher 
overvalues his self-worth he would fail to be magnanimous.  Rather than aiming at and achieving the mean with 
regard to self-worth, such a philosopher would be guilty of the vice of vanity (cf. 1123b8–9). 
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account of things is possible.  The second reference to “one’s own,” which occurs here in Book 
IX, seems to pull back the on the idea that one will ever be able to achieve a full truthful account 
of things.  Indeed, the fact that the philosopher ought to entrust the assessment of the worth of his 
advice to the recipient indicates that even the philosopher is incapable of attaining complete 
objectivity and may have a preference for what is “one’s own,” or for his own teaching.9   Ever 
so subtly, Aristotle suggests that the philosopher may not be impartial as to the worth of his 
teaching, and that the love of “one’s own” may cloud his assessment of the worth of his teaching. 
 In chapter two, Aristotle continues his protreptic approach by reminding the philosopher 
of what he owes the political realm.  He does so by raising the question of what obligation one 
has to one’s father.  Ought one “render everything to one’s father and obey him in everything?” 
(1164b22).  The claims of the ancestral are raised in light of the preceding discussion regarding 
the advice rendered by the philosopher—that is, the philosopher and his penchant for innovation 
are weighed against the claims of established customs.  Similar political questions are raised in 
conjunction with the claim of the ancestral: must one “serve a friend more than a serious man?” 
and “must one repay a favor to a benefactor rather than give away something to a comrade?” 
                                                 
9 The difference in approach may be due to the audience Aristotle is addressing.  In the first portion of the Ethics 
Aristotle is directing his writing primarily to the politically inclined gentlemen (καλοικάγαθοι), who may initially be 
suspicious of philosophy.  Thus, in order to convince the καλοσκάγαθος to give up what is “his own,” Aristotle 
needs to hold out the possibility of an “objective account” of things.  In contrast, in the second half of the Ethics, 
Aristotle undertakes a “another beginning” (1145a15) and seems to be directing his writing to the philosopher.  The 
philosopher, of course, does not need to be reminded of the possibility of obtaining an “objective view” of things, 
but instead needs to be reminded that he may not have such an objective view of things.  For a discussion 
concerning Aristotle’s intended audience, see Tessitore, Reading Aristotle’s Ethics, as well as Richard Bodéüs, The 
Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s Ethics.  While Bodéüs contends that Aristotle’s primary audience is the lawgiver, 
whom he hopes to serve by “providing him knowledge of the best political or constitutional rules” (p. 39), Tessitore 
remarks that Aristotle has a dual audience, comprising of both “non-philosophers and potential philosophers” (p. 
20).  My own account builds on insights from both Bodéüs and Tessitore but differs in that I view Aristotle’s 
primary audience to consist of both statesmen/legislators and philosophers. 
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(1164b26–28).  Each of these questions raises the issue of how one ought to be disposed towards 
the claims of “one’s own” and towards the claims of philosophic truth.   
 In dealing with these questions, Aristotle initially provides an answer that would not 
shock his more philosophically inclined readers: 
That someone ought not to give back everything to the same person is not 
unclear; nor is it unclear that, for the most part, he must repay good deeds 
more than gratify his comrades, just as a person must pay back a loan to 
someone he owes, more than he must give away something to a comrade. 
(1164b30–34). 
This answer provides the philosophically inclined reader with precisely what he would expect:  
not everything is owed to the ancestral; the good ought to take priority over one’s comrades; and 
the repayment of a loan (i.e., repayment for the philosophical advice one has received) ought to 
come before one undertakes to give any gift to one’s comrades.  No matter how axiomatic this 
answer may seem to the philosopher, Aristotle immediately calls it into question.  Perhaps, 
suggests Aristotle, “not even this is always so” (1164b34).  What follows is a somewhat cryptic 
example regarding ransoms.  Ought a person who has been ransomed from pirates pay in return 
the ransom to his ransomer?  Aristotle indicates that while the general rule holds that an 
obligation is incurred, the obligation is relieved under certain circumstances.  For example, if a 
person owes his ransomer money while at the same time his father is being held ransom, he 
ought to ransom his father first (11643b –1165a3).  Through this example, Aristotle elevates the 
claim of the ancestral and suggests that the philosopher’s axiomatic preference for the good over 
the ancestral may not always be warranted. 
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 In addition, Aristotle seeks to remind the philosopher of his superior position relative to 
those to whom he gives advice.  He writes, “Sometimes the repaying of a previous service is not 
even equal [or fair]—when someone benefits a person he knows to be serious, but the repayment 
is to one whom the serious person supposes to be corrupt” (1165a4–7; square brackets original; 
emphasis added).  In this scenario, the service is rendered by a knower (i.e., a philosopher), who 
has a correct assessment of the recipient’s character, while the recipient (i.e., a statesman)—
although, serious—only has an opinion of the philosopher’s character.  Through an appeal to the 
philosopher’s superior knowledge, Aristotle seeks to exhort him to be patient with those to 
whom he gives advice, as they may be incapable of recognizing either the soundness of the 
advice, or the philosopher’s character, and may be under the false impression that the 
philosopher is corrupt. 
 Only after having called into question the philosopher’s axiomatic preference for the 
good over the ancestral and after having exhorted the philosopher to be patient with those who 
lack knowledge, does Aristotle make clear the implications of his teaching.  He writes that 
different relations ought to be accorded different honors.  Again, Aristotle places the philosophic 
and the ancestral in explicit contrast to one another: “Honor too we owe to parents, just as to the 
gods—though not every honor.  For we do not owe the same honor to a father as to a mother; 
nor, in turn, do we owe them the honor proper to a wise man or general” (1165a24–26).  This 
suggests that the honor due to a wise man (as well as a general, for that matter) is different than 
that which is due to a father.  Aristotle raises here the notion that honor may be due to a wise 
man—i.e., someone who gives advice—but it is only after he has elevated the claims of the 
ancestral, that the possibility of such honor is mentioned.  The chapter concludes by noting that 
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while a relative assessment of what honor belongs to each relation is easy amongst those “of the 
same family” or class,10 such an assessment is difficult when it involves people of different 
characters (1165a33–34).  Nevertheless, Aristotle concludes that “one must not, on this account, 
give up the attempt but rather make the relevant distinctions, to the extent possible” (1165a34–
36).  Thus, Aristotle concludes this chapter by remaining coy about what honor is, in fact, owed 
to the philosopher.11 
  In chapter three, Aristotle continues the theme of the obligations that exist among 
relations.  Having cautiously presented his belief, in the previous chapter, that members of the 
political community have an obligation to the ancestral, Aristotle now introduces the far more 
radical contention that the philosopher himself may have certain obligations toward the political 
community.  Perhaps in recognition of the fact that the philosopher will likely have an instinctual 
aversion to the idea that he has obligations to the political community, Aristotle introduces the 
topic tentatively.  He begins by simply reiterating the relatively uncontroversial assertion that 
friendships based on what is useful or pleasant tend to dissolve when they no longer serve the 
purpose for which they were entered.  However, the focus soon shifts to the more difficult—and 
for the philosopher, perhaps, more controversial—question of whether a friendship based on the 
good can be dissolved if the character of one of the parties undergoes a change: “If someone 
accepts another person as good, and that other becomes corrupt or seems so, must he still love 
                                                 
10 Liddell and Scott note that the word τὰ ὁμογενής can mean “of the same race or family.” However, they further 
note that Aristotle’s usage of the word suggests a broader meaning: “of the same genus” or “of the same kind or 
general character.”  Greek English Lexicon, 1223.  
 
11 Aristotle has thus far hinted several times that the philosopher is owed some sort of honor without specifying what 
that honor is.  See 1164b 4–6; 1164b10–14; and 1165a24–26.  Aristotle’s coyness on this front stands in marked 
contrast to Plato’s presentation in the Apology of Socrates’ (perhaps facetious) demand that the philosopher be 
awarded meals in the Prytaneum at public expense. See above at chapter 3 n. 48. 
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him?  Or is it not possible, if indeed not everything is loveable but only the good?” (1165b12–
15). 
 Aristotle has, of course, already prepared his reader for the answer to this question in the 
previous two chapters by suggesting that the ancestral is loveable.  If the good and the ancestral 
are distinct—as they usually (perhaps always) are—this would imply that the ancestral is 
loveable despite the fact that it is distinct from the good.  In this way, Aristotle has tacitly 
signaled his answer: while the good may be pre-eminently loveable, the philosopher owes 
something to the ancestral as well.  This comes to light most clearly in the hypothetical 
friendship presented by Aristotle in which one individual stays the same, while the other “greatly 
surpasses him in virtue” (1165b23).  Ought the more virtuous individual treat the one who has 
remained the same as a friend?  Or, alternatively, if an individual comes to a greater awareness 
of the good and thereby recognizes the flaws and failings of the city in which he was raised, how 
ought he respond to the city that raised him?  Aristotle argues that while friendship may no 
longer exist in such situations, the philosopher still owes something to his former friend.  Rather 
than altogether dismissing his former friend, “one ought … to remember the life lived together 
with him,” and on this basis “render something to those who were once friends” (1165b33–36).  
Thus, even in the event that the distance becomes so great as to dissolve the friendship, Aristotle 
nevertheless finds that something is still owed.  
 Having introduced the possibility of an individual who so surpasses his friend in virtue 
that the two can no longer remain friends, Aristotle turns, in chapter four, to the question of 
whether it is possible for such an individual to be a friend to himself.  While the question is no 
doubt provocative, it seems to be a logical development from the previous chapter.  If one’s 
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superiority to those around him is so great that he can no longer remain friends with them, then 
perhaps such a person can fulfill his desire for friendship by being friend to himself.12  This topic 
is introduced by noting that four attributes appear to be most characteristic of friendship: (1) 
wishing and doing things that are good (or at least appear good) for the sake of the other; (2) 
wishing that the friend exist and live, for the friend’s own sake; (3) going through life together 
and choosing the same things as the friend; and (4) sharing in life’s sufferings and joys (1166a1–
10).   
 Aristotle goes on to state somewhat tersely that these four characteristics can all pertain 
to oneself.  However, his description of the manner in which the second of the four 
characteristics of friendship applies to oneself—wishing that a friend exist and live—contains a 
compact discussion of what it means to exist: 
He also wishes that he himself live and be preserved, and especially that 
[part of himself] with which he is prudent.  For existence is a good to the 
serious person, and each wishes for the good things for himself.  Yet no 
one chooses to possess every good by becoming another—as it is, the 
god possesses the good—but rather by being whatever sort he is; and it 
would seem that it is the thinking part that each person is or is most of 
all. (1166a18–23; square brackets original) 
 
A serious person, argues Aristotle, finds his existence to be both desirable and good and, as a 
result, he will seek to preserve his existence.  By invoking the notion of preservation, which 
hinges on the virtue of prudence (φρόνησις), Aristotle is able to focus on man’s existence as a 
                                                 
12 In Book IV of the Republic Socrates contends that the perfectly just man can be a friend to himself: the just man 
“arranges himself, becomes his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts [of his soul], exactly like three notes in a 
harmonic scale…. And if there are some other parts in between, he binds them together and becomes entirely one 
from many.” Rep. 443c–e. 
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mortal entity—that is as a human being.  No one, he tells us, would choose to possess every 
good by becoming another.  By focusing on prudence, Aristotle argues that we seek that which is 
good for us as human beings, and that only the god is completely self-sufficient and in 
possession of the universal good.  Thus, Aristotle reminds us that even the individual who is pre-
eminent in virtue is merely human and, as such, needs to preserve his existence.  In the very 
argument in which the friend is famously declared to be “another self,” Aristotle seeks to tame 
the philosopher by reminding him of his humanity, and that his virtue, while it may be self-
sufficient, is not the whole of virtue.  In this way, Aristotle reveals to the philosopher that he may 
in some sense be in need of a friend and, given Aristotle’s discussion in Book VIII concerning 
the importance of complementarity in friendship, we can surmise that the philosopher’s friend 
will be an individual whose characteristics complement those of the philosopher.  Together, the 
philosopher and his friend could, perhaps, possess the entirety of virtue.  
 
Forming a Friend 
Together, chapters three and four point toward a difficulty.  On the one hand, chapter three raises 
the possibility that the philosopher may be so vastly superior to others that he is incapable of 
friendship with them.  On the other hand, chapter four reiterates the philosopher’s limited nature 
as a human being and strongly suggests that he is nonetheless in some sense in need of a friend.  
What ought the magnanimous philosopher to do in such a situation?  It seems that the only path 
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forward would be to seek out a potential friend, whom one can form, or educate, with a view to 
virtue, such that he may become good and pleasant.13   
 Chapters five and six are devoted to identifying who the philosopher ought to become 
friends with.  Aristotle begins chapter five by distinguishing goodwill from friendship proper.  
While goodwill is similar to friendship, it differs in that it “arises suddenly” and is “without 
intensity or longing” (1166b34–1167a3).  Nevertheless, Aristotle emphasizes that goodwill is a 
necessary precursor to friendship, and that goodwill, if “prolonged over time and carries over 
into the habit of living together … becomes friendship” of the highest kind (1167a13–14).  As 
noted above, in the Gorgias, Socrates and Callicles are described as having goodwill for one 
another, and yet later in the dialogue, it becomes evident that the initial goodwill they feel toward 
one another is an insufficient ground for friendship.14  Thus, Aristotle makes explicit what Plato 
had implied in the Gorgias: goodwill may become the grounds on which a friendship can be 
started, but friendship itself requires time and trust. 
 Aristotle concludes chapter five by indicating to whom the philosopher might look in his 
search for a potential friend.  He writes, “On the whole, goodwill arises on account of virtue and 
a certain decency, whenever someone appears to another as noble or courageous or some such 
thing, just as we said in the case of competitors as well” (1167a18–21; emphasis added).  Thus, 
Aristotle suggests that the philosopher ought to seek out those who appear to be noble or 
                                                 
13 The transition from chapter four to chapter five indicates that this may be Aristotle’s intention.  At the end of 
chapter four, after having warned that the base person only seeks to spend time with others so as to escape their own 
misery, Aristotle tells the reader he must “flee corruption with the utmost effort and attempt to be decent, since in 
this way he would both be disposed toward himself in a friendly way and become a friend to another” (1166b27–
29).  In turn, chapter five focuses on good will, which Aristotle defines as “the beginning of friendship” (1167a3).   
 
14 See above at p. 105. 
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courageous when looking for a potential friend.  The introduction to chapter six further 
underscores the importance of complementarity in friendship.  Aristotle notes that “like-
mindedness … appears to be a mark of friendship” (1167a22).  However, he quickly clarifies 
that this like-mindedness does not pertain to just anything.  Indeed, “those who are of like mind 
concerning the things in the heavens” are not friends (1167a26).  Of course, those who concern 
themselves with “the things in the heavens” are the philosophers.  Aristotle indicates that it is not 
on account of their philosophical agreement that two individuals become friends.15  Instead, he 
notes that like-mindedness pertains to matters of common advantage and action.  He provides an 
example, citing how the citizens of Mytilene were like-minded when they resolved to have 
Pittacus rule.  In contrast, “when each person wishes that he himself rule … there is civil faction” 
(1167a 30–35).  This example is meant to distinguish the like-mindedness that contributes to the 
common good (each having in mind that the good should rule) from the like-mindedness of 
multiple self-interested individuals that results in discord.  Aristotle is unambiguous in pointing 
out that the former is a mark of friendship, while the latter is not.16  
 By stressing the complementarity of the partners in a friendship, Aristotle subtly indicates 
to the reader why Socrates’ search for a definition of friendship in the Lysis results in failure.  It 
                                                 
15 That philosophical agreement is not an essential ingredient for friendship is hinted at already in Book I, in which 
Aristotle criticizes Plato’s theory of the forms.  Aristotle writes that an examination of the universal goods “is 
arduous, because the men who introduced the forms are dear.  But perhaps it might be held to be better, and in fact 
to be obligatory, at least for the sake of preserving the truth, to do away with one’s own things, especially for those 
who are philosophers.  For although both are dear, it is a pious thing to honor the truth first” (1096a13–16).  
Aristotle indicates that philosophical agreement does not constitute the grounds of his friendship with Plato. 
 
16 Aristotle’s example also points to a difficulty that will have to be overcome if those who are philosophically 
magnanimous and are to become friends with the politically magnanimous: how will these two individuals, both of 
whom believe themselves deserving of the greatest honors, decide who ought to rule?  This difficulty is addressed, 
and a solution provided, in chapter 8 of Book IX. See below at n. 39 and accompanying text. 
 189 
 
 
 
 
will be recalled that Socrates had initially interpreted the phrase “like to like,” as requiring 
identicality.  In contrast, Aristotle suggests that friendship is not marked by identicality, but 
instead by a like-mindedness that concerns “what is advantageous,” aims at “what has been 
resolved in common,” and pertains to “matters of action” (1167a26–30).  By looking for 
identicality, Socrates’ inquiry was bound to fail.17  Indeed, interaction between those who seek 
the exact same benefits or honors is more likely to result in factious disputes than harmony.18  
Aristotle indicates that the final definition of friendship that Socrates puts forward (but fails 
adequately to pursue) in the Lysis is, in fact, the one that is most characteristic of friendship 
between the good. The highest form of friendship, for Aristotle, is that which exists between 
those who are similar to one another, yet differ in a point of virtue. 
 Aristotle’s distinction between goodwill and friendship is important.  The notion that 
goodwill is only potential friendship, or friendship that lies idle, suggests that the individual 
described in chapter five as one who appears noble or courageous to the philosopher, has the 
potential to become friends with the philosopher.  Much of the Ethics can be read as an attempt 
by Aristotle to actualize the potentiality of his readers as such noble individuals.  No less than 
four times in the Ethics does Aristotle remind his readers that his intention is to make his reader 
“good” (1094b11; 1095a4–6; 1103b26–30; 1179b1–4).  Furthermore, in the introduction to Book 
II of the Ethics, Aristotle states that “none of the moral virtues are present in us by nature, since 
                                                 
17 In Book I of the Metaphysics, Aristotle provides a further subtle critique of Socrates’ interpretation of the phrase 
“like to like.” He writes that “if we were to follow out the view of Empedocles and interpret it according to its 
meaning and not to its lisping expression, we should find that friendship is the cause of good things, and strife of 
bad” (Meta. 985a3–6).  Aristotle may be implying that Socrates’ interpretation of Empedocles’ view is insufficient. 
 
18 This raises the question of whether two philosophers could ever be friends.  While Aristotle indicates that he and 
Plato are friends, he seems to be clear that their friendship is not based on their philosophical agreement.  See above 
at n. 15. 
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nothing that exists by nature is habituated to be other than it is….  [The moral virtues] are instead 
present in us who are of such a nature as to receive them, and who are completed through habit” 
(1103a19–26).19  Thus, Aristotle’s task in the portions of the Ethics discussing the moral virtues 
can, in large measure, be interpreted as that of “forming a friend.”    
 To comprehend well the manner in which Aristotle’s Ethics is an attempt to “form a 
friend” by actualizing his potential for virtue, it is necessary to turn to Aristotle’s inquiry into the 
nature of “being” in the Metaphysics, where Aristotle discusses the forces of potentiality 
(δύναμις) and actuality (ἐνέργεια) in detail.  In the first book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle 
recounts the history of philosophy, or the history of the investigation into the “first causes and 
the principles of things” (Meta. 981b29).  He notes that most of the pre-Socratic philosophers 
believed that “the principles which were of the nature of matter were the only principles of all 
things” (983b7–8).  Aristotle describes this belief as inadequate, as it does not account for the 
existence of artificial or conventional things.  He states, “It is not likely either that fire or earth or 
any such [material] element should be the reason why things manifest goodness and beauty both 
in their being and in their coming to be” (984b11–13).  Aristotle argues that there needs to be 
something beyond the simple material elements that accounts for change and causes things to 
exhibit goodness and beauty.  
 This question concerning the origin of the artificial and conventional, as well as of the 
origin of goodness and beauty, is similar to the question that Aristotle implicitly raises in the 
Politics concerning the origins of the polis.  It may be recalled that while Aristotle argues that the 
                                                 
19 Aristotle’s view seems to be similar to that of Protagoras as depicted by Plato in the Protagoras (cf. Protagoras 
323a4–328c3). 
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household comes into existence to deal with day-to-day necessities, and the village comes into 
being to provide for the non-daily needs, he never indicates what it is that causes the polis to 
come into existence.  Indeed, it seems that with respect to material necessity alone, the village is 
self-sufficient.  Nevertheless, Aristotle maintains that the polis is natural and serves the purpose 
of “living well,” without providing much in the way of explanation as to why this is so.20  In the 
Metaphysics, in his recounting of pre-Socratic philosophy, Aristotle provides the early pre-
Socratic answers to the question of why things manifest goodness or beauty, or what causes 
things to progress and develop beyond the bare necessity dictated by nature.  He notes that 
according to Empedocles, friendship is the cause of order, beauty, and goodness, and strife is the 
cause of what is bad, disordered, and ugly (cf. 984b8–985a9).  Thus, for Empedocles, friendship 
and strife are the sources of movement or change and account for what is conventional or 
artificial.  However, Aristotle states that while Empedocles correctly identifies the sources of 
movement or change as friendship and strife, he does so in a vague and unscientific manner 
(985a22–985b3). 
 It is not until Book IX of the Metaphysics, when Aristotle describes the forces of 
potentiality (δύναμις) and actuality (ἐνέργεια), that he describes in a scientific manner the way in 
which friendship and strife act as the sources of movement or change.  At the beginning of Book 
IX, Aristotle explains that potentiality and actuality are the originative sources of motion.  
However, he is quick to note that these terms do not refer simply to motion but are also used in 
another sense (1045b28–1046a4).  Thus, while potency and actuality are, indeed, the cause of 
                                                 
20 See above at pp. 121–123. 
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motion, they are also the cause of something else.  As I hope to make clear, these forces are, in 
fact, that which cause things to exhibit either goodness, beauty, and order, or disharmony and 
ugliness. 
 To understand how the forces of potentiality and actuality cause things to exhibit either 
goodness and beauty or disharmony and ugliness, it will be useful first to look to Aristotle’s 
criticism of the Megaric school’s understanding of potency and actuality.  In the third chapter of 
Book IX of the Metaphysics, Aristotle states that “there are some who say, as the Megaric school 
does, that a thing ‘can’ act only when it is acting, and when it is not acting it ‘cannot’ act” 
(1046b28–30).  Aristotle provides the example of a builder to elucidate this position.  According 
to the Megaric school, “he who is not building cannot build, but only he who is building, when 
he is building” (1046b30–31).  Potency and act are, for the Megaric school, unified and 
indistinct.  The obvious difficulty with this view, states Aristotle, is that “a man will not be a 
builder unless he is building … and so with the other arts” and, indeed, all other capacities 
(1046b33–35).  This leads to the absurd conclusion that an individual gains and loses the ability 
to conduct an art as many times as he commences and ceases acting, with no account of how he 
comes to possess the art (1046b 35–1047a4).  According to the Megaric position, any time a 
capacity is not exercised, the capacity is lacking altogether.  The consequence of the Megaric 
position, according to Aristotle, is that it does away with both “movement and becoming” 
(1047a14–15).  As Edward Halper writes, the Megarians “appear to have pressed the results of 
logic despite the disagreement of these results with physics.”21  Aristotle, in contrast, maintains 
                                                 
21 Edward C. Halper, The One and the Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: The Central Books (Ohio, IN: Ohio State 
University Press, 1989), 206.  Interestingly, the Megaric position is also described—but not mentioned by name—in 
the second and third chapters of Book VII of the Ethics.  Here the position is described in the context of a discussion 
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that because movement and becoming are processes that clearly do occur in the world, potency 
and actuality are distinct forces that account for these processes.   
 Aristotle introduces in chapter four the notion of pairs of potentialities, which are 
dependent on one another.  In a passage that is dense with formal logic, Aristotle makes the case 
that “if B’s existence necessarily follows from A’s, and if A is possible, B must be possible.”22  
While it is initially unclear what role this discussion concerning pairs of potentialities plays in 
Aristotle’s metaphysics, chapter five makes his intentions manifest.  Aristotle begins by noting 
that all potentialities or capacities come from (1) nature; (2) habit; or (3) instruction (1047b31–
34).23  Potentialities from nature are non-rational and, as a result, always act in a particular way 
when they are brought into contact with that which has the potential to be affected.  Aristotle 
makes clear that pairs of potentialities within nature have a certain regularity or necessity.   For 
example, when fire comes to bear on a pot of water, it will eventually boil and becomes steam.  
                                                 
concerning self-restraint.  Aristotle asks how it could be the case that “a person, though he forms a correct 
conviction, lacks self-restraint” (1145b22–23).  He goes on to note that on account of this puzzle, Socrates denied 
that a person “who has scientific knowledge [could] lack self-restraint” (1145b23).  The Socratic position holds 
instead that “nobody acts contrary to what is best while supposing that he is so acting; he acts instead through 
ignorance” (1145b26–27).  This position is identical to the Megaric position; both suppose that when a person has a 
capacity (in this case, knowledge), he must exercise it; both deny the existence of potentiality.  Aristotle rejects this 
position in chapter three of Book VII: “Since we say ‘to know’ in two senses—both the person who has the science 
but is not using and he who uses it are said to know—it will make a difference whether someone who does what he 
ought not do has the relevant knowledge but is not actively contemplating it, or whether he is actively contemplating 
it” (1147b31–34).  Thus, Aristotle’s position differs from Socrates in that he maintains that one can have knowledge 
but fail actively to exercise it.   
 
22 Halper, The One and the Many, 206; Cf. Meta. 1047b14–30. 
 
23 This discussion mirrors Aristotle’s account in Book II of the Ethics of the manner in which the intellectual and 
moral virtues come into being.  Aristotle writes, “Both the coming-into-being and increase of intellectual virtue 
result mostly from teaching—hence it requires experience and time—whereas moral virtue is the result of habit …. 
Neither by nature, therefore, nor contrary to nature are the virtues present; they are instead present in us who are of 
such a nature as to receive them, and who are completed through habit.  Further, in the case of those things present 
in us by nature, we are first provided with the capacities (δυνάμεις) associated with them, then later on display the 
activities (ἐνεργείας)” (1103a14–8).  Aristotle is clear that while the intellectual and moral virtues come into being 
through habit and teaching, we have the capacity (δύναμις) for them by nature. 
 194 
 
 
 
 
The water’s potential to become steam is actualized when it comes into contact with the 
potentiality of fire to cause the water to turn to steam.  When these two potentialities come into 
contact, they are both necessarily actualized.24 
 In contrast to the non-rational potencies, which act in a pre-determined and necessary 
way, rational potencies—those from habit and instruction—can act in different ways or produce 
contrary effects.  Aristotle uses carving as an example: “We say that potentially … a statute of 
Hermes is in the block of wood … because it might be separated out” (1048a32–34).  However, 
the block of wood can also potentially be something else, perhaps a table.  The final form that the 
block of wood exhibits depends on the “desire or will” of the carver (cf. 1048a5–15).  The 
rational potency of the carver comes to bear on the non-rational potency of the piece of wood to 
determine what artificial or conventional thing it might be.  Indeed, we may say that the carver 
has the ability to bring order or beauty to nature.  However, Aristotle makes clear that it is 
impossible for these potentialities to produce contrary effects at the same time.  The carver can 
form the block of wood into a statue of Hermes, or he can form it into a table, but he cannot 
make both at the same time.  Aristotle indicates that “desire or will” is determinative of what the 
rational potency will do when it is brought into contact with that which has the potential to be 
affected.  Thus, potencies—including rational potencies—come in pairs, and it is through the 
interaction of these potencies that the artificial or conventional comes into existence. 
                                                 
24 Aristotle uses temperature and health as an example of this process at a variety of different places.  See, e.g., 
Meta. 1046b18–20, “The wholesome makes health alone, the heat-making potency heat, and the cold-making 
potency cold” as quoted in Halper, The One and the Many, 204; Phys. 201a19–24, “The same thing, if it is of a 
certain kind, can be both potential and fully real, not indeed at the same time or not in the same respect, but e.g. 
potentially hot and actually cold.  Hence at once such things will act and be acted on by one another in many ways: 
each of them will be capable at the same time of causing alteration and of being altered.”  
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  Of course, human beings have both types of potencies—the non-rational potencies from 
nature, which are innate and “imply passivity,” as well as rational potencies that come to be from 
either habit or learning (1047b31–34). The fact that human beings have both kinds of potencies 
is amply demonstrated in the Ethics.  In Book II, Aristotle notes that the moral virtues come into 
existence via a process whereby practice comes to bear on the innate passive potencies.  He 
states: “Neither by nature, therefore, nor contrary to nature are the virtues present; they are 
instead present in us who are of such a nature as to receive them, and who are completed through 
habit” (1103a22–26).  Thus, the innate potencies are realized, or come to be, through practice or 
habit, and they in turn give rise to another potency, or capacity: the capacity to act virtuously.  
However, as the Ethics demonstrates, if repeated practice is to result in the acquisition of a stable 
virtue, it needs to be informed by reason.  Thus, to act virtuously, one needs to be informed (or 
formed) by one who has knowledge—that is, by the philosopher.  The philosopher’s rational 
potency has the ability to form another individual in the same way that a carver’s rational 
potency can form a statue of Hermes out of a piece of wood.  When the philosopher’s rational 
potency comes into contact with his friend’s rational potency for habitual action, the result may 
well be the actualization of virtue.  It is the contact between the philosopher’s rational potency 
and his friend’s potency for habitual action that is the cause of that which is good, beautiful, and 
orderly. 
 Aristotle’s understanding of potency and actuality as explicated in the Metaphysics helps 
to clarify much of his discussion of friendship in the Ethics. Part of Aristotle’s purpose in the 
Ethics is to “form a friend,” by actualizing the potentiality of another individual.  In chapter 
seven of Book IX, Aristotle investigates the counter-intuitive observation that those “who 
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perform a benefit seem to love those who receive this benefit more than those who are the 
recipients of the benefit love those who perform it” (1167b16–19).  While it may seem contrary 
to reason for the benefactor to love the recipient more than the recipient to love his benefactor, 
Aristotle explains why this is so by analogizing the situation to the relationship between an 
artisan and his work (perhaps a carver and his statue).  An artisan, states Aristotle, “is fond of his 
own work more than he would be loved by that work, should it come to have a soul…. The case 
of those who perform a benefit is like this too, for what has received the benefit is their own 
work” (1167b34–1168a4).  This curious comparison suggests that by dispensing advice, the 
philosopher is, in some sense, acting like an artisan: the philosopher leaves his imprint on the one 
he has benefitted.25  In fact, in words that mirror the division between the active and passive 
parts of friendship in book VIII, Aristotle reiterates that “friendly affection … resembles an 
active ‘making,’” while “being loved resembles a passive ‘undergoing’” (1168a19–20). Thus, it 
is through the dispensing of advice that the philosopher is able to form the character of another 
individual, such that the latter is able to act as an enlightened statesman.26 
 The format of Aristotle’s presentation of the virtues in the first portion of the Ethics 
makes clear that his purpose is, in fact, to dispose a potential friend to be receptive of the advice 
of the philosopher.  As noted in the previous chapter, Aristotle begins with the virtue of courage, 
                                                 
25 Aristotle ends book IX with the same observation in the context of a warning regarding the friendship of base 
people: “Now the friendship of base people is corrupt: they share in base things and, being unsteady, they come to 
be corrupt by becoming like one another.  But the friendship of decent people is decent and is increased by their 
associating with one another.  They also seem to become better by engaging in activity together and by correcting 
one another, for they take an imprint from one another of the qualities they find pleasing.  Hence the saying, “noble 
things from noble people” (1172a9–14).  
 
26 Leo Strauss observes that “Aristotle’s political science is an attempt to actualize [the gentleman’s] potentiality.  
The gentleman affected by philosophy is in the highest case the enlightened statesman, like Pericles who was 
affected by Anaxagoras.”  The City and Man, 28. 
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subtly making clear its limitations and pointing toward the need for magnanimity.27  
Magnanimity, in turn, points toward friendship as the cure for the magnanimous man’s socially 
destructive tendencies.28  Throughout his presentation of the social virtues, Aristotle points 
toward the need for an intellectual virtue or formative force that is capable of guiding these 
virtues.  He states repeatedly that “one ought to choose the middle term—not the excess and not 
the deficiency—and that the middle term is what correct reason states it to be” (1138a18–21), but 
never once indicates what “correct reason” (ὀρθὸς λόγος) is.  When he turns to the intellectual 
virtues in Book VI, he makes clear that what he had previously stated regarding the ethical 
virtues is, “though truthful, not at all clear” (1138b25).  As a result, in Book VI, he argues that it 
will be necessary also to examine the intellectual virtues, as it is the intellectual virtues that 
define the boundary or outer limits of ὀρθὸς λόγος.  It is in his explanation of the intellectual 
virtues that Aristotle finally forthrightly reveals that the statesman ought to be receptive to the 
formative advice of the philosopher.  However, as I will make clear, Aristotle maintains an 
approach that is sensitive to the statesman’s sense of self-worth, framing the philosopher’s role 
in a manner that is as non-threatening as possible.   
                                                 
27 Lorraine Smith Pangle questions why Aristotle begins with courage: “Does [Aristotle] begin with courage because 
it is traditionally the core meaning of virtue or arete? … Or is it, to the contrary, because courage is the noblest and 
most splendid of all …?  In beginning with courage, Aristotle begins where the traditional gentleman does without 
imposing more clarity on his priorities than he finds there, but with a gentle persistence in querying those priorities.” 
“The Anatomy of Courage in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,” Review of Politics 80 no. (2018): 571.  The fact that 
Aristotle begins with courage may be explained by his depiction of the development of friendship.  In his account of 
friendship, Aristotle states that goodwill—the beginning and prerequisite condition of friendship—arises “on 
account of virtue and a certain decency, whenever someone appears to another as noble or courageous or some such 
thing.”  Cf. 1167a18-20. 
 
28 While a full investigation of justice is beyond this project, the virtue of justice is also incomplete and points 
toward friendship. See above at n. 4.  
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 The intellectual virtues, Aristotle tells us, are five-fold: art (τέχνη), science (επιστήμη), 
prudence (φρόνησις), wisdom (σοφία), and intellect (νούς) (1139b 15–18).  Of these five, νούς 
receives the least attention.  Notably, however, it is νούς that pre-eminently defines ὀρθὸς λόγος.  
Indeed, νούς is the most divine of the intellectual virtues and is specifically concerned with the 
outer limits or boundaries of correct reason.29  In chapter six of Book VI, in which Aristotle 
briefly describes the intellectual virtue of νούς, he distinguishes it from επιστήμη, σοφία, and 
φρόνησις.  While επιστήμη “is a conviction concerning universals and the things that exist of 
necessity” (1140b31–32), νούς concerns the “principle of what is known scientifically” 
(1140b34).  Νούς is, therefore, a grasp or comprehension of the principles of science itself, or a 
grasp of that which lies beyond science.  Aristotle explains that while that which is “known 
scientifically is demonstrable,” the principles upon which επιστήμη rests are not demonstrable 
but are beyond λόγος altogether; they defy rational explanation. 
 Precisely because these principles with which νούς is concerned lie beyond λόγος, they 
are beyond the capacity of man.  Man is principally defined—and distinguished from the gods—
by his capacity for speech.  As Aristotle makes clear in the Metaphysics, the activity of pure 
intellect or νούς is characteristic of the god (Meta. 1072a1–29).  Nevertheless, while this sort of 
existence is not a possibility for man, Aristotle indicates that through the exercise of certain 
intellectual capacities, man is capable of certain “νούς-like” activities.30  Heidegger explains the 
νούς characteristic of man in the following way: “This νούς in the human soul is not a νοείν, a 
                                                 
29 In its most real or highest form, νούς is pure actuality, or divine thought thinking itself (Cf. Meta. 1072a1–29). 
 
30 Martin Heidegger notes, “Aristotle calls this νούς: ὁ καλούμενος τής ψυχής νούς, the “so-called” νούς, which 
means the non-genuine νούς.” Plato’s Sophist, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997), 41.  
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straightforward seeing, but a διανοείν because the human soul is determined by λογός.”31  Man’s 
capacity for νούς is therefore never pure but is bound up with λογός.  As a result, to the extent 
that man is able to take part in noetic activities, it will take a form that is characteristically 
human.   
 In Book VI Aristotle makes clear that the form that man’s dianoetic activity takes is that 
of wisdom (σοφία) and prudence (φρόνησις).  Through the exercise of these intellectual virtues 
man has the capacity to engage in activity that approximates that of the divine νούς.  What is it 
about σοφία and φρόνησις that sets them apart as man’s “νούς-like” capacities?  Σοφία, Aristotle 
explains, is “a science and an intellectual grasp [νούς] of the things most honorable by nature” 
(1141b3–5).  While science (ἐπιστήμη) concerns the demonstrable teaching that proceeds from 
certain eternal principles, σοφία goes beyond mere ἐπιστήμη in that it seeks “not only to know 
what proceeds from the principles but also to attain the truth about the principles” (1141a18–19).  
Wisdom, therefore, concerns the outermost principles that are capable of being discerned by the 
wise (σοφός) human being.  Aristotle specifically distinguishes σοφία from φρόνήσις, which 
concerns itself with human affairs. While prudence deals with that which is immediately given in 
our everyday existence, or that which concerns our human needs, σοφία has the ability 
intellectually to grasp (νοείν) the principles that are beyond merely human concerns and is able 
to demonstrate, or teach, that which proceeds from those principles.  Thus, it is σοφία’s concern 
with the outermost limits of ὀρθὸς λόγος that sets it apart as man’s highest virtue.    
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
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 Although Aristotle sets up σοφία as distinct and separate from φρόνησις on account of 
the former’s concern with the principles that underlie science, φρόνησις too imitates—although 
to a lesser degree—the activity of the divine νούς.  Φρόνησις, as noted, concerns itself with 
human affairs and, in contrast to science, concerns those things that can be otherwise.  Aristotle 
defines it as “a true characteristic that is bound up with action, accompanied by reason, and 
concerned with things good and bad for a human being” (1140b5–7).  Because of this somewhat 
expansive definition, φρόνησις comes in a variety of forms, including (1) the political art 
(πολιτική); (2) household management (οἰκονομία); and (3) φρόνησις in the specific sense, 
concerning the interests of the individual (cf. 1141b24–31).  While these roles are all distinct, 
they are nevertheless similar to one another in that they all involve action in response to 
engagement with particular circumstances.  Aristotle states the following:  
Prudence concerns the ultimate particular thing, as was said, for the 
action performed is of this kind.  Indeed, prudence corresponds to 
intellect (νούς), for intellect (νούς) is concerned with the defining 
boundaries, of which there is no rational account; and prudence is 
concerned with the ultimate particular thing, of which there is not a 
science but rather a perception. (1142a24–27). 
 
Φρόνησις, like σοφία, corresponds to νούς, because it is concerned with the “defining 
boundaries, of which there is no rational account.”  However, in contrast to σοφία, which is 
concerned with the most abstract principles, prudence is bound up with the most particular thing.  
Thus, both σοφία and φρονήσις involve an intellectual grasp of things that are at the opposite 
ends of the very limits of human comprehension.   
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 Aristotle continues by noting that the perception of the “ultimate particular thing” 
involved in φρόνησις is a perception “not of things peculiar to one of the senses, but a perception 
of the sort by which we perceive that the ultimate particular thing, in mathematics, is a triangle” 
(1142a28–29).   Commenting on this passage, Heidegger suggests that Aristotle is referring to 
the perception of “states of affairs as a whole” as they are “commonly given in everyday 
existence.”32  When we are faced with a particular, given situation, we may be able, without the 
need for further deliberation, intuitively to grasp the course of action that must be taken.  In the 
same way that we can sense by simple perception that in mathematics the triangle is the most 
elementary shape that cannot be broken down any further,33 so the prudent man (φρόνιμος) is 
able intuitively to perceive how he ought to act in a particular situation.34 
 As Heidegger points out, Aristotle holds that this same intuitive grasping occurs in the 
arts and sciences.  For Aristotle, those engaged in the arts and sciences do not deliberate about 
the ends that ought to be pursued but only about the method that ought to be employed to pursue 
the end: “A doctor does not deliberate about whether he is going to heal; on the contrary, that 
belongs to the meaning of his existence itself, because as a doctor he has already resolved in 
                                                 
32 Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 110. 
 
33 Heidegger writes, “In Greek geometry the triangle is the ultimate, most elementary plane figure, which emerges 
out of the polygon by means of a διαγράφειν, “writing through.” Διαγράφειν analyzes the polygons until they are 
taken apart in simple triangles, in such a way that the triangles are the ἔσχατα where the διαιρείν stops.  In αἴσθησις, 
as it occurs in geometry, I see the triangle at one stroke as the most original element, which cannot itself be resolved 
again into more elementary figures.” Plato’s Sophist, 110–11.  
 
34 Notably, Aristotle distinguishes perception itself from prudence.  He writes, “Prudence is concerned with the 
ultimate particular thing, of which there is not a science but rather a perception, and a perception not of things 
peculiar to one of the senses, but a perception of the sort by which we perceive that the ultimate particular thing, in 
mathematics, is a triangle.  For here too there will be a stop.  But this is perception rather more than prudence, 
though perception of a form different from that [of one of the senses]” (1142a27–32).  Thus, it seems that for 
Aristotle, perception is a sort of pure onlooking, divorced from action, while φρόνησις involves both the onlooking 
and the action that follows it. 
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favor of healing.”35  Thus, the doctor looks around at the given situation as it presents itself, and 
when he perceives “the first αἴτιον [cause] whence [he] can intervene,” he then acts to bring 
about the end which is already posited.36  In the same way, a politician or statesman does not 
deliberate about the end  he ought to pursue (i.e., the good of the community), but instead looks 
at the political situation and simply perceives the best possible way that this end might be 
pursued.  Thus, Aristotle frames φρόνησις—intuitive grasping of the situation at hand—as 
something that precedes action. 
 Aristotle indicates that it is through the intellectual activity of σοφία and φρόνησις that 
man is capable of acting in a manner akin to the divine νούς.  While of these two capacities, 
σοφία has priority, Aristotle does not straightforwardly assert this priority.  Instead, he clarifies 
the relationship between these two intellectual virtues through an extended discussion of 
deliberation.  This discussion reveals that good deliberation is a capacity of those who are held to 
be prudent and is dependent on σοφία.  Good deliberation, Aristotle writes, is a sort of 
“correctness of deliberation,” in which the end of the action being deliberated upon is correct 
(1142b16).  Aristotle explains that while “the base person” may set before himself some ignoble 
goal and, with the use of calculation, attain that goal, he will not thereby have engaged in good 
deliberation.  While he may have gotten ahold of what he sought, he cannot be said to have 
exhibited “good deliberation,” because good deliberation “is apt to hit on what is good” (cf. 
1142b17–27).  For deliberation to be considered “good,” the end at which it aims must be good. 
                                                 
35 Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 111. 
 
36 Ibid. 
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Therefore, good deliberation—the characteristic of the prudent man—takes its bearing from 
σοφία, which establishes the end toward which the prudent man will be directed.37   
 On its face, this relationship between σοφία and φρόνησις appears to be problematic.  
Indeed, the magnanimous statesman is the jealous type not prone to listening.  However, as 
pointed out, Aristotle has taken care throughout the first five books of the Ethics to point out the 
limits of the social virtues, as well as their need to be guided by some higher virtue.  In this way, 
Aristotle has disposed his audience to be solicitous of any advice that may help guide these 
social virtues.  At this critical juncture in Book VI, where he finally forthrightly makes clear that 
φρόνησις takes its direction from σοφία, Aristotle frames his depiction of the relationship in 
terms that will be palatable to the magnanimous statesman.  The virtue of φρόνησις is described 
as being for the sake of some further political action.  In addition, the hero chosen as the 
archetype of this virtue is the great Athenian statesman Pericles (1140b9).  The courageous 
individuals at whom Aristotle aims this description of φρόνησις will appreciate the life of action 
that Aristotle presents here.  In contrast, his description of those who are wise is presented in a 
non-threatening manner: Aristotle holds up the philosophers Anaxagoras and Thales who, while 
they “know things that are extraordinary, wonderous, difficult, and daimonic,” are thought to be 
useless “because they do not investigate the human goods” (1141b3–8). Notably, Aristotle does 
                                                 
37 Another distinction between φρόνησις and σοφία is that φρονήσις is ordered toward action—that is, it is ordered 
towards an end beyond itself.  In contrast, σοφία contains the end within its own activity; contemplation is good for 
its own sake.  As Aristotle will argue explicitly in Book X, the very practice, or activity, of contemplation makes 
one happy, or εὐδαίμων.  In contrast, φρόνησις, or the intellectual grasping of any given situation that is ordered 
towards action, is oriented toward bringing this happiness into existence.  In this way, φρόνησις is ordered towards 
an end beyond itself, while σοφία is not.  Σοφία is, therefore, architectonic, in that it posits the end for which 
φρόνησις acts.   
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not here dispute this assertion,38 but instead follows up by contrasting their wisdom with the 
utility of prudence: “But prudence is concerned with the human things” (1141b9).  By calling 
attention to what appears to be the uselessness of wisdom and immediately comparing it with the 
eminent practicality of prudence, Aristotle presents the two virtues in such a way that that the 
statesman will not feel threatened by the philosopher but will instead solicit his advice.  
 Aristotle makes clear that the philosopher is able to form the character of the statesman 
through the dispensation of advice.  Although the greatest of his politically inclined readers are 
hubristic and by nature contemptuous of advice, Aristotle shows that it is nevertheless possible 
for the philosopher to gain an audience with these politically inclined readers by appealing to 
their desire for action and by presenting the philosopher in a non-threatening manner.  
Nevertheless, several issues remain: first, by framing φρόνησις as being oriented and directed 
toward action, Aristotle has placed one of man’s highest, νούς-like capacities in the service of 
political action.  Furthermore, σοφία has been relegated to acting as a formative or guiding force 
for the statesman and the city.  Nevertheless, through his presentation of the intellectual virtues, 
Aristotle again seems to show that great things may be accomplished for the sake of the city if 
the two types of magnanimous men were to become friends.   
 
                                                 
38 In the Politics Aristotle indicates his disagreement with the conclusion that philosophy is useless by recounting 
the story told about Thales, who was able to use his knowledge of astronomy to predict a good harvest of olives.  
Using this knowledge, Thales cornered the olive market by buying up all the olive presses while the olives were out 
of season.  In turn, on the advent of the olive season, he was able to hire out the olive presses for whatever rates he 
wished.  Thales, Aristotle concludes, showed “how easy it is for philosophers to become wealthy if they so wish, but 
it is not this they are serious about” (Pol. 1259a18–19).  This example further supports the interpretation outlined 
above; in Book VI of the Ethics Aristotle exaggerates the conventional image that people have of philosophers in 
order to present them in a non-threatening, almost buffoonish, manner. 
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Actualization, Pleasure, and Self-Love  
That the philosopher is able to form the character of another individual through the dispensation 
of advice raises a number of related issues:  First, the fact that σοφία has priority over φρόνησις, 
suggests that the relationship between the philosopher and the statesmen will not be one of 
equality.  Aristotle seems to suggest at a number of points that friendship is characterized by 
equality.  Is it possible for true friendship to exist between two unequal individuals?  Second, 
what does the philosopher gain from actualizing the potency of the gentleman?  Why would the 
magnanimous philosopher, who has been described by Aristotle as being somewhat asocial and 
“incapable of living with a view to another” (1124b31), put his talents in the service of his friend 
and of the city? Would this not involve a certain degradation on the part of the magnanimous 
philosopher? Aristotle devotes chapters eight and nine to answering these issues.     
 He opens chapter eight by exploring the perplexing question “as to whether one ought to 
love oneself most or someone else” (1168a29).  On the one hand, people commonly stigmatize 
those who are “fondest of themselves” as “self-lovers” (αὐτοφιλία) on the understanding that the 
base person does “everything for his own sake” (1168a32).  On the other hand, Aristotle notes 
that all the qualities of friendship are “present especially in the person in relation to himself,” 
such that “he is most a friend to himself, and so [he] ought to love [him]self most” (1168b4–7).  
Thus, Aristotle proposes to investigate these common opinions to see the extent to which they 
are true. 
 In the ensuing discussion, Aristotle clarifies both why self-love can be a good thing and 
how it can be made compatible with friendship.  He begins by stating that those who are 
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constantly grasping for a “greater share of money, honors and bodily pleasures” are seeking to 
gratify the nonrational part of their soul.  Aristotle concludes that these individuals “bring self-
love into reproach” (1168b15–21).  In contrast, while those who pursue what is just, moderate, 
and noble may not commonly be characterized as self-lovers, Aristotle states that this type of 
person is, in fact, more of a self-lover.  Indeed, Aristotle notes that those who pursue what is just, 
moderate, and noble are self-lovers, as they are seeking to gratify the most authoritative part of 
themselves (1168b36).   Aristotle’s argument mirrors Plato’s comparison of the tyrannical man 
and the just man in the Republic.  While the tyrannical man is grasping and has insatiable 
desires, the just man is self-restrained, and ensures that his desiring part is “neither in want nor 
surfeited—in order that it will rest and not disturb the best part by its joy or its pain, but rather 
leave that best part alone pure and by itself” (Rep. 571e2–572a2). 
 A number of indications suggest that Aristotle’s praise of self-restraint is not absolute, or 
that it does not comprise his ultimate thoughts concerning self-love.  He observes that by being a 
self-lover, the good man will both “profit himself and benefit others by doing noble things” 
(1169a12–13).  However, it seems that these “noble things” may be different for different 
people.  Aristotle writes, “Every intellect chooses what is best for itself, and the decent person 
obeys the rule of his intellect” (1169a17–18).  The serious person, he states, “does many things 
for the sake of both his friends and his fatherland, and even dies for them if need be: he will give 
up money, honors and, in general, the goods that are fought over, thereby securing for himself 
what is noble” (1169a19–22).  This gentleman, as Aristotle describes him, can be said to “grasp” 
at what is noble.  Of course, by this point in the Ethics, Aristotle can trust that his reader believes 
the noble to be, not whatever the community honors, but what “serious individuals” deem noble 
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or honorable  Thus, Aristotle suggests that the self-lover seeks out opportunities to undertake 
great deeds of noble self-sacrifice, not to attain honor from any “random person,” but inasmuch 
as these deeds are considered noble by “serious individuals.”  
 However, while noble self-sacrifice that has the effect of saving the fatherland may be 
best for some, it is not best for all serious persons.  Aristotle notes that it is equally possible that 
the serious person would “forgo, in favor of his friend, the performance of certain [noble] 
actions, and that it is nobler for him thus to become the cause of his friend’s actions than to 
perform those actions himself” (1169a33–34; square brackets original).  Given his discussion of 
potentiality and actuality, it seems that Aristotle distinguishes two roles: while it may be best for 
those who are politically magnanimous to pursue the noble action of self-sacrifice, it is better for 
those who are philosophically magnanimous to be the cause of their friend’s actions, or to 
actualize their friend’s innate potentiality. Aristotle suggests that it is greater for the 
philosophically magnanimous man to give up honors and political offices to a friend, thereby 
becoming “the cause of his friend’s actions,” than to “perform those actions himself” (1169a29–
34).  In this way, Aristotle solves the unstated issue regarding the roles of the politically 
magnanimous man and the philosophically magnanimous man that had been left lurking in the 
background, namely, which of the two ought to rule.39  The philosopher’s role is to enable the 
statesman to rule. 
 Although Aristotle resolves the unstated issue as to whether the philosopher or the 
statesman should rule, the question remains, what does the philosopher obtain in return for 
                                                 
39 See above at n. 16 and accompanying text. 
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actualizing the ruling potential of his friend?  If it is equality that characterizes friendship most of 
all, should the philosopher not obtain something in return for providing this great benefit to his 
friend? It would seem uncharacteristic of friendship, if it were the case that the friendship 
between the philosopher and the statesman resulted in the statesman’s ability to gratify his most 
authoritative part by doing noble deeds, while the philosopher was left without any means to 
gratify his most authoritative part.  Aristotle’s statement that it may be “nobler” for the 
philosopher to “become the cause of his friend’s actions than to perform those actions himself” 
seems to be an underwhelming reason for the magnanimous philosopher to commit himself to 
actualizing the potentiality of his friend for the benefit of the city.  What benefit does the 
philosopher obtain from actualizing the potential of his friend?  Furthermore, what if there are no 
opportunities for the politically magnanimous man to gratify himself?  If the city is at peace—a 
condition that Aristotle will later endorse as being preferable to war (cf. 1177b7–12) —how will 
the politically magnanimous man have opportunity to gratify himself? 
 Aristotle provides answers to these questions in chapter nine of Book IX of the Ethics.  
Here, Aristotle explains that the philosopher’s friend, having been formed by the philosopher, is 
in turn able to actualize the potential of the philosopher.  The way in which Aristotle explains 
this process of actualization is somewhat cryptic.  To grasp Aristotle’s answer properly, it is 
necessary to turn again to the metaphysical principles that undergird his explanation.  
Specifically, we must turn first to Aristotle’s account of actuality, or complete reality, in the 
Metaphysics, as well as to his treatment of pleasure in Book VII of the Ethics. 
  As noted above, the Metaphysics makes clear that actuality is the opposite of 
potentiality, and that a person or thing’s actuality is realized when two potentialities come into 
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contact.  As we noted, just as the potentiality of the carver can come to bear on the innate 
potentiality of a block of wood, actualizing its potential to become a statue, so the philosopher’s 
potentiality can come to bear on, and actualize, the innate potentiality of the statesman, such that 
the statesman may become an enlightened statesman.  In chapter six of Book IX of the 
Metaphysics, Aristotle notes that there are different types of actions or actualities.  On the one 
hand, some actions have a limit or a definite end. As an example, Aristotle states that an exercise 
that makes the body thin is not a complete action, as the movement itself (i.e., exercise) is not the 
purpose of the action.  The purpose, or end, for which the action is engaged (thinning out the 
body) is outside the activity itself (Meta. 1048b18–23).  Such actions are limited, or incomplete, 
as the end does not inhere in the action itself.  On the other hand, actions in which the end is 
present in the action itself are complete actions.  Aristotle provides the following examples: “At 
the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood, are thinking 
and have thought” (1048b23–24).  Activities such as seeing, understanding, and thinking, 
Aristotle indicates are whole and complete immediately upon being exercised.  Aristotle thus 
concludes by classifying the former actions (actions that have a definite end) as movements, and 
the latter actions (actions which contain the end in the activity itself) as actualities or “complete 
reality” (1048b28–34).  
 Aristotle’s extended account of pleasure in Book VII of the Ethics makes clear that 
pleasure is one of those types of actualities that are complete, or which contain their end in their 
action.  Indeed, pleasure is similar to sight, understanding, and thought.  Aristotle prefaces his 
investigation of the nature of pleasure with a brief description of the reasons that people posit for 
deprecating pleasure as being less than, and distinct from, the good.  The central reason that 
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people deprecate pleasure is that they view “every pleasure [as] a perceptible process of coming 
into its nature, [and] no coming-into-being belongs to the same class as the ends we pursue” 
(1152b13–14).   According to this teleological argument, all actions or activities are pursued for 
the sake of some end or purpose.  As a result, because pleasure is an activity, or a “coming-into-
being,” it cannot be the good or the purpose for which we act.  According to the common opinion 
that Aristotle describes, pleasure exists for the sake of some other end. 
 Aristotle quickly notes his disagreement with this opinion.  He states, “It does not turn 
out that, on account of these things, pleasure is not good, or even not the best thing” (1152b25).  
Aristotle begins by distinguishing different types of pleasures: incidental pleasures and 
unqualified pleasures.  Incidental pleasures, Aristotle informs us, are restorative in nature. These 
pleasures are not “unqualifiedly pleasant,” as they are pleasant only to the extent there is 
something lacking on the part of the individual enjoying the pleasure (1152b33–35).  For 
example, eating and drinking are pleasant only because they are restorative in nature.  However, 
once our nature has been restored (our hunger sated or our thirst slaked), continued eating and 
drinking are no longer pleasant.  Thus, restorative pleasures are not unqualifiedly pleasant but are 
pleasant only by virtue of a deficient condition.   
 In contrast, “unqualified pleasures” are those that are pleasant in and of themselves.  In 
support of this contention, Aristotle explains that contrary to common opinion, pleasure is not a 
process of coming-into-being but is an “activity and an end” (1153a10).  Some pleasures, 
Aristotle contends, do not have something else as an end, but the end inheres in the activity itself.  
Aristotle indicates that pleasure is like one of the “complete activities” listed in Book IX of the 
Metaphysics; seeing, understanding, and thinking. As a result, he defines pleasure as an 
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unimpeded “activity of the characteristic that accords with nature” (1153a14), and he provides 
“the activity bound up with contemplation” as an example (1152b37).  When one’s nature is not 
deficient, the activity of contemplation is accompanied by neither pain nor desire but is 
pleasurable in and of itself.  Thus, because the activity of pleasure that is “bound up with 
contemplation” is not impeded in any way when one’s nature is not deficient, contemplation is 
unqualifiedly pleasant.   
 In the following chapter, Aristotle goes on to argue that pleasure is good and may in fact 
be “the best thing.”  He explains that if the unimpeded activity of each characteristic (i.e., 
pleasure) is most choiceworthy, it follows that “a certain pleasure would be the best thing” 
(1153b12).  Of course, the term “best thing” implies that it is better than all others, or that it is 
the highest good. What is striking about this claim is that Aristotle explicitly seems to be pulling 
back on a claim he had made in Book I.  There he had critiqued Plato’s theory of the forms on 
the basis that the good appears to be manifold; things such as pleasure, honor, and prudence, all 
of which are said to be good in themselves, are “distinct and differ in the very respect in which 
they are goods” (1096b24–25).  In fact, Aristotle went on to note that even if there is some one 
thing that is separate all by itself, which we might term “the good” or the idea of the good, such a 
thing “would not be subject to action or capable of being possessed by a human being” 
(1096b33–34).  Why would Aristotle now discuss this “best thing” after having claimed in Book 
I that it is beyond the capacity of a human being to attain?   
 A possible answer is given immediately after Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic theory 
of the forms in Book I.  He notes that even though no human being can possess such a thing as 
“the good,” it may be helpful to have the idea of the good “as a sort of model,” or pattern, so that 
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“we will to a greater degree know also the things that are good for us; and if we know them, we 
will hit on them” (1097a2–4).40  Thus, while Aristotle seems to be ambivalent about the actual 
existence of this sort of good, he appears to think that it may nevertheless be useful for human 
beings to strive for, so that they may attain what is good for them.41 
 The fact that in Book VII Aristotle states that pleasure may be “the best thing” may 
indicate that he views pleasure as the model, or pattern, on which human beings can base their 
life.  In making the argument that the pleasures of contemplation may be “the best thing,” 
Aristotle states that “if in fact there are unimpeded activities of each characteristic … a certain 
pleasure would be the best thing” (1153b7–13; emphasis added).  The significance of the 
conditional nature of this argument is made clear near the end of Aristotle’s account of pleasure, 
where he underscores the human limitations in achieving such pleasure.  Because human nature, 
in contrast to that of the god, is not simple, “the same thing is not always pleasant” for human 
beings.42  The pleasure that the god enjoys is, in the words of Book I, “not subject to action or 
capable of being possessed by a human being” (1096b33–34).  While the god can “always 
                                                 
40 Cf., Rep. 592a7–592b7. 
 
41 Aristotle further notes that the argument “seems to be inconsistent with the sciences” because the various sciences 
are not concerned with the “knowledge of the good itself.”  Nevertheless, he concludes, “It is not reasonable for all 
craftsmen to be ignorant of so great an aid and not even to seek it out” (1097a3–7).  Aristotle seems to suggest that 
this pattern of the good may be useful for select few—perhaps one or two—types of craftsmen. 
 
42 In Book XII of the Metaphysics Aristotle describes the pure activity of the divine νούς: “[The First Μover has] a 
life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be) 
since its actuality is also pleasure.  (And for this reason are waking, perception, and thinking most pleasant, and 
hopes and memories are so on account of these.)” (1072b14–17).  For Aristotle, the god, in contrast to human 
beings, is able to undertake action that is both continuous and pleasurable.  Furthermore, the complete activities for 
which human beings have the capacity—waking, perception, and thinking—are related to the complete activity of 
the First Mover due to the pleasure involved in these activities.  It seems that by engaging in activities such as 
waking, perception, and thinking (activities that have no end apart from itself), we are—to an extent—able to share 
in the unqualified pleasure enjoyed by the First Mover or divine νούς.   
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enjoy… a pleasure that is one and simple” (1154b26), such a pleasure is beyond the capacity of a 
human being to attain due to a certain “defective condition” (1154b29).43  
 Why, if Aristotle has already in Book VII arrived at the conclusion that the best life for a 
human being is the life of contemplation, does the Ethics continue for another three books?  The 
answer has to do with our limited capacity for continuous pleasure.  While human beings are 
capable of experiencing the sublime pleasures associated with contemplation that the god 
experiences, we are incapable of experiencing this pleasure continuously, due to our embodied 
and limited existence.  As a result, Aristotle’s concluding paragraph of Book VII reminds the 
reader of his humanity: “‘Change in all things is sweet,’ as the poet has it, on account of a certain 
defective condition.”44 
 That Aristotle discusses the limitations of human nature immediately before launching 
into his two books on friendship may seem to suggest that it is precisely our limitations that 
cause us to engage in friendship.  Much of Book IX of the Ethics seems, at least at first glance, to 
bear out such a reading.  As noted above, Aristotle indicates the manner in which the philosopher 
may seek out a courageous or noble individual in order to form a friend precisely because his 
status as a mortal human being requires him to have a friend.   And in chapter nine of Book IX, 
                                                 
43 Robert Bartlett and Susan Collins note that the term defective (πονέρια) is “usually translated as “wickedness”; 
[Aristotle] may here be playing on the fact that the term has both a moral and a nonmoral use.” Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, 162 n. 62. 
 
44 The quotation is taken from Euripides’ Orestes.  In the play, Orestes is suffering from madness brought on by the 
furies, who are exacting punishment on him for murdering his mother.  The line, “change in all things is sweet” is 
spoken by his sister Electra, who is tending to him and encouraging him to rise from his bed.  Orestes responds, 
“That will I; for that has a semblance of health; and that seeming, though it be far from the reality, is preferable to 
this” (Euripides, Orestes, 235). Aristotle may be suggesting that in response to the painful awareness of the fact that 
the life of the god is beyond our reach, it is best to embrace the world of appearances, which, though far from 
reality, can ease our sufferings. 
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Aristotle explicitly links his insights concerning our limited nature in Book VII to the 
philosopher’s need for a friend who can actualize his potentiality.  If this interpretation were to 
hold, Aristotle’s attempt to find a basis for friendship that is rooted in self-sufficiency would be a 
failure.  As I will make clear, however, towards the end of the Ethics, Aristotle actually does find 
a basis for friendship between two magnanimous individuals that is not rooted in deficiency but 
is instead based on a self-sufficiency, while enabling each party to the friendship to recognize 
and appreciate the good of the other.  
 Aristotle begins his analysis by raising the issue of whether the happy person needs 
friends.  He mentions the Socratic opinion concerning self-sufficiency and friendship that was 
stated in the Lysis: “Those who are blessed and self-sufficient have no need of friends, since the 
good things are theirs already; and … since the happy are self-sufficient, they have no need of 
anyone in addition” (1169b4–7).  The quotation that Aristotle invokes to summarize this position 
may give us an inkling of his valuation of the Socratic stance.  Indeed, he cites the following line 
from Euripides’ Orestes: “When a daimon gives well, what need of friends?” (1169b8).  In the 
play, the line is stated caustically by Orestes, as he is at the time being pursued mercilessly by 
the daimonic furies after he has killed his own mother.  This suggests that Aristotle is not entirely 
convinced of the Socratic stance, or that the Socratic stance may not convey the totality of the 
phenomenon of friendship. 
 Why, then, will the magnanimous, self-sufficient individual need friends?  Furthermore, 
if he does need friends, does this not imply a deficiency on the part of the magnanimous man?  
Aristotle’s response to the Socratic dilemma unfolds in three stages by way of a kind of 
crescendo, with each argument building upon and complementing the previous argument.  
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Aristotle’s first argument in favor of the philosopher’s need for friendship is based on a number 
of conditions: if the actions of a serious person are good and pleasant, and if we can contemplate 
the actions of those near us better than our own, it follows that “the actions of serious men who 
are friends” will be “pleasant to those who are good” (1169b30–1170a1).  Lorraine Smith Pangle 
points out that this argument is incomplete, as “a friend’s activity [is] always ultimately his and 
not ours.”45  According to Pangle, any pleasure we receive from witnessing the good or noble 
acts of another “will always be a somewhat passive and vicarious pleasure.”46  However, as 
pointed out above, Aristotle views friendship as consisting of an “active making.”  Thus, to the 
extent that the philosopher is the cause of his friend’s good and noble actions, the pleasure 
received will not be simply passive and vicarious.  Instead, the philosopher will have undertaken 
an active role in creating those good and noble acts.  
 The second argument draws our attention away from viewing the activity of a friend to 
the difficulty attending continuous activity.  Aristotle tells us that life is hard for the solitary 
person, “since it is not easy to be active continuously by oneself” (1170a5–6).  This recalls 
Aristotle’s argument in Book VII concerning the limits of human life.  In contrast to the god, 
who is capable of constant contemplation, human beings are limited and are therefore incapable 
of constant contemplation.  This conclusion is stated explicitly in Book X of the Ethics, where 
Aristotle states that while the wise person is “the most self-sufficient,” the life of constant 
contemplation “would exceed what is human” (1177a30; 1177b27).  Read in this context, 
                                                 
45 Lorraine Smith Pangle, “Friendship and Self-Love in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,” in Action and 
Contemplation: Studies in the Moral and Political Thought of Aristotle, ed. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 198. 
 
46 Ibid. 
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Aristotle’s second argument for the need for friends seems to be that because the life of constant 
activity is impossible, the magnanimous man will, to this extent, need friends.   
 Finally, Aristotle’s third argument is based on an understanding of the workings of 
nature.  He notes that for a serious person, a friend is choiceworthy and good by nature, and that 
the things that are good by nature are “good and pleasant” in themselves (1170a13–16).  In this 
way, Aristotle signals to the reader that his third argument will show friendship to be good not on 
account of some lack that it is able to fill, but inasmuch as it is good in itself, or on its own terms. 
Aristotle begins by pointing out that for human beings, living is defined as “a capacity for 
perception or thought” (1170a16–18).  This definition is striking in that it seems to go out of its 
way to include perception.  At the beginning of the Ethics, Aristotle had insisted that what is 
distinctive about human beings is our capacity for thought, as it is our capacity for thought that 
distinguishes us from the animals.  At this point, however, shortly after having pointed out that 
man is not a god, Aristotle includes man’s particularly corporeal capacity of perception in his 
definition of man, thereby drawing our attention to man’s distinct status as neither beast nor god.  
He continues, noting that “a capacity is traced back to its activity, and what is authoritative 
resides in the activity” (1170a18).  As applied to perception and thought, this means that the 
authoritative status of a person or thing lies not in its potentiality, but in its activity.  We have 
already seen that the philosopher actualizes the potentiality of the statesman by the dispensation 
of advice, causing him to act in accord with the moral virtues.  At this point, as we will see, 
Aristotle intends to make the argument that while the philosopher actualizes the statesman, the 
statesman in turn also actualizes the potentiality of the philosopher.   
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 To make the case that the statesman also actualizes the philosopher’s potential, Aristotle 
states the following: 
If living itself is good and pleasant … and if he who sees perceives that 
he sees … then there is something that perceives that we are active.  The 
result is that if we are perceiving something, we also perceive that we are 
perceiving…. And to perceive that we are perceiving … is to perceive 
that we exist. (1170a27–34). 
 
This abstruse passage is meant to elucidate a fundamental aspect of Aristotle’s understanding of 
friendship. His argument is that it is through the senses, and in particular the sense of sight, that 
we come to perceive (αἰσθάνομαι) or understand that we have sight.  Since sight is a type of 
activity, it is through the medium of sight that we are capable of perceiving or apprehending that 
we are active.  As a result, when we look at something, or apprehend something, we also come to 
realize that we are apprehending.  Finally, to realize that we are apprehending something, is to 
understand that we exist.  This passage could appropriately be called the existential moment in 
Aristotle’s Ethics.  For Aristotle, it is through our sense perception, and specifically through our 
perception of a friend, that we become aware of our own existence.47  Because the philosopher is 
the cause of his friend’s noble actions, he is able to perceive the good present in himself by 
witnessing his friend’s noble actions.   
 In this third and final argument as to why the philosopher needs a friend, Aristotle 
explains how the exchange between two friends takes place.  It will be recalled that in the very 
                                                 
47 Aristotle’s understanding of existence can profitably be contrasted with René Descartes’ famous “Cogito, ergo 
sum.”  While Descartes’ interaction with the sensual world stems from an attitude of skepticism, in which our 
existence is revealed to us through the use of our mind alone, Aristotle affirms that it is through sense perception 
that we come to be aware of our existence. Cf. René Descartes, Meditations, Objections, and Replies, ed. and trans. 
by Roger Ariew and Donald Cress (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 2006), 14–15. 
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first chapter of Book IX, Aristotle had indicated that the philosopher is owed some kind of return 
for the philosophical advice he gives his friend.  Nevertheless, Aristotle indicated that it is up to 
the recipient of the advice to determine its worth.  Aristotle cryptically stated: “For if the giver 
receives as much as the recipient is benefited … the giver will have received what was merited 
from the recipient in question” (1164b11–13).  In this third argument as to why the philosopher 
needs friends, Aristotle finally unpacks this statement regarding what the philosopher is owed: 
the philosopher receives pleasure in return for his philosophical advice.48  By rendering 
efficacious philosophical advice, the philosopher actualizes the potential of his friend and is able 
to witness his friend’s noble acts.  Furthermore, because he is the proximate cause of his friends’ 
noble actions, the philosopher is, in a sense, witnessing his own actions and is thereby taking 
pleasure in his own existence.  The relationship between the statesman and the philosopher is 
made equal by the exchange of pleasure that occurs.49 
 However, Aristotle does not stop at pointing out the benefits that the philosopher will 
obtain from actualizing the potential of the statesman.  As noted earlier, Aristotle describes the 
statesman’s prudence—specifically his ability to survey a given situation and intervene—as 
directed and oriented toward political action.  We saw that this is problematic both because it 
                                                 
48 In Book VIII, Aristotle had indicated that it is through the exchange of what is good and pleasant that partners in 
friendship are made equal: “Each one, then, both loves what is good for himself and repays in equal measure what 
they wish for the other and what is pleasant.  For it is said, ‘friendship is equality.’” (1157b35–37). 
 
49 The equality that characterizes the relationship between the philosopher and the statesman is an equality of returns 
and not an equality of status.  Aristotle intimates that the return one obtains can have the effect of equalizing a 
relationship that is inherently unequal in status in his discussion of the friendships that exist in the household.  He 
explains that while no amount of affection by a child could make up for the “greatest benefits” that a parent bestows 
on the child, parents nevertheless “love children as they love themselves,” and that this friendship affords “both 
what is pleasant and what is useful” (1161b27–34).  Thus, it seems that the delight derived from watching an inferior 
whom one has benefitted in some way is what sustains the relationship. Aristotle also makes clear that pleasure is 
something whole and complete.  See below at n. 57 and accompanying text.   
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subordinates a “νούς-like” function as if it were a mere instrument to achieving some political 
good, and because the opportunities to exercise this function are likely to be limited.  Aristotle 
had already hinted at the lack of opportunity to exercise this “νούς-like” function in the service 
of political ends in his description of magnanimity in Book IV.   
 In Book IV, Aristotle noted that the magnanimous man’s awareness of his own worth and 
greatness causes him to view most things as beneath him. As a result, he is slow to act; in fact, 
Aristotle goes so far as to characterize him as “idle” (1124b24).  Not any small occasion will 
cause the magnanimous man to act, as these are inappropriate to his greatness.  Instead, it is only 
when an opportunity arises that is equal to his greatness that the magnanimous man will take a 
great risk, and, in doing so, he will be unsparing of his life “on the grounds that living is not at all 
worthwhile” (1124b8–10).  However, as long as no opportunity presents itself for the statesman 
to intervene, his overweening concern with his own worth culminates in a sort of sloth.50  Susan 
Collins concludes that because the magnanimous man views only great enterprises as worthy of 
his action, “the ‘activity’ of magnanimity … could be described most simply as the 
magnanimous man’s self-contemplation of his own great virtue.”51  
 Chapter 9 presents the solution to the twofold difficulty of the statesman’s “νούς-like” 
capability being directed toward political action and of the lack of opportunity that the 
magnanimous statesman may have to contemplate his own great virtue.  Aristotle not only 
indicates that the philosopher will obtain pleasure from witnessing the noble acts of his friend, 
                                                 
50 Thomas W. Smith, Revaluing Ethics: Aristotle’s Dialectical Pedagogy (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2001), 118–19. 
 
51 Collins, Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship, 63. 
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but he makes clear that by actualizing the potential of his friend, the friend also becomes aware 
of his own existence.  Aristotle writes, “Existing is … a choiceworthy thing because of a 
person’s perception that he is good, and this sort of perception is pleasant on its own account.  
Accordingly, one ought to share in the friend’s perception that he exists” (1170b8–12). The 
philosopher, Aristotle explains, becomes aware of his own existence by sharing in the friend’s 
perception (συναισθάνομαι) that he exists.  By actualizing his friend’s potential, both the 
philosopher and the statesman become aware of their own goodness together.   
 How does this joint-perception of existence occur?  It is in his explanation of this process 
that Aristotle finally makes clear that the friendship between the philosopher and the statesman 
will have political consequences.  Aristotle explains, “This [joint-perception of existence] would 
come to pass by living together and sharing in a community of speeches and thought—for this is 
what living together would seem to mean in the case of human beings, and not as with cattle, 
merely feeding in the same place” (1170b12–14; square brackets added).  Aristotle indicates that 
it is through the establishment of a “community of speeches and thought”—i.e., through the 
establishment of a polis—that the philosopher can share in his friend’s perception that he exists.  
Thus, in the same way that the philosopher’s potential is actualized by witnessing the noble acts 
of his friend—acts of which he is the proximate cause—so the statesman’s potential is actualized 
by perceiving the regime that he has founded.  With the help of the philosopher, the statesman 
will be able to form “a community of speeches and thought” and will become aware of his own 
virtue by looking at and deriving enjoyment from the regime he has helped to establish.   
 By linking the magnanimous statesman’s ability to perceive his own virtue with the 
establishment of a regime, Aristotle resolves the difficulties that had initially appeared to 
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complicate his depiction of the magnanimous statesman’s prudence.  The perception involved in 
φρόνησις is no longer oriented simply toward political activity, such as noble acts of valor, but is 
instead engaged in for its own sake.  The magnanimous man perceives the regime he has formed, 
and, through this perception, he becomes aware of his own existence and his own virtue.  The 
statesman’s ultimate activity—the activity that is done for its own sake—consists in a pure 
onlooking.  In addition, Aristotle obviates the difficulty posed by opportunity. The magnanimous 
statesman was initially beset by awareness of his own greatness, which caused him to refrain 
from acting.  Unless a worthy opportunity presents itself, the magnanimous man will not act.  As 
a result, in the depiction of the magnanimous man in Book IV of the Ethics, the life of the 
magnanimous man appears to be a joyless quest for opportunities worthy of his effort.  By 
pointing to the magnanimous man’s ability to perceive the regime that he creates, Aristotle 
shows that the magnanimous statesman’s ability to contemplate his own virtues need not be 
limited to those rare opportunities in which he can exercise his virile virtues. 
 In the Politics, Aristotle provides little justification as to why the polis emerges.  It will 
be recalled that while the household and the village are sufficient to deal with the necessities of 
life, Aristotle nonetheless traces the emergence of the polis from several villages and argues that 
it is ordered towards the good.52  In Book IX of the Ethics, Aristotle indicates that friendship is 
the cause of the city’s coming-into-being.  Specifically, it is the friendship between the 
philosopher and the statesman that leads to the formation of the city.  While it is not incorrect to 
say that Aristotle’s intention in the Ethics is to direct the statesman toward a higher form of life, 
                                                 
52 See above at pp 121–123. 
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the form that this life takes is not the life of philosophic contemplation, as many scholars have 
indicated.53 Instead, it is the life of perception, which seems to be somewhat analogous to the life 
of philosophic contemplation.54 Aristotle directs the gentleman to take an active role in the 
creation of a just and noble state such that he may then perceive his creation, and through that 
perception might become aware of his own goodness and take delight in his own existence.  
Together, the philosopher and the enlightened statesman are co-creators of the polis and are able 
to order it toward the good.  It is their friendship—a friendship in which wisdom and power 
come together—that is the formal cause of the polis. 
 
Self-Sufficiency and Actualization 
Aristotle’s arguments concerning the need for friendship make clear that friendship between 
those who are good is a mutually beneficial arrangement for the magnanimous philosopher and 
the magnanimous statesman, and that it will have beneficial political effects. Indeed, the 
philosopher and the statesman actualize each other’s potentiality, such that both become aware of 
their own good and take pleasure in that awareness.  However, if their innate capacity to become 
aware of their own existence lies dormant until it become actualized through the other’s actions, 
would this not imply a certain deficiency?  Indeed, as Sarah Broadie notes, the motion from a 
                                                 
53 See e.g., Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates; Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship; 
Tessitore, Reading Aristotle’s Ethics. 
 
54 Toward the end of the Ethics, Aristotle writes that the political and warlike actions are “without leisure and aim at 
some end … whereas the activity of the intellect [νούς], because it is contemplative [θεωρητικὴ], seems to be 
superior in seriousness” (1177b17–21).  On this basis, some have concluded that the life of philosophic 
contemplation is the only life that is happy in the primary sense.  However, “θεωρητικὴ” can also mean “able to 
perceive.”  Liddell and Scott, Greek English Lexicon, 797.  Thus, Aristotle seems to be suggesting that both the life 
of the enlightened statesman and that of the philosopher are characterized by leisure. 
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state of potentiality to actuality “essentially arises from its subject’s lack.  The subject moves or 
is moved into a new condition because the latter is better than its previous states.”55  If it is true 
that the statesman and the philosopher play an actualizing role for each other—each actualizing 
the other’s potential for pleasure—then Socrates’ view of friendship would seem to be 
vindicated: all friendship would have its basis in deficiency, lack, or need.  However, as I hope to 
make clear, Aristotle is eminently aware of this difficulty, and he confronts it directly in his final 
account of pleasure in Book X. 
 Aristotle’s final account of pleasure in Book X begins in chapter four and is similar to his 
earlier treatment of pleasure in Book VII.56   In both accounts, Aristotle argues against the 
common opinion that pleasure is a process, or a coming-into-being.  However, his method in 
                                                 
55 Sarah Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 339. 
 
56  Despite many similarities, significant differences remain between the two accounts of pleasure.  Perhaps the most 
significant discrepancy is that Aristotle seems to provide different definitions of pleasure in the two accounts.  In 
Book VII, he concludes that pleasure is an “unimpeded activity” of “the characteristic that accords with nature” 
(1153a13–14).  In contrast, in Book X, we are told that pleasure “completes the activity, not as a characteristic that 
is already inherent in it, but as a certain end that supervenes on it” (1174b33–34).  These seem to be contradictory 
understandings of what pleasure is.  As a result, some scholars have concluded that these two accounts are 
incompatible.  According to this interpretation, Aristotle’s description of pleasure in Book X is simply hortatory, 
while his account of pleasure in Book VII contains his more complete treatment of pleasure.  See, Smith, Revaluing 
Ethics, 233–45; Aristide Tessitore, “A Political Reading of Aristotle’s Treatment of Pleasure in the Nicomachean 
Ethics,” Political Theory 17 (1989), 247–65. 
 However, it is not the case that these accounts of pleasure are necessarily contradictory.  If we view Book 
X not as providing a definition of the nature of pleasure, but instead as a description of the way in which we 
experience pleasure, the two accounts are perfectly compatible.  Indeed, in Book VII, the definition that pleasure is 
an “unimpeded” activity suggests that the nature of pleasure—that is, pleasure in its most pure, active form—is the 
pleasure of contemplation practiced by the god. Given our status as embodied creatures, Aristotle had indicated that 
our capacity to enjoy such pleasures is limited.  As I made clear earlier, this pure, active form of pleasure is 
presented by Aristotle as a sort of pattern, or model on which we may model our own lives.  In Book X, we are told 
how one may pursue that pattern or model.  By suggesting that pleasure “completes the activity, not in the manner of 
a characteristic that is already inherent in it, but as a certain end that supervenes on it,” Aristotle indicates that it is 
by pursuing whatever activity accords with our nature that we will experience pleasure.  In this way, Aristotle’s 
description of the manner in which we experience pleasure is carefully stated. Thus, while Aristotle’s account of 
pleasure in Book X is hortatory in the sense that it compels people to pursue what is good, it is not therefore false or 
incompatible with his account of pleasure in Book VII.   
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each account is slightly different.  In Book VII, as part of his rebuttal of the contention that 
pleasure is simply a process, Aristotle emphasizes pleasure’s status as an activity.  In contrast, in 
Book X Aristotle instead focuses on the wholeness and completeness of pleasure.  In support of 
this contention, Aristotle contrasts pleasure with motion; while motion is never complete, as the 
entity in motion changes position over time, the form of pleasure “is complete at any moment” 
(1174b4–8).  Furthermore, in contrast to motion, which we can experience only over time, we 
can experience pleasure in an instant.  At any distinct moment in which we undergo the 
experience of pleasure, that experience is whole and complete.  Why does Aristotle emphasize 
the completeness of pleasure and its status as being independent of time?  The reason is that he is 
attempting to point out that our inability to experience pleasure continuously is not a deficiency.  
Because pleasure is something that is whole and complete and “resides in the ‘right now’” 
(1174b9), our human incapacity to experience this pleasure continuously in the manner of the 
god or First Mover does not imply a deficiency on our part.57  
 Furthermore, in both accounts of pleasure—the accounts in Book VII and Book X—
Aristotle makes mention of the fact that there are distinct pleasures and activities that are 
appropriate to different individuals.  Thus, he intimates that while the activity of contemplation 
and its accompanying pleasures may be best for some, it is not necessarily best for all.  In fact, in 
Book VII, Aristotle notes that “some of the base motions and processes seem to be base 
unqualifiedly, whereas for a particular person, they are not such but are even choice worthy for 
him, while some are not choice worthy for him but are such only on a given occasion and for a 
                                                 
57 In Book I, Aristotle writes that “the good will not be good to a greater degree by being eternal either, if in fact 
whiteness that lasts a long time will not be whiter than that which lasts only a day” (1096b3–4). 
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short time, though not unqualifiedly” (1152b29–32). Aristotle thus subtly indicates that the 
activities bound up with courage, or perhaps even violence—which in the absence of some sort 
of necessity would be base—may appear good to some people.  According to Aristotle, different 
individuals choose different activities and pleasures that correspond to what is most authoritative 
in them.  At various points of the Ethics, Aristotle points out that we are the part that is most 
excellent and authoritative in us.  Thus, by perceiving the ultimate particular thing—the moment 
that he can engage and bring a task to completion—and then acting upon that perception by 
undertaking noble deeds of valor, the statesman engages and gratifies his most authoritative part.  
Similarly, by contemplating the outermost bounds of abstract thought, the philosopher engages 
and gratifies his most authoritative part.  The pleasure that the statesman and the philosopher 
receive from engaging in their respective activities is whole and complete, even though they are 
incapable of being practiced continuously. 
 Aristotle’s description of pleasure in Book X as something whole and complete is meant 
to show that our human incapacity to experience pleasure continuously does not imply a 
deficiency on our part.  While it is true that we cannot experience pleasure in the manner of the 
god—i.e., continuously—this is not indicative of any deficiency on our part, because pleasure is 
something whole and complete.  However, Aristotle does not end his analysis of pleasure with 
this insight.  Instead, he turns to address the specifically human element of our existence, 
namely, our capacity for sensation.  He writes, “Every sense perception is active in relation to the 
thing perceived, and it is active in a complete way when it is in a good condition with a view to 
the noblest of the things subject to sense perception” (1174b14–16).  Thus, after having 
explained that there is nothing deficient about our inability to experience divine pleasure 
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continuously, Aristotle explains that a proper consideration of our existence as embodied human 
beings must take into account our material surroundings as well. 
 Aristotle continues by noting that the specifically human aspect of our existence is also 
capable of experiencing pleasure: “When both the thing perceived and that which perceives are 
of this most excellent sort, there will always be pleasure” (1174b30–32).  While Aristotle is 
somewhat cryptic in his description of the pleasure that accompanies perception, in light of his 
comments concerning friendship, it appears that what he has in mind is the pleasure that 
accompanies a friendship based on the good, specifically, the delight that one derives from 
perceiving the order and beauty that one has created.  Thus, friendship is necessary as it 
completes, or activates, our existence as human beings.   
 Again, the fact that friendship is necessary to complete our existence as human beings 
may seem to vindicate the Socratic contention that all friendship is based on a metaphysical lack 
or need.  However, because Aristotle has consistently maintained that we are defined by what is 
authoritative in us, he forestalls this conclusion.  The fact that friendship completes or activates 
our existence as human beings does not imply any deficiency on the part of the magnanimous 
statesman or philosopher.  Indeed, neither the magnanimous statesman’s capacity to perceive the 
ultimate particular thing and engage in noble courageous acts nor the magnanimous 
philosopher’s godlike capacity for contemplation requires actualization from another.  As a 
result, Aristotle is able to maintain that while friendship completes our existence as human 
beings, we do not need a friend to complete the most authoritative part of us.  Aristotle resolves 
the Socratic paradox concerning the good man’s need for friendship by recognizing our 
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limitations as human beings but refusing to acknowledge that we are defined by those 
limitations. 
 Aristotle makes clear that the limitations posed on us as human beings do not define us 
when he depicts the life of contemplation. After describing the superiority of the contemplative 
life to the life of political action, Aristotle points out that this contemplative type of life exceeds 
what is human.  He writes, “It is not insofar as he is a human being that a person will live in this 
way, but insofar as there is something divine present in him” (1177b27–28).  Nevertheless, 
Aristotle concludes: 
One ought not—as some recommend—to think only about human things 
because one is a human being, nor only about mortal things because one 
is mortal, but rather to make oneself immortal, insofar as that is possible, 
and to do all that bears on living in accord with what is the most excellent 
of the things in oneself. (1177b32–1178a1). 
 
Thus, Aristotle recognizes that while the material, corporeal aspects of our existence ought to be 
of concern if we are to attain our full potential as human beings, one ought not to attend to these 
human concerns at the expense of our most divine capacities.  While the perception of his friend 
and the political regime he founds may be pleasurable and necessary for the magnanimous 
philosopher’s completion as a human being, he ought not devote himself to these pleasures at the 
expense of his more divine capacity of philosophic contemplation.  Similarly, while the 
magnanimous statesman may derive pleasure from undertaking noble (and necessary) actions 
pertaining to politics and war, these pursuits should not be all encompassing, or be pursued at the 
expense of his more divine capacity for perception. 
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 This exhortation is echoed in the form of a warning at the conclusion of Aristotle’s 
discussion of pleasure.  He points out that the pleasures that complete the activities bound up 
with thinking differ from pleasures related to sense perception, and similarly the pleasures that 
accompany the various sense perceptions differ from another.  He continues by stating that while 
the pleasures that properly correspond to the activity act as an aide in the completion of the 
activity, pleasures foreign to the activity have the effect of impeding the activity.  Thus, he 
writes, “Those who love the aulos are incapable of paying attention to speeches if they overhear 
someone playing the aulos, because they take greater delight in the art of aulos playing than they 
do in the activity before them” (1175b2–6).  The delight that one derives from music can 
interfere with other more rational activities.  This example is intended to show that lower-order 
pleasures, or pleasures associated with lower-order activities, can impede our ability to utilize 
our higher capacities.  Thus, just as the pleasures of music can interfere with our capacity to 
engage in rational activity, so the lower-order sensory pleasures can interfere with our theoretical 
(θεωρητικὴ) capacities.  When this occurs, Aristotle seems to say, our lives become all too 
human. 
 
Aristotle as Advisor 
Having established the importance of friendship, while also warning his readers of its dangers, 
Aristotle devotes the last chapter of Book X to explaining precisely how the statesman and the 
philosopher can order the regime toward the good, or how they may transcend mere nature.  
Aristotle notes that while all the relevant topics have been discussed—virtue, friendship, and 
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pleasure—the inquiry is not yet complete, as the end in matters of action consists not simply in 
contemplating and understanding things, but in doing them.  To this end, Aristotle proposes to 
investigate the manner in which one may “possess the virtues and make use of them” (1179a3).  
As I hope to make clear, Aristotle believes that possessing and making use of the virtues is 
dependent upon good laws, as it is through the habituation engendered by the law that a person 
may come to be capable of reasoned debate and persuasion.  However, Aristotle also deals with 
the difficulty that attends the lack of public care for the laws, explaining how one can become 
good in the absence of good laws.  Aristotle posits private education and friendship as the 
method of reforming the law in such a situation. In this way, he reveals that the Ethics is a 
handbook both to establish and maintain public order.  Viewing the Ethics in this way, 
establishes its relationship with the Politics and explains Aristotle’s reserve in the Politics. 
 Speeches and rhetoric alone are insufficient, argues Aristotle, to make the majority of 
people decent.58  The use of reasoned persuasion is, in most cases, inadequate without a certain 
level of pre-rational education.  In order for the majority of people to be capable of listening to 
reasoned advice, the “soul of the student must be prepared beforehand by means of habits” 
(1179b25–26).  Here, Aristotle agrees with Plato’s method of education: habituation must 
precede rational education.  A correct upbringing in which one is taught what he ought to love 
and what he ought to dislike is necessary if he is later going to be open to reasoned persuasion.  
However, Aristotle notes that correct habits are difficult to obtain without proper laws.  While 
people may have the potential to develop habit and thereby acquire a second nature, they are not 
                                                 
58 Cf. Apology 38a2–4. 
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disposed to to act in a moderate manner before this potential is actualized.  Left in their untutored 
state, most people are prone to act immoderately and in an uncontrolled manner. Because most 
people “obey the governance of necessity more than of speech, and of punishments more than of 
what is noble” (1180a4–6), Aristotle concludes that life as a whole is in need of law.  
 Despite the necessity of law in the formation and habituation of the citizens of the polis, 
Aristotle observes that most cities utterly neglect the law.  What occurs in most cities is not the 
rational imposition of law, but instead the “command characteristic of a father” (1180a19).  
According to Aristotle, the problem inherent in this “command method” of order is that it leads 
to resentment; people begrudge those who impede them in their pursuit of their untutored 
desires.  In contrast, the impersonal character of the law avoids this resentment and is not viewed 
as invidious.  The rational, orderly, application of the law, Aristotle indicates, is superior to the 
personal, perhaps tribal approach to justice that characterizes the pre-political realm.   
 Unfortunately, argues Aristotle, what holds sway in most cities is not the reason of the 
law.  Quoting a line from Homer’s Odyssey, Aristotle indicates that what happens instead is that 
each father “‘lay[s] down the sacred law for children and wife’ in the manner of the Cyclops” 
(1180a28–30).  Aristotle’s invocation of the Cyclops—a race of bloodthirsty cannibals—is 
notable for two related reasons.  First, Aristotle, suggests that untutored nature is nasty, brutish, 
and short.  Without the imposition of the impersonal framework of the legal system most 
individuals will fail to acquire the virtue necessary to ensure that life is pleasant, orderly, and 
good, and will instead act in the brutal manner of the Cyclops.  In addition, the Cyclops spurned 
technical innovation, trusting instead in the forces of nature, or providence.  In the Odyssey, in 
the line prior to the one invoked by Aristotle, we are told that “the Cyclopes neither plant nor 
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plough, but trust in providence.”59  By trusting in providence or fortune alone, the Cyclops live a 
savage and bloodthirsty life.  Nature, Aristotle intimates, is nasty and brutish.  
 How, then, can one rise above the severity of nature?  Somewhat paradoxically, Aristotle 
indicates that the cure lies within nature itself.  Indeed, he states, “when cities utterly neglect the 
public care, it would seem appropriate for each individual to contribute to the virtues of his own 
offspring and friends” (1180a30–33; emphasis added).  In the following paragraph, Aristotle 
paints a glowing portrait of the way in which a father’s actions can come to influence his 
children:   
For just as it is the laws and customs that hold sway in cities, so also it is 
the speeches and habits of the father that do so in households—and these 
latter to a greater degree, on account of the kinship and benefactions 
involved, for from the outset household members feel affection for one 
another and are readily obedient by nature. (1180b4–8). 
 
It may seem odd that Aristotle would point to private education and the care for one’s own 
offspring and friends as the means of transcending the severity of nature after having just 
compared that approach to the life of the Cyclops.  How can the love of one’s own be 
characterized both as the cause of a harsh cycloptic existence and as the method by which man 
transcends that existence?  Aristotle’s Janus-faced depiction of paternal authority and friendship 
suggests that fortune or chance will never be completely conquered.  In contrast to Socrates and 
Lysander, both of whom sought to conquer fortune altogether by subverting the established 
order, Aristotle suggests that one still needs to work with the material that nature provides, such 
that it may be molded in the manner best conducive to human flourishing.  As the examples of 
                                                 
59 Homer, Odyssey, trans. Samuel Butler, ed. Louise Ropes Loomis (Roslyn, NY: Walter Black, 1944), 9.105-110. 
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Socrates and Lysander show, attempts to confront fortune directly, without respect for prevailing 
conditions, will result in failure.   
 So, how does one accommodate oneself to nature, or that which is given, so that the 
cycloptic existence of pure nature might be transcended? Throughout the Ethics, Aristotle has 
subtly indicated that the answer lies in the phenomenon of friendship—that is, the natural forces 
of potency and actuality.  As noted above, the actuality of a rational agent can come to bear on 
the potentiality of another rational agent, thereby cultivating and actualizing the other’s innate 
potentiality.  In this last chapter of the Ethics, Aristotle indicates that friendship—and by 
extension the forces of potentiality and actuality—are natural, pre-political forces that exist both 
in family life and in friendships.  These natural forces, Aristotle contends, both can and should 
be cultivated when public care and education have broken down.  When the established order is 
in a state of dissolution, fathers and friends ought to act as informal lawgivers and educate those 
in their care privately.60 
 The primary difficulty in establishing private education, however, is that if it is to be 
effective, the educator himself must already be properly formed.  If the lawgiver is to institute 
(informal) laws that are conducive to the cultivation of virtue, he must be cognizant of the end at 
                                                 
60 Richard Bodéüs argues that Aristotle’s primary purpose in this passage is to align the private education with the 
public education of the regime.  He writes, “Aristotle’s injunction upon the heads of household should be understood 
primarily as providing a way to align children’s education, via paternal authority, with the principles of the laws 
which determine the development of the political community to which the children belong.  Thus is removed the 
possible discontinuity between the household regime and the political regime.” Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s 
Ethics, 56.  Bodéüs continues in a footnote, arguing that Aristotle’s point is “not to enact rules of conduct allegedly 
better than the norms implicitly recommended by the laws, in contradiction with the ends of the constitutional 
regime in force.” Ibid., 166 n. 26.  Bodéüs’s interpretation does not adequately take into account the context in 
which this injunction concerning private education is given.  Aristotle makes clear that private education ought to be 
undertaken “when cities utterly neglect the public care” (1180a30–31).  This suggests that Aristotle’s injunction is 
not primarily a way of aligning paternal authority with the public education of the regime but is instead a way of 
reforming a regime that has fallen into a state of disrepair. 
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which these laws are aimed, and he must himself be oriented toward that end; in sum, the 
educator or lawgiver must—to a certain degree—already be virtuous.  Aristotle had indicated 
earlier in the chapter that in the absence of the requisite laws, it is difficult for someone to obtain 
a correct upbringing leading to virtue.  As a result, he seems to be in the position of a catch-22.  
On the one hand, when the city neglects the public care, it requires individuals to undertake 
private education so as to reform the public order.  On the other hand, private education itself 
requires the pre-existence of an individual that has been properly educated, which in turn 
depends on good laws.   
 Nevertheless, Aristotle notes, even in the absence of a formal system of public care, it is 
not impossible for select individuals to be self-taught on the basis of experience alone: 
Nothing prevents someone—even someone without scientific 
knowledge—from exercising a noble care for an individual, provided that 
he has, through experience, contemplated in a precise way the results for 
each, just as even some people seem to be their own best doctors but are 
unable to aid another at all. (1180b16–19). 
 
Aristotle concedes that certain individuals are capable of being self-taught via experience.  
However, he immediately follows this concession by noting that this experience is, on its own, 
insufficient for educating others; self-taught individuals are “unable to aid another at all” 
(1180b19).  He notes that if such a self-taught individual had the desire to educate others, he 
would have to concern himself with science, and “proceed to the universal and become also 
acquainted with this to the extent possible” (1180b21–22).  Thus, if one wishes to become an 
educator, experience alone is insufficient; rather, one needs at least some level of acquaintance 
with universal, scientific, principles.  
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 Aristotle next turns to the question concerning the source from which the legislator may 
attain the requisite scientific knowledge that is necessary for one to become an educator or 
skilled legislator.  The legislative skill, he argues, is different from that of the other sciences or 
capacities that people may develop.  The other arts and sciences operate on a sort of 
apprenticeship system, where an individual who practices the art also transmits that capacity to 
others.  However, in politics—of which the legislative art is a part—this does not seem to occur.  
Echoing Socrates’ observation in the Gorgias, Aristotle notes that skilled politicians do not make 
“their own sons or any of their friends into skilled politicians” even though this would be a 
reasonable thing to do (11801a5–7).  Aristotle observes that instead it is the Sophists who profess 
to teach “the political art” and how to “make men good citizens” (Prot. 319a4; NE 1180b35–
1181a2).  And, like Socrates, Aristotle seems to be dismissive of their claims.  In general, he 
notes “they do not even know what sort of a thing [the political art] is or with what sorts of 
things it is concerned: otherwise they would not have posited it as being the same thing as 
rhetoric—or even inferior to it” (1181a13–16).   
 In elaborating upon the Sophists’ failure properly to teach the political art, Aristotle does 
not dismiss their claims of knowledge completely.  Instead, he insinuates that their art is 
incomplete.  He writes that the Sophists’ view of legislating is that it consists simply of “putting 
together a collection of the well-regarded laws” (1181a17).  However, on its own, this collection 
is insufficient because the selection of which laws to implement is not an easy task but requires a 
particular skill.  The Sophists, he concludes, fail to recognize that “selection [is] a part of the 
comprehension involved, and [act] as if the correct judging of them were not the greatest thing, 
just as it is in music” (1181a17–19).  Aristotle’s critique of the Sophists seems to be aimed not at 
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their lack of scientific knowledge, but at their belief that this scientific knowledge is sufficient by 
itself and that the act of implementing that knowledge is an easy task.   
 Founding a regime and establishing good laws, Aristotle suggests, is not simply an 
endeavor that entails scientific knowledge or an intellectual grasp of the truth about eternal 
principles.  Instead, these tasks require the full range of man’s dianoetic capacities.  In addition 
to an intellectual grasp of the outermost bounds in the direction of the most general universality, 
founding a regime requires an intellectual grasp of the ultimate particular thing as well.  The 
former capacity belongs, of course, to the philosopher. The philosopher has the capacity to create 
treatises and “collections of well-regarded laws” based on an intellectual grasp of eternal 
principles.  The latter capacity—a capacity to grasp the ultimate particular thing—belongs to 
those politicians or statesmen who have the relevant experience: “Those with the relevant 
experience in each thing,” he writes, “judge the works involved correctly, and they comprehend 
through what or how the works are brought to completion” (1181a20–23).  It is not the 
philosopher, but statesmen with political experience who have the capacity to observe a given 
political situation and discern the first instance or opportunity where they may intervene to bring 
a particular action to completion.  Of course, in establishing the rule of law the philosopher and 
the statesmen are not creating ex nihilo, but are instead building on, and bringing to completion, 
what is already inchoately present in nature.61 
 Aristotle makes clear in the last chapter of the Ethics that forming or reforming a regime 
requires not only the scientific capacity of the philosopher, but also the practical reason of the 
                                                 
61 Pol. 1253a30-31: “Accordingly, there is in everyone by nature an impulse toward this sort of community.  And 
yet he who first founded one is responsible for the greatest of goods.” 
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statesman.  The last chapter sheds much light on the purpose of the Ethics as a whole.  The 
capacity of the magnanimous philosopher and of the magnanimous statesman are necessary for 
the formation of a polis that is ordered toward the good.  While both types of magnanimous 
individuals are capable of bestowing great benefits on the community, their awareness of this 
fact also causes them to be a danger to their community.  Aristotle shows that friendship of the 
good—that is, friendship between two magnanimous individuals who are self-sufficient and 
aware of their own greatness—can cultivate the public benefits that magnanimity can provide 
while avoiding its attendant dangers.  In this way, Aristotle solves the classic dilemma posed by 
political philosopher: friendship can attain the coincidence of power wisdom and power that 
ensures that the regime and the public order are directed toward the good.
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CONCLUSION.   FRIENDSHIP AND THE PRACTICE OF POLITICS 
  
Reading the Socratic dialogues on friendship in conjunction with books VIII and IX of 
Aristotle’s Ethics reveals a significant and sustained difference in understanding between 
Socrates and Aristotle. As I have sought to show throughout this dissertation, Socrates views all 
friendship as based on a metaphysical lack, or need, in which a friend is seen as a sort of 
“phantom friend” who fills this void.  According to Socrates, people naturally desire the good, 
and friendship simply acts as an impediment to man’s ability to access the good.  The political 
implication of the Socratic understanding of friendship is that all political relationships—to the 
extent that they are based on friendship (or “phantom friendship”)—are obstacles to man’s desire 
for the good or for metaphysical completion.  Indeed, Socrates’ own way of life is devoted to 
questioning and undermining the standards of justice that are the basis for political friendship.  
He takes a negative and abstentious approach to the political realm because the friendships it 
fosters are, according to him, obstacles to man’s ability to access the good and are therefore 
unjust.    
 In contrast, Aristotle articulates an understanding of friendship that is based on an 
awareness and appreciation of another’s goodness.  True friendship, or a friendship of the good, 
is not based on any kind of metaphysical lack but instead on self-sufficiency and a recognition of 
another’s goodness.  Aristotle deftly responds to the aporia that Socrates confronts, namely, why 
someone who is self-sufficient and good would have any need for a friend.  According to 
Aristotle, each individual is good and self-sufficient in his own nature.   By finding a positive 
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basis for friendship, Aristotle also finds a positive basis for politics.  Aristotle is keen to 
reconcile philosophy with politics, and it is through the friendship between two magnanimous 
individuals who are similar, yet different in some key regard, that he accomplishes this goal.  By 
affirming the self-sufficiency of both the magnanimous statesman and the magnanimous 
philosopher, while at the same time leading each of them to recognize the virtues of the other, 
Aristotle attains the coincidence of power and wisdom that is necessary if philosophy is to have a 
guiding impact on the political realm.   
 My argument has largely held up Aristotle’s understanding of friendship as a positive and 
sound basis for our own orientation toward politics in contrast to Socrates’ conception of 
friendship.  Aristotle’s writings on friendship pave the way for an appreciation of the practice of 
politics and man’s political nature that avoids viewing politics as merely a realm of injustice or 
as something that we enter into solely on account of our individual deficiencies.  Aristotle’s 
conception of friendship provides a level of dignity to politics.  Despite the broad disagreement 
between the Socratic and Aristotelian conceptions of friendship and politics, Socrates and 
Aristotle agree that friendship is unable to provide completion for man.  Neither would endorse 
the notion that a friend is one’s “other half.”  Such an understanding of friendship, described in 
Aristophanes’ speech in the Symposium, views man as, on his own, incomplete and in search his 
“other half.”  According to Aristophanes, those who discover their other half, “are wondrously 
struck with friendship, attachment, and love, and are just about unwilling to be apart from one 
another even for a short time” (Symp. 192b9–c2).  If they were capable of fusing into one, 
Aristophanes argues, they would choose to do so, and thereby be made whole.  The Aristophanic 
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conception of ἔρος views friendship as a source of completion that can satisfy the desire that 
people have for completion, or wholeness. 
 Socrates is emphatic in the Lysis that friendship is incapable of providing completion in 
the manner described by Aristophanes.  While Aristotle explicitly disagrees with and critiques 
the Socratic conception of friendship in Books VIII and IX of the Ethics, he nevertheless agrees 
that friendship is incapable of providing completion in the Aristophanic sense.  Rather, the 
highest and most divine activity of which man is capable is the activity of contemplation.   In 
fact, Aristotle warns that the pleasures associated with friendship may interfere with the activity 
of contemplation.  While the philosopher’s perception of his friend and of the political regime he 
founds may be pleasurable and necessary, he ought not devote himself to these pleasures at the 
expense of his more divine capacity for philosophic contemplation.   
 That Socrates and Aristotle both deny that friendship can provide metaphysical 
completion for man suggests that we need to remain wary of any political movement that seeks 
to ground man’s metaphysical completion either in friendship or the polis itself.  It is certainly 
true that Aristotle’s conception of magnanimity and friendship provides a level of dignity to the 
political life—a dignity that Socrates denies.  Furthermore, friendship may go some way to 
providing an antidote to the sense of anomie and isolation that many scholars claim is pervasive 
in modern political societies.  Nevertheless, Aristotle denies that friendship itself is able to 
provide for man’s metaphysical completion.  For Aristotle, man’s highest activity and, therefore, 
his most complete end, consists in philosophical contemplation.  
 240 
 
 
 
 
 While Aristotle’s project lends dignity to politics and is able to go some way toward 
combatting some of the social ills facing modern political society, we may well ask what the 
practical political implications of his project might be.  Aristotle’s understanding of friendship 
and magnanimity may seem somewhat far removed from our understanding and practice of 
politics.  We may justly ask, What concrete, practical implications does Aristotle’s treatment of 
magnanimity and friendship have for us?  At first glance, it may seem that his account of 
magnanimity and friendship has little relevance for us:  The very notion of magnanimity as a 
virtue seems out of vogue today.1  While the lack of recognition we afford to the magnanimous 
philosophers who have worked behind the political scene and away from the public eye may be 
entirely as Aristotle would wish, it would seem that today the meritorious claims of the great 
statesmen of the western tradition, such as George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, or Winston 
Churchill often go unrecognized as well.  Indeed, Paul Carrese notes that “political science and 
democratic theory in America for over a century have eschewed issues of character and virtue in 
favor of new conceptions of democratic leadership,” premised largely on democratic and 
progressive values.2 
 It may be argued that this irrelevance of magnanimity gives evidence of the health of the 
current state of politics.  The notion of an enlightened statesman, together with the aid and advice 
                                                 
1 Paul Carrese notes that this is increasingly true of modern academics and historians.  He argues that academic 
portrayals of statesmen who have historically been depicted as principled leaders with noble and austere characters 
have been subject to a “subtle demotion-via-contextualization.”  He goes on to posit that while the purpose of this 
genre is to demythologize these individuals and to portray them as “merely historical character[s],” the actual result 
is a “democratic historian tell[ing] a democratic age just what it wants to hear: that we have nothing much to look up 
to, no real greatness to ponder in [past statesmen], and no real failing in our more democratic culture.”  “George 
Washington’s Greatness and Aristotelian Virtue,” in Magnanimity and Statesmanship, ed. Carson Holloway 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008), 147–48. 
 
2 Ibid., 146. 
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of a magnanimous philosopher, taking the polis in hand and formulating policy at will seems 
threatening to modern liberal democracy’s devotion to egalitarianism and the rule of law.3 
Perhaps our failure to recognize the magnanimity of bygone statesmen is, in some sense, a 
testament to the success of these statesmen.  For example, upon exiting the Constitutional 
Convention, Benjamin Franklin is famously reported to have said in response to the question of 
what sort of government had been created, “A republic, if you can keep it.”4  It is not unfair to 
surmise that the greatest danger to the newly-formed republic would be some overly ambitious 
character such as a Napoleon or a Cromwell.  The hunger for rule that sometimes accompanies 
great statesmen, coupled with the desire of the populace for a hero, was a potential threat to the 
fledgling American republic’s success.  It is to George Washington’s great credit that he rejected 
overtures from the people to seize power and retain the office of the presidency as a life-time 
appointment, not once, but twice.5  Thus, viewed from a particular perspective, the absence of 
recognition of the virtue of magnanimity can seem almost salutary.  Republicanism—or at least 
democracy—seems to be alive and well. 
 Nevertheless, before we congratulate ourselves and celebrate the demise of magnanimity, 
we would do well to reflect on Aristotle’s account of magnanimity as well as on the related 
phenomenon of friendship to examine whether the loss of these concepts truly signals an 
advance.  In what follows, I will make three claims concerning the continued relevance of 
                                                 
3 Carson Holloway writes, “The democratic societies of the modern world are largely predicated on a belief in the 
fundamental equality of all human beings.  In contrast, the very idea of magnanimity seems to be inseparable from 
an aristocratic affirmation of inequality:  the magnanimous man is better than his fellow citizens.” “Introduction” in 
Magnanimity and Statesmanship, ed. Carson Holloway (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008), 1.  
 
4 Thomas Kidd, Benjamin Franklin: Life of a Founding Father, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 230. 
 
5 Carrese, “George Washington’s Greatness,” 147. 
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magnanimity and friendship in modern democratic politics.  The first claim will center on 
Aristotle’s insistence on complementarity in friendship, and the way that this may come to bear 
on politics, even in relatively prosaic periods in the life of democratic societies.  Second, I will 
briefly analyze Aristotle’s discussion concerning the benefits, as well as the limits, of the rule of 
law.  Aristotle’s discussion serves, I think, as a useful reminder that law is not the embodiment of 
either reason or the purpose of politics but always remains simply an imitation of these things.  
To the extent that law remains only an imitation of reason and the purpose of politics, Aristotle’s 
discussion concerning the limits of law reminds us that we may at times require the political skill 
of statesmanship to reform the law.  The last point I will make is that Aristotle’s writings 
concerning magnanimity, friendship, and law contain a warning against the false but dangerously 
alluring belief that laws and institutions have a permanent character.   
 As I have framed it, Aristotle’s account of friendship—in particular his friendship of the 
good—is one of complementarity.  True friendship can exist only between individuals who are 
both good and differ from one another in some fundamental respect.  I have argued that Aristotle 
has in mind the friendship between the statesman and the philosopher: the wisdom of the 
philosopher, coupled with the courage and conventional nobility of the statesman, ensure that 
wisdom is able to have a constructive impact on the political realm.  Does Aristotle’s view of the 
matter deny the possibility of friendship between statesmen, or friendship between philosophers? 
Would this interpretation not put Aristotle’s theory of friendship at odds with what we see in our 
everyday life?  Is it not plainly the case that it is precisely philosophers who join together in the 
pursuit of truth, or statesmen who together struggle to achieve political objectives?  John von 
Heyking points out that some of the most profound and consequential friendships are those that 
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exist between great statesmen.6  He points to the friendship between Winston Churchill and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt as being not only a deep friendship, but also one that had profound 
consequences in turning the tide of the Second World War.  Similarly, the political friendship 
between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson was instrumental in the establishment of the 
American Republic.  If Aristotle’s approach takes such friendships off the table, is his 
understanding of friendship at odds with the phenomena? 
 It is important to remember that Aristotle’s theory of friendship is not exhausted by the 
type of friendship I have been describing in the previous chapters.  Friendships of utility and 
pleasure, while not friendship “in the authoritative sense,” are nonetheless still friendships, albeit 
of a lower degree.  In fact, Aristotle indicates that these friendships are much more common than 
are friendships of the good, insofar as people who are good (or magnanimous) are rare.  Thus, 
Aristotle does not deny that friendships between two statesmen or between two philosophers 
may occur.  Instead, he simply claims that the basis of such a friendship will not be on account of 
the similarity of the two individuals; instead, it will be based on either pleasure or utility.   
 Furthermore, to point out that the basis of such friendships is utility or pleasure is not to 
trivialize these friendships. As Aristotle makes clear in his discussion concerning justice, 
necessity can provide a strong basis for unity. In fact, it is necessity more than anything else that 
“holds people together as if they were some single entity” (NE 133b7–8).  It is not beyond the 
realm of possibility to surmise that absent the dire threat posed by the Third Reich, the friendship 
between Churchill and Roosevelt would not have been nearly as strong as it was. While not 
                                                 
6 John von Heyking, The Form of Politics: Aristotle and Plato on Friendship, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2016), 6. 
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comprising the most developed and highest form of friendship, friendships based in utility or 
need can provide a strong—albeit, perhaps temporary—basis for friendship. 
 Furthermore, while I have noted above that Aristotle’s account of friendship ought to be 
understood primarily as a sort of guide for situations in which public order has broken down, its 
use is not limited to such situations.  Aristotle’s account of friendship contains insights that are 
applicable also to periods characterized by relative stability and ordinary day-to-day politics.  For 
example, Aristotle stresses the complementarity that characterizes friendship.  He does so in 
large part because such friendships can lead to the establishment or profound reorganization of a 
political regime.  Nevertheless, such complementarity can be beneficial (and perhaps necessary) 
also in ordinary day-to-day operations of the political regime.   A friendship between those of 
different and complementary strengths may be beneficial to the polity in small but important 
ways.  For example, the technical skills of a policy analyst, combined with the rhetorical skills of 
a politician, can serve to enhance the political and financial well-being of a regime.  Thus, while 
Aristotle’s description of friendship is, at its height and in its greatest splendor, the friendship 
between two individuals with the ability to confer “the greatest benefits” on the regime, his 
understanding of friendship has implications for ordinary, everyday politics as well. 
 In fact, not only does Aristotle’s insistence on complementarity in friendship remain 
relevant, but it also contains an important reminder for the practice of politics today.  Aristotle 
labored to establish the credibility and importance of philosophy among the powerful and 
established political gentlemen (καλοικάγαθοι) of his day, who viewed philosophy with 
suspicion.  While Aristotle’s primary rhetorical concern in the Ethics is to convince these noble 
gentlemen of the insights and benefits that philosophy and science can bring to the political 
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realm, his secondary aim, is to convince the philosopher of the necessity and dignity of the 
practice of politics.  In contrast to the political conditions facing Aristotle, today we witness 
great optimism concerning the benefits of science (επιστήμη) to solve our present political 
problems.  This trend, beginning with the political philosophy of Hobbes, sought to place politics 
on what seemed to be the sound foundation of science and institutions,7 rather than in man’s 
fickle passions.8  The dangers posed by those who fail to recognize the necessity and claims of 
science seem to be mild in comparison to the hostility displayed toward science in Aristotle’s 
day.  Instead, the greater danger facing today’s political climate is a misplaced optimism 
concerning the power of science, combined with what amounts to a depreciation of the political 
insights possessed by virtuous statesman.  Indeed, today the practice of politics has fallen into a 
sort of disrepute, such that the very term “politics” is viewed with a certain level of disdain.   
 Given the current deprecation of politics and the optimism concerning the benefits and 
capacity of science, Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship between philosophy and politics 
contains important insights for our expectations of philosophical speculation.  His description of 
man’s νούς-like capacity as two-fold, comprising not only the capacity of the philosopher to 
comprehend and grasp the most abstract, scientific truths, but also the capacity of the statesman 
to perceive and recognize the ultimate particular, seems to be a particularly relevant insight in 
today’s context.  Aristotle’s political philosophy contains a useful reminder that we must 
                                                 
7 Leo Strauss writes that “Hobbes’ break with tradition was doubtless the result of his turning to mathematics and 
natural science.”  The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis, trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago:  
The University of Chicago Press, 1936), 136. Strauss later revised his thesis and argued that Machiavelli, not 
Hobbes, was the founder of modern politics  
 
8 Hobbes lists magnanimity as a passion, rather than a virtue.  See Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 41 (ch. 6). 
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recognize the claims of what is overtly political.  As Aristotle presents it, the political sphere is 
the sphere of the particular, and it is ultimately the statesman who has the capacity to perceive 
the specifics of a particular situation, and to decide what laws are suitable for the character of the 
people and the material conditions of the polis.  The statesman thus has a hand in forming the 
values or purpose of the polis, or what the polis will esteem. 
 Aristotle’s recognition of the dignity and claims of politics, brings me to my second point 
concerning the importance of his understanding of magnanimity and friendship; the limits of the 
rule of law.  While Aristotle emphasizes that the complementary friendship between the 
philosopher and the statesman can confer great benefits on the city, particularly when such 
friendship ensures that “well-regarded laws” are implemented in the correct manner (NE 
1181a13–24), he also points out that the rule of law has certain limitations.  Indeed, as Aristotle 
presents it, law is an artifice or convention that is meant to embody—to the extent possible—the 
νούς-like capacities of the statesman and the philosopher.  However, at a number of different 
points in the Politics, Aristotle makes clear that the law is only an imitation of the correct reason 
or intellect of the statesman and the philosopher, and that the law can never fully capture either 
the intellect of the statesman or the purpose of the regime.  
 Aristotle’s recognition of the limits of the rule of law are first hinted at in the second 
book of the Politics. In a passage in which he is commenting on and critiquing previous 
contributions that have been made to the study of political science, Aristotle raises the question 
as to “whether it is harmful or advantageous for cities to change traditional laws, if some other 
one should be better” (Pol. 1268b27–29).  His principal advice is to remain cautious about 
changing the law, due to the fact that the law obtains its power from habituation and established 
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usage.  Because people obey the law out of a sense of habit that is created over a period of time, 
“the easy alteration of existing laws in favor of new and different ones weakens the power of law 
itself” (1269a20 – 22) and ought to be avoided.  As a result, Aristotle’s overall advice is to avoid 
changing the laws unnecessarily, due to the instability this would engender.   
 Nevertheless, immediately prior to his conclusion that one should avoid the unnecessary 
alteration of law, Aristotle emphasizes that progress in the law is attainable.  As evidence, he 
points to the “simple and barbaric” nature of the laws that existed in ancient times (1268b39–40).  
In fact, Aristotle even goes so far as to ridicule the “ancient ordinances [that] still remain” as 
being “altogether silly” (1269a1).  He follows this up with the observation that “in general, all 
seek not the traditional but the good” (1269a4–5).  Thus, Aristotle’s conclusion seems to be that 
while laws serve to maintain a certain stability, they are not an end in and of themselves.  While 
the law seeks to reify reason and the values or purposes of the regime, it never fully succeeds in 
doing so but remains an imperfect imitation of reason, purpose, and value. 
 This point is underscored in Book III of the Politics in a passage devoted to the topic of 
kingship.  Aristotle explicitly raises the question of whether it is better to be “ruled by the best 
man or by the best laws” (1286a9–10).  On the one hand, he notes that rule by the best man 
would seem to be more advantageous than the rule of law, as laws are limited by the very fact 
that they are framed with a view to universality.  In contrast to the rule of an enlightened 
statesman, laws are unable to take into account the particular, or situations that lie outside the 
norm.  In some circumstances, the application of a general law of justice may be unwise, and 
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perhaps even be unjust or conflicting with the purpose of the regime.9  In such situations the 
prudent statesman or the political man on the spot who is familiar with the particulars is capable 
of rendering justice that reflects the standards and values of the city in a way that the generality 
of law is unable to do.10  On the other hand, Aristotle notes that there are benefits to the rule of 
law as well.  The rule of law, in contrast to human rule, is dispassionate.  There is no fear that 
law, carried away by passion, will rule with partiality, or with its own interests in mind.  Thus, 
this section seems to reiterate Aristotle’s qualified respect for the law.  While the rule of law is 
marked by sobriety, there are some things that it simply is unable to judge well. 
 Aristotle’s observations concerning the rule of law point not only to the limits of the rule 
of law, but also to its impermanent character.  This becomes clear when we set Aristotle’s 
thoughts concerning the limits of the rule of law in relief against his famous statement made 
towards the end of Book III of the Politics concerning the individual of superlative virtue. 
Aristotle indicates that when an individual arises who is so outstanding in virtue that he is 
preeminent over all others in the city, the only natural course that remains “is for everyone to 
obey such a person gladly, so that persons of this sort will be permanent kings in their cities” 
(1284b32–34).11  Here, Aristotle suggests that in such a situation the best and most just regime 
                                                 
9 Cf. Republic 331c1–d1. 
 
10 See also, NE 1137b13 – 20: “The equitable is … a correction of the legally just.  The cause of this is that all law is 
general, but concerning some matters it is not possible to speak correctly in a general way.  In those cases then, in 
which it is necessary to speak generally, but it is not possible to do so correctly, the law takes what is for the most 
part the case, but without being ignorant of the error involved in so doing.” 
 
11 Aristotle repeats this claim again at the very end of Book III of the Politics in a discussion concerning ostracism 
(Cf. Pol. 1288a25–28). 
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would be the absolute rule by the individual of superlative virtue.  Is Aristotle’s final claim that 
the rule of law is ultimately second to the absolute rule of an enlightened statesman?    
 Scholars have struggled to make sense of Aristotle’s remarkable—albeit, brief—praise of 
absolute rule, particularly because it seems so at odds with the republican character of much of 
the rest of the Politics.  Waller Newall posits that while Aristotle recognizes the enlightened 
statesman’s claim to rule as rational and correct, he mutes this claim because it would undermine 
the claim of “the self-governing political community that is at the forefront of his political 
philosophy.”12  According to Newall, Aristotle views both monarchy and the self-governing 
political community characterized by the rule of law as being sanctioned by nature.  Newall 
avoids the obvious contradiction involved in this assertion by pointing to Aristotle’s Physics, 
where natural phenomena are “understood both in terms of spontaneous self-movement and as 
being analogous to the rational precision by which an artist produces things.”13  Newall explains 
that if we extend “this understanding of nature to political life, the natural realm of politics is 
accordingly a mixture of the self-government of political communities and the skills of 
monarchical statecraft through which prudent rulers ‘make people better.’”14  As Aristotle writes 
in Book I of the Politics, “there is in everyone by nature an impulse toward [the city].  And yet 
he who first founded one is responsible for the greatest of goods.” (Pol. 1253a30–31).  The idea 
seems to be that although the city naturally comes into being on the basis of a certain necessity, it 
                                                 
12 Waller R. Newall, Tyranny: A New Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 141. 
 
13 Ibid., 175. 
 
14 Ibid., 176. 
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is through enlightened statesmanship that the city obtains a form or purpose beyond the simple 
countering of necessity.  
 Newall’s explanation of Aristotle’s puzzling assertion in favor of absolute rule is 
congruent with my own interpretation of the Ethics.  The matter of the regime—i.e., the 
people—has the natural capacity to become virtuous, but it is up to the enlightened statesman to 
activate that capacity.  However, the question that remains is under what conditions ought the 
city embrace self-government and the rule of law, and under what conditions ought it entrust all 
power and authority to the skills of monarchical statecraft?  Aristotle remains silent about this.  
The most he states is that the city ought to entrust absolute rule to the monarch when such an 
individual’s superlative virtue becomes evident.   
 The question of when the city ought to entrust governance to an absolute monarch is 
dependent upon when the superlative virtue of an outstanding individual becomes manifest.  
Such pre-eminence will likely become evident in the rare situation in which the values and 
purpose of the regime have been forgotten.  When the regime and the people in it have forgotten 
their very purpose and the public care is utterly neglected, a statesman, with the advice of a 
philosopher, might distinguish himself and renew the city’s sense of purpose. (NE 1180a30–
b28).  Of course, as shown above, these magnanimous individuals who are capable of bestowing 
the greatest benefits on the city by giving it a sense of purpose are potentially dangerous.15  Thus, 
it may be that Aristotle chooses to devote the majority of his writings in the Politics to extolling 
the virtues of the self-governing community, while muting the claim to rule on the part of 
                                                 
15 See above at pp. 140–49. 
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individuals of superlative virtue because the situations in which absolute rule is necessary are 
rare, and the dangers that are associated with absolute rule are great.  Nevertheless, the fact that 
Aristotle merely mutes the claim of such individuals of superlative virtue rather than 
extinguishing them completely, suggests that the institutions and procedures that allow for self-
government and the rule of law are not permanent but are subject to decay. 
 Viewed from this perspective, Aristotle’s political philosophy is an endorsement of the 
rule of law with the important qualifier that law itself is neither the embodiment of reason nor the 
embodiment of the fundamental character of the regime.  At a time when there is strong belief in 
the power of the scientific administration of politics and a belief that all political problems can be 
solved by better laws, superior institutions, and more sophisticated procedures, it is useful to 
remember that law is only an approximation of the fundamental character or purpose of the 
regime.  Part of what it means to be human, according to Aristotle, is to be a political being.  
Thus, when the institutions that are meant to reflect the fundamentally political concepts of 
human existence such as purpose, value, and reason fail to do so, a significant aspect of human 
existence—we may even say the human aspect of existence—is removed as a possibility for 
man.  The attempt to resolve all problems through the use of abstract sciences and institutions 
that no longer reflect their original purpose or value is, in the end, a dehumanizing of man’s 
existence.  
 The above statements are not intended to suggest that modern liberal democracy has 
reached the point at which it is necessary to abandon self-government and the rule of law in 
favor of absolute rule.  However, Aristotle’s warnings concerning the limits and impermanence 
of the rule of law suggest that it is important to maintain a recognition of the virtue of 
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magnanimity and an awareness of what can be accomplished by the friendship of magnanimous 
individuals.  Indeed, if modern political societies lose a sense of what magnanimity is, they may 
be incapable of recognizing the magnanimous man when he is most needed.  Or, perhaps worse 
yet, the failure to recognize magnanimity may instead culminate in the public acclamation of a 
demagogue who merely appears magnanimous.  There is the very real danger—a danger that is 
particularly acute in democracies—that a demagogue, upon seizing power, is capable of 
transitioning into a dictator.  Maintaining an appreciation for the virtue of magnanimity, the 
friendship of magnanimous men, and for the magnanimous statesmen of the past avoids not only 
an excessive trust in the power and permanence of laws and institutions, but it also enables us to 
distinguish true magnanimity from its dangerous simulacrum.
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